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THE EUROPEAN SITUATION in 1815.
C H A P T E R I.
THE E UROPEAN SITUATION IN 1815.
The modern idea l  in international p o l i t i c s  
i s  the League o f  Nations. The idea of  a l l ia n c e s ,  not o f  
monarchs or o f  diplomats but of  free  nations , has i t s  
o r ig in s  much further  back than the recent war. It  has 
shown i t s e l f  in severa l  previous attempts to r e a l i s e  a state  
o f  ex is ten ce  in which nat iona l  c o n f l i c t  has g iven  way to 
co -op era t ion ,  and in which the world 's  energies have been 
devoted to un iversa l  progress .
I t  is  only  by a care fu l  research into these 
e a r l ie r  f l i g h t s  o f  idealism that we are able to understand 
the weakness and the strength ,  th e  hopes and fears ,  embodied 
in the present League. Without a r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  the 
p e r iod ica l  outcropping o f  th is  s p i r i t ,  despair or cynicism 
might e a s i l y  take the p lace  o f  the optimism o f  the years 
immediately fo l low in g  the peace o f  1919. Delays or h a l f ­
hearted intervention  in in ternational  quest ion s ,  the  d e fe c t io n  
o f  some nations and the secre t  diplomacy o f  others, 
aggravated by general mistrust and wide-spread poverty, are
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hardly e f f e c t i v e  guarantees o f  a su ccess fu l  future .  The 
Balance o f  Power theory is  now p a r t ia l l y  d is cred ited  owing 
to i t s  frequent o p p os i t ion  to  th e  nat iona l  s p i r i t ,  while 
th is  la t t e r  o f t e n  degenerates into mere des ire  for  s e l f ­
aggrandisement and aggress ive  s e l f i s h n e s s .  The chaos 
fo l low in g  on the excesses  o f  nationalism resu lted  in 
the formation o f  the League o f  Nations.
In 1815 these same excesses led to the con­
ception  o f  the Holy A l l ia n ce  as the a rb ite r  o f  Europeao 
d isputes .  I t  lacked the unify ing  f o r c e  o f  an organised 
adm inistrative  body to a c t  as a headqusirters s t a f f ,  but 
the causes o f  i t s  f a i lu r e  l i e  deep er .  The d e s ire  for  s e l f ­
aggrandisement, with i t s  accompanying cankers o f  mistrust 
and susp ic ion ,  prevented the nations from embarking on the 
sea o f  mutual con f idence  and f r a t e r n i t y .  As now, so in the 
years be fore  Waterloo. Narrow a l l ia n ce s  were adhered to ,  
l imited con ferences  were held, both expressive  o f  f o r ce s  
adverse to the r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  the ideal o f  the League o f  
Nations, o f  the Holy A i l ie a n ce ,  and o f  a l l  other p r o je c ts  
o f  a s im ilar  nature since  the Truces o f  God in the  eleventh 
and tw e l f th  cen tu r ies .
The f o r e ig n  p o l i c i e s  o f  nations a r e ,  o f  
course la ter -dependent .  Therefore  in dea l ing  with the 
a t t i tu d e  o f  the B r i t i s h  Government towards the Holy A l l ia n ce  
i t  i s  necessary to  in v e s t ig a te  b r i e f l y  the aims and ambi­
t ion s  o f  the f i r s t - c l a s s  European powers. For th is  
in v e s t ig a t io n  there i s  no b e t te r  f i e l d  than the Council 
Table o f  the Vienna Congress, Here, w ith  the react ionary  
Metternich as host ,  the diplomats o f  Europe fenced and 
fought among themselves from November 1 s t .  1814 u n t i l ,  
a f t e r  Waterloo, they moved on to  Paris where the f in a l  act 
o f  the Congress was signed on July 9th. 1815.
The matter o f  the g re a te s t  moment to the p le n i ­
p o te n t ia r ie s  was the r e - s e t t l i n g  o f  Europe, with rewards 
fo r  the v i c t o r s  and punishments f o r  the conquered. The 
guiding p r i n c i p l e s  in the re -se t t lem en t  were the d e s ire  
to r e - e s t a b l i s h  a Balance o f  Power, and the des ire  to 
r e s to re  a l l  th in gs ,  as near as p o s s ib le ,  to th e ir  p o s i t i o n  
in 1789; the f i r s t  from f e a r  o f  Revolution  and Napoleonism, 
the second as a con cess ion  to long enthroned author ity .
The ideas o f  a »Concert o f  Europe" and " le g i t im a c y “
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e f f e c t i v e l y  smothered any r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  e i th er  Nationalism 
or Democracy. This f a c t  a lone was s u f f i c i e n t  to n u l l i f y  
any idea o f  a l a s t in g  peace, and i t  caused more than s ix t y  
years o f  in te rm it ten t  r e v o l u t i o n  and war. But the f a i l u r e  
o f  the Holy A l l ia n c e  was t h e r  e su lt  rather  o f  the cu p id i ty  
and ambition o f  nat ions  which should have been " s a t i s f i e d “ 
than o f  s t ru g g l in g  n at ion a l ism .
Even b e fo r e  the “Hundred Days“ ser ious  ten­
s ion  had been occas ioned  in the Congress owing to  c o n f l i c t ­
ing op in ion s  on the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  rew ards .  England 
des ired  above a l l  e l s e  the co n s o l id a t io n  o f  her maritime 
and commercial preponderance. To assure t h i s ,  she was 
determined to  ob ta in  sanct ion  f o r  her c o l o n ia l  ex tensions ,  
and her p o l i c y  during the many c r i s e s  o f  the next decade 
was to  keep open her trade e x i t s  both in Europe and 
America. This she did reg a rd le ss  of  the e f f e c t  o f  her 
a t t i tu d e  on European r e l a t i o n s .  Another danger on the 
p o l i t i c a l  h or ia on  was the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an entente 
between Russia  and Prussia  and la te r  between Russia and 
France, This l a t t e r  country  had great  op p o r tu n it ie s  f o r  
naval and commercial development in o p p o s i t io n  to  England. 
Russia was l i k e l y  to become a menace to our Eastern
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possess ions .  Of a l l  the European monarchs and statesmen 
assembled at Vienna the Tzar, Alexander I ,  had the 
greatest  p r e s t ig e .  He b e l iev ed ,  with reason, that the 
Grand A l l ia n ce  could not have conquered without his aid .
His views were d ia m e tr ic a l ly  opposed to those o f  Austria 
and England, and he had the ruin o f  the Ottoman Empire 
be fore  his eyes.  But in one respect  he, and some of  his 
adv isers ,  were more advanced than the r e s t ;  they were 
l i b e r a l  in sentiment, w hilst  the other rep resen ta t ives  
with Metternich at th e ir  head, discouraged the democratic 
idea .  Their overwhelming des ire  for  r e a c t io n  manifested 
i t s e l f  in the immediate r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  T zar 's  ten ta t ive  
suggestion o f  a general pub l ic  law and an international 
p o l i c e ,  and the f i r e s  o f  democracy and nationalism were 
for  a time damped.
The foundation on which the •Confederation 
o f  Europe" was b u i l t ,  was la id  on March 10th .,  1814, by the 
Treaty o f  Chaumont, in which were c lauses  expressing the 
des ire  o f  th e  a l l i e s  "to  unite  the powers c loser  -  
assuring the repose  o f  Europe by the re-establishment o f
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a ju s t  equilibrium**. England had no o p t ion  but to take a 
prominent p o s i t i o n  In the  Sett lem ent.  At no period in her 
h i s t o r y  have the r e l a t i o n s  o f  Great B r i ta in  w ith  the 
Continental  Powers been more intimate than from 1815-1820. 
She had been the most constant member o f  the anti-Napoleonic  
A l l ia n c e ,  and, u n t i l  matters on the Continent became more 
s e t t l e d ,  i t  would be im possib le  f o r  her to resume an in­
sular p o l i c y ,  even i f  she wished to do so .  Even in December 
1813 C astlereagh  had stated  that England's in te r e s t  in 
European a f f a i r s  was not  to end with Napoleon's  d e fea t .
“The Treaty o f  a l l i a n c e  i s  not to terminate
the war, but i s  to  con ta in  de fens ive  engagements with
mutual o b l i g a t i o n s  to support the power attacked by
France. The casus f o e d e r i s  is  to  be an attack  by France
on the European dominions o f  any one o f  the con tra c t in g  
1
pairties. “
The bogey o f  the French Revolution  and sub­
sequent agg ress ion  was .hiding a l l  fu ture  p o s s ib le  com plica­
t io n s .  A l im ited  union with  limited o b j e c t s ,  to w5rk f o r
1. Cabinet Memorandum " B r i t i s h  Diplomacy}' 1813-1815" (C.K, 
W ebster) .  Page 123.
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the general good o f  Europe. This was the aim with which 
Castlereagh be lieved  English in te r e s t s  to be con s is ten t .
Both in the Treaty o f  Chaumont and in the la te r  Treat ies  
o f  P a r is ,  th is  a t t i tu d e  i s  maintained and i t s  hold on t  he 
mind o f  the Foreign  M in ister  i s  shown in a l e t t e r  sent 
by him to h is  lea d er ,  Lord L iverpool  in February, 1814,
"The wish o f  the Government is  to connect 
th e ir  in te r e s t s  in peace and in war w ith  those o f  the 
C on t in en t , . . . . .  and that  as now she might look forward to a 
return  to ancient p r i n c i p l e s ,  she was ready  to make 
necessary s a c r i f i c e s  on her part to reconstruct  a balance 
in Europe,*
The weight o f  R u ss ia 's  in f luence  during these 
years is o f  extreme importance, Alexander, w ith  his 
mystical  impressionable character ,  had been great ly  a f fe c ted  
by the study o f  Rousseau under the dlitector  o f  his Swiss 
tutor La Harpe. He saw him self  and his minister Czartoryski 
as the successors  o f  Henri IV and Sully  in th e i r  endeavour 
to bring perpetual peace to Europe. The burning o f  Moscow 
moved him g r e a t l y ,  but even before th is ,  in 1804, he embodied
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his idea o f  a permanent C h r is t ia n  r e p u b l i c  in his in­
s t ru c t io n s  to h is  f r i e n d  N o v o r e l t s o v o , who was Russian 
envoy on a s p e c ia l  m iss ion  t o  London. He instructed  him 
to lay  b e fo re  P i t t  the proposa ls  f o r  an A l l ia n c e ,  which was 
to r e - e s t a b l i s h  Europe in such a way that  the various govern­
ments were “ to be everywhere founded on th e  sacred r ig h ts  
o f  humanity."
But the European nations had the ir  doubts 
about the  T za r ’ s C h r is t ia n  c h a r i t y .  Like his predecessors  
he maintained a con stan t  in im ica l  a t t i t u d e  towards the 
Ottoman p eop le ,  t h e  a g e - lo n g  f o e s  o f  th e  orthodox Church. 
Even in the document sen t  to P i t t  he could not r e f r a i n  
from a l lu d in g  to  the c o r ru p t io n  and d i s in t e g r a t io n  in th e  
Turkish Empire, When the Holy A l l ia n c e  was nnde pu b l ic  
the nat ions  looked askance a t  i t  f o r  the same r e a s o n s .  To 
counteract  t h i s  f e e l i n g  Alexander published the t e x t  o f  the 
Treaty in March, 1816, and a ls o  sent an address to  the 
Sublime Porte  to  d i s s i p a t e  th e ir  m isg iv in gs .
But th i s  had l i t t l e  e f f e c t .  Europe was 
f i r m ly  convinced  that  the Tzar had a d e ^ l a i d  scheme o f  
r e c o n s t r u c t in g  Europe and o f  taking over the supremacy 
la id  down by Napoleon,
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C H A P T E R I I .
THE TREATY OF THE HOLT ALLIANCE.
CHAPTER I I
THE TREATY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE
Cn the  26th .  o f  September, 1815, the 
Emperor A lexander ,  at a g rea t  rev iew  o f  the A l l i e d  troops  
on th e  Vertus p la in  near Chalons, made the f i r s t  pub lic  
announcement o f  the  Holy A l l i a n c e .  The idea had been in ­
sp ired  in h is  im p ress ion a b le  mind by a c e r t a in  Madame de 
Krudener, who, a f t e r " une heunesse une peu l e g e r e !?was 
sm it tm b y  a r e l i g i o u s  f e r v o u r .  Alexander, f o r  a b r i e f  
moment was the a r b i t e r  o f  Europe, His p i e t y  was s in c e r e .  
Always he had held war in h o r r o r ,  and the d e s o la t io n  o f  
Moscow had burned i t s e l f  in to  h is  im agination .  He had been 
commissioned by God to re s cu e  Europe from s t r i f e ,  and the 
d e s t r u c t io n  o f  the Russian c a p i t a l  had been a warning o f  
h is  la s t  o p p o r t u n i t y .  He was now determined to persuade 
Europe to r e c o g n i s e  the k in sh ip  o f  mankind. His remaining 
years were to be spent in the  s e r v i c e  o f  C h r i s t ia n i t y  
and in g i v in g  to th e  world a durable  peace .
His weak nature had been impressed by a 
s e r i e s  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  enthusiasms from t h e  f i r s t .  His 
tu to r ,  La Harpe, had in s tru c ted  him in Rousseau 's  d o c t r in e s ;
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T r a d i t io a s  o f  R uss ian  a u to c r a c y  were in txis b lo o d .  From 
the tu rm o il  o f  th ese  two i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  ideas  he turned 
to  r e l i g i o u s  m ystic ism  and t  he b e l i e f  th a t  he was s e t  
apart to calm the world* s u n re s t .  This f i r s t  appears in  
h is  p r o p o s i t i o n  to  P i t t  in  1804. At Vienna he had ten ta ­
t i v e l y  proposed an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  European p o l i c e .  And 
now, the main items o f  the Treaty  having been drawn up, 
and the s o v e r e ig n s  and statesmen being ready  t o  depart 
from P a r is . , ,  th e  Tzar thought the moment p r o p i t i o u s  f o r  
advancing h is  scheme in  o rd er  to make the understanding 
between the Great  Powers a permanent s e c u r i t y  f o r  peace .
I t s  f i n a l  fo rm  was as f o l l o w s ; -
"ACT OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE*
"In the Name o f  the Most Holy and I n d i v i s i b l e  T r in i t y .
" T h e ir  M a je s t i e s  the Emperor o f  A u s tr ia ,  the
"king o f  P r u s s ia ,  and the Emperor o f  R ussia ,  having, in c o n -  
"sequence o f  t h e  g r e a t  events  which have marked the course  
" o f  the th ree  l a s t  y ea rs  o f  Europe, and e s p e c i a l l y  o f  the 
" b l e s s in g s  which i t  has p lea sed  D iv ine  Providence  to  shower 
"down upon t h o s e  S ta te s  which p la c e  th e i r  co n f id e n ce  and 
"hope in i t  a l o n e ,  acqu ired  the intim ate c o n v i c t i o n  o f  the 
" n e c e s i i t y  o f  s e t t l i n g  the s t e p s  to  be observed by the 
"powers, in t h e i r  r e c i p r o c a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  upon the sublime 
"truths  which the  Holy  R e l i g i o n  o f  our Saviour tea ch es .
" They solemnly  d e c la r e  that  th e  present A ct  has
- 1 0 -
"no other o b j e c t  than to p u b l ish ,  in the fa ce  o f  the whole 
"world, th e ir  f ix e d  r e s o l u t i o n ,  both in the adm inistration  
"o f  th e ir  r e s p e c t i v e  s t a t e s ,  and in t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a -  
" t ion s  with every  o ther  Government, to  take  fo r  th e ir  so le  
"guide the p recep ts  o f  that  Holy R e l i g i o n ,  namely, the 
"precepts o f  J u s t i c e ,  C h r is t ia n  Charity  and Peace, which, 
" far  from being  a p p l i c a b le  on ly  to p r iva te  concerns, must 
"have an immediate in f lu e n c e  upon the C ouncils  o f  P r inces ,  
"and guide a l l  t h e i r  s teps  as being the on ly  means o f  
" c o n s o l id a t in g  human i n s t i t u t i o n s  and remedying th e ir  im- 
" p e r f e c t i o n s .  In consequence, t h e i r  M a jes t ie s  have agreed 
"on th e  f o l l o w in g  a r t i c l e s ; ­
" Art I . P r i n c i p l e s  o f  the C h r is t ia n  R e l i g i o n .
" Conformably to the words o f  the Holy S cr ip tu res
"which command a l l  men to cons ider  each other as brethren, 
"the Three c o n t r a c t in g  Monarchs w i l l  remain united by the 
“bonds o f  a true  and in d i s s o lu b le  f r a t e r n i t y ,  and consider-  
" ing  each o th er  as f e l l o w  countrymen, th ey  w i l l ,  on a l l  
"o c ca s ion s  and in a l l  p la c e s ,  lend each other aid and 
"a s s is ta n c e ;  and, reg a rd in g  themselves towards th e ir  sub-  
" j e c t s  and armies as f a t h e r s  towards f a m i l i e s ,  they w i l l  
"lead them, in the same s p i r i t  o f  f r a t e r n i t y  with whidh 
"they  are animated, t o  p r o t e c t  R e l ig io n ,  Peace and J u s t ice ,
■ Art I I . F r a t e r n i ty  and A f f e c t i o n .
" In consequence the s o le  p r in c ip l e  o f  f o r c e ,
"whether between Governments or between t h e i r  S u b jec ts ,  
" s h a l l  be that  o f  doing  each other r e c i p r o c a l  s e r v i c e ,  and 
" o f  t e s t i f y i n g  by u n a lte ra b le  g ood w il l  the mutual a f f e c t i o n  
"with which th ey  ought to be animated, t o  consider  them- 
"s e lv e s  a l l  as one and the ' : ' same C hrist ian
"nat ion ,  the Three a l l i e d  powers look ing  on themselves as 
"merely de legated  by Providence  to govern three Branches 
"o f  one fa m i ly ,  namely, A u s tr ia ,  P russ ia ,  and Russia ,  thus 
" c on fess in g  t h a t , t h e  C h r is t ia n  world, o f  which th ey  and 
" th e ir  people  form a p a rt ,  has in r e a l i t y  no other Sovere ign  
"than Him to  whom a lone power r e a l l y  be lon gs ,  because in
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"him alone are found a l l  the treasures  o f  l o v e ,  s c ie n c e  
"and i n f i n i t e  wisdom, that  i s  to say God, our Divine 
"Saviour, the Word o f  the  Most High, t h e  Word o f  L i f e .  
"Their M a je s t ie s  con sequ en tly  recommend to th e ir  peop les ,  
"with the most tender s o l i c i t u d e ,  as the so le  means o f  
"en joy ing  that  Peace which a r i s e s  from a good conscience 
"and which a lone i s  d u rab le ,  to  strengthen themselves 
"every day more and mere in t h e  p r in c ip l e s  and e x e rc is e  
"o f  the d u t ie s  which t h e  D iv ine  Saviour has taught to man­
kind .
Art I I I . A cc e s s io n  o f  Foreign Powers.
* A i l  the Powers who s h a l l  choose  solemnly t o
"avow the sacred p r i n c i p l e s  which have d ic ta ted  the present 
■Act and s h a l l  acknowledge how important i t  Is f o r  the 
■happiness o f  n a t io n s ,  too  long  a g i ta te d ,  that  these truths 
"should h en ce for th  e x e r c i s e  over the d e s t i n i e s  o f  mankind 
" a l l  t h e  in f lu e n c e  which belongs to them, w i l l  be r e ce iv ed  
"with equal ardour and a f f e c t i o n  in to  th is  Holy A l l ia n c e .
(S igned)  F ran c is .
F red er ick  William.
• A lexander ."  1
There i s  no doubt that Alexander was a bso lu te ­
l y  s in cere  in h is  d e s i r e  f o r  in te r n a t io n a l  f r ie n d s h ip  and 
fo r  l i b e r a l  re fo rm s .  The s u s p ic io n  with which the  proposa l  
was greeted by the governments and peop les  were, a t  the 
time, g r o u n d le s s .  Both the P o l i s h  and Ottoman questions 
were stored  away in another corner o f  h is  i l l -b a la n c e d  brain,
l."Map o f  Europe by Treaty" K e r t s l e t ,  V o l ,  I .  Wo. 36. p a ge ,317
t t / ‘  I  /  ^  ^  ^* ’’
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National aggrandisement in  th ese  quarters was perm iss ib le ,  
i f  he could s a t i s f y  h is  con sc ien ce  that the r e s u l t  would 
be b e n e f i c i a l  to  the peace o f  Europe,
F re d e r ick  William o f  Prussia  and the Emperor 
Francis  had both  added th e ir  names to t h e  document pr ior  to 
i t s  being made p u b l i c .  The fo rm er , "p io u s ly  simple" ,  
trusted  the Tzar i m p l i c i t l y .  The l a t t e r  fo l low ed M ettern ich ’ s 
advice  and humoured A lexa n d er 's  madness. A l l  the  European 
monarchs w ith  t h e  ex cep t ion  o f  the Sultan, ominous dmissiom, 
were inv ited  to  accede to  th is  Treaty. A l l ,  save the 
Pr ince  Regent o f  England and the Pope, accepted the in v i ta ­
t i o n .  The m a jo r i ty  signed in 1815, the Netherlands and 
Wurtemburg in 1816, Saxony, Switzerland and the Hanse towns 
in 1317.
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C H A P T E R  III.
THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN 
FROM 1815 to AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.
CHAPTER I I I .
the attitude  op great BRITAIN FROM 1815 to AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.
The dominating f ig u r e  in B r i t i s h  po lv t io^  at 
th is  time was the F ore ign  M in is te r ,  Castlereagh, Lord 
L iv e rp o o l ,  the Prime M in is te r ,  was a man o f  mediocre 
q u a l i t i e s  who seldom overru led  his more i l l u s t r i o u s  
c o l le a g u e .  The monarchy was no longer a potent p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e ,  George I I I  having become peremanently insane in 
1810. His son George, Pr ince  of  Wales, was regent .
The Government o f  Great B r i ta in  was much 
further advanced a long c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l in e s  than that  o f  
any other European s t a t e .  In theory  the king was s t i l l  
the head o f  the Government, t h e  appointer o f  judges, holding 
the r ig h t  o f  making war, peace and t r e a t i e s .  In p ra c t ice  
none o f  these  powers was ex erc ised  by the ru ler  person a l ly .  
Every p o l i t i c a l  a c t  ordered by the king had to  be ordered 
through a m in is te r  who assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i t .  The 
king thus y ie ld e d  c o n t r o l  t o  the  Cabinet, which, by th is  
time, was composed o f  Hhe Party which held a m ajority  in
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th.6 Commoas* From 1733 — 1330 the Tory Party held th is  
m a jor ity .  They were e le c te d  to power by an a r i s t o c r a t i c  
o l ig a rch y ,  the on ly  en franchised  part o f  the nation ,  anh 
the part the l e a s t  in f lu en ced  by any change in public  
op in ion .  This r e s t r i c t e d  f r a n c h i s e ,  th e  "pocket" and • 
"ro t ten "  boroughs, the a l l -p o w e r fu l  system o f  br ibery ,  
a l l  conduced to  keep any Government in power. The landed 
c la s s e s  were s e t t l i n g  down again, a f t e r  the holocaust o f  
the war, t o  a serene p o l i t i c a l  domination. The Industr ia l  
Revolution  had not yet  had any e f f e c t  on the co n s t i tu t io n  
o f  the country .  T h ere fore ,  although far  removed from the 
despotism o f  Eastern Europe, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the p o l i c y  
o f  England, a t  home and abroad, lay c h i e f l y  with the  Prime 
Minister and the Foreign  S ecre tary .
L iv e rp o o l  was never in the  f r o n t  rank o f  
English  Statesmen, but he was a c a r e f u l  and e f f i c i e n t  
administrator with a great  c a p a c i t y  f o r  holding together 
a party in danger o f  d is r u p t io n .  The Earl o f  Eldon was 
Lord C hance l lor ,  a f r i e n d  o f  George I I I  and the Regent, and 
a stern, u n y ie ld in g  Tory, who would countenance neither 
dompromise nor re form ,
Casthelreagh was incomparably a more able
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m inister ,  and a more in t e r e s t in g  p e rso n a l i ty  than any o f  
h is  c o l le a g u e s .  He has su f fe red  g re a t ly  at the hands o f  
the p o l i t i c a l  s a t i r i s t s  and h is to r ia n s  o f  the f i r s t  half  
o f  the century, by whom he was considered the arch-enemy 
o f  freedom. This was p a r t ly  due to th e  f a c t  that he was 
looked upon as the E nglish  rep resen ta t ive  o f  th e  Holy 
A l l ia n ce  and a l l  i t s  works, and p a r t ly  to his en t ire  lack 
o f  personal charm. But even his most ardent c r i t i c s  were 
s i len ced  by h is  masterly  handling o f  a f f a i r s  at Vienna, 
and when he returned to  London in 1814, the whole House 
rose  to welcome him. But th is  triumph was his la s t .  The 
necessary o b s c u r i t y  o f  d ip lom atic  tran sa ct ion s  make no 
appeal to the popular imagination, nor do the q u a l i t ie s  o f  
a d ip lo m a t is t .  He was a man o f  no enthusiasms, and in 
Parliament h is  d ig n i ty  and c u l tu r e ,  so valuable in the 
European con g resses ,  c o u ld  not rep lace  his  lack o f  ora tory .  
His mixed metaphors were a by-word In Parliament, and h is  
bald and ungrace fu l  soeeches were not atoned f o r  by any 
con v ersa t ion a l  a b i l i t y .  He had no romance about him, no 
warm sympathy or  i d e a l i s t i c  fervour ,  and because o f  th is  
he was a lon e ,  without a personal f o l lo w in g  to support him
(
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during tiis c a r e e r ,  or to fo l l o w  up his  p o l i c y  afterwards. 
His so le  merit  and s t r e n g t h  lay  in his statesmanship, 
and u n t i l  Napoleon was s a f e ly  in St.Helena, the nation 
looked to him as to a p i l o t  during a storm. But a fte r  
1815, h is p o p u la r i ty  s t e a d i ly  waned. His in t e l l e c t u a l  
temper, and well  balanced judgment now seemed to be a 
c loak  h iding a dead ly  zea l  against the l i b e r t i e s  o f  man­
kind. The b ig o t s  o f  the  age could not b e l ie v e  a man to be 
void o f  p r e ju d i c e ,  and the lack  at ardour in his character  
and declamation in h is  speeches was looked upon as a pose. 
His stumbling b lo c k  was that he was too reasonable .
The f i r s t  intim ation  r e c e iv e d  in England o f  
the ex is ten ce  o f  the Holy A l l ia n c e  Treaty, was a l e t t e r  
sent from P a r is  on September 20th, 1815, to the "Prince 
Regent o f  Oreat B r i t a i n ” , by the Sovereigns o f  Austria , 
Prussia and Russia .
"S ir ,  Our Brother and C o u s in ; -  The events which have 
"desolated the world f o r  the l a s t  twenty years have convinced 
us that the on ly  means o f  a rres t in g  them is to be found in 
“ the l o y a le s t  and most intimate union between th e  Sovereigns 
•whom Divine Providence has placed at the head o f  the nations 
" o f  E u rop e , . . .but in order to  assure  to t h i s  bond the s o l i d -  
" I ty  which the grandeur, and the p u r ity ,  o f  the aim to 
"which it leads  im periously  demand, we have thought i t  
"should be founded on th e  sacred p r in c ip le s  o f  the C h r is t -  
"ian R e l ig i o n ,
(S igned)  Franco is ,
Frederick-Guillaume,
Alexander. 1
l."Map o f  Europe by Treaty" (H e r ts le t )  Vol .  I .  No. 3Ô.
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This p la u s ib le  appeal to the Pt ince  
Regent h im se l f ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Eastern European auto-  
earcy ,  and his  personal  a t t i tu d e  towards i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  determine, and has l i t t l e  bearing on B r i t i s h  p o l i c y .
The sentiments expressed in his  o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r s  are, 
n a tu ra l ly ,  l a r g e ly  due to o f f i c i a l  in f lu e n ce .  However, 
taking into  c o n s id e r a t io n  the lack o f  n o b i l i t y  in the 
Regent*s ch a ra c te r ,  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i tu a t io n ,  and 
the r e l a t i v e  p r e s t ig e  o f  England, Russia and Alexander, 
a f a i r l y  r e l i a b l e  c o n c lu s io n  may be drawn. Ke was ce r ­
ta in ly  not o f  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  exalted and i d e a l i s t i c  nature 
to appreciate  the r e l i g i o u s  fervour o f  the Tzar, but he was 
f la t t e r e d  by the i n v i t a t i o n .  I t  came from three  sover­
e ig n s ,  the personal  in f lu en ce  o f  each of whom was much 
greater  than that o f  the King or Regent o f  England, and 
whose kingdoms, bound together  by th is  A l l ia n c e ,  would form 
a con s id erab le  combination in peace or war.
The o n ly  p r iv a te  l e t t e r  o f  the Regent r e fe r r in g  
to th is  matter,  i s  one w r it ten  t o  the Tzar in May o f  the 
f o l lo w in g  year ,  1816, This was enclosed with an o f f i c i a l  
rep ly  to A lex a n d er 's  overture  f o r  a c l o s e r  co -op era t ion
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between England and Russia in matters o f  European p o l i c y : ­
" I am anxious to accompany the o f f i c i a l  answer
"which your Imperial Majesty m i l l  r e c e i v e  to the ov er tu re .........
"with the Personal Assurance o f  my unalterable  determina- 
" t ion  to combine my e x e r t io n s  with those o f  your Imperial 
"Majesty to secure f o r  the world the B less ings  o f  a las t ing
pea ce ......... W hilst I r e j o i c e  to  observe that your Imperial
"Majesty i s  prepared to  found what yet  o f  Glory i t  remains 
" f o r  your Imperial Majesty to acquire ,  upon the r e - e s t a b l i s h -  
"ment o f  morals, and upon the Consolidation  o f  Peace, I
“d e s i r e  no prouder ta sk  than t o  co -operate  with your Imperial
1
Majesty in t h i s  great  work,**
There i s  something akin to s e r v i l i t y  in th i s  
L etter .  Anxiety  to a l la y  any misunderstanding with Russia 
which the luke-warm character  o f  the o f f i c i a l  rep ly  to 
these p a r t i c u la r  overtures  might have caused. The sympathy 
o f  a r e s t r i c t e d  ru ler  with a f e l l o w  monarch having unlimited 
power, overcame state  in t e r e s t ,  in p r iv a te .  Fortunately  
th is  sentimental leaning o f  the Regent was quite  compatible
1, P ub lic  Record O f f i c e s .  Foreign O f f i c e  Archives.  65 i^Russia) 
101. Mo, 6 . .
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with Castiereagh^B p o l i c y  o f  f l a t t e r i n g  Alexander into  
a f r i e n d ly  s t a te  o f  mind.
However, in 1815 the R egen t 's  r e p ly  depended 
upon the a d v ice  o f  h is  M in i s t e r s . ,  And h is  m inisters  
remembered that they had to  meet the assembled Houses 
o f  Parliament ere long ,  and g ive  an a ccou n t  o f  th e ir  
n e g o t ia t io n s .  Caution th e re fo re  was necessary .  The 
a r i s t o c r a c y  and gentry  o f  the e le c t o r a t e  had never been 
p a r t i c u la r ly  p a r t i a l  to  prolonged in te r fe re n ce  in con­
t in e n ta l  m atters .  The m in istry  might frame the rep ly  in 
whatever manner they w ished , but they must be able to 
j u s t i f y  th e ir  a c t io n s  on th e  grounds o f  expediency . 
Throughout the war f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  had c o r r e c t l y  interpreted 
nat iona l  sentiment. L i f e  and independence had been to r th  
any s a c r i f i c e ,  and the lower c la s s e s ,  ignoring  th e ir  
m iser ies  and deg ra d a t ion s ,  had f u l l y  supported the ir  
a r i s t o c r a t i c  l e a d e r s .
But the fe a r  o f  rev o lu t ion  haunted th is  
ru l in g  c l a s s  with an amazing p e r s is te n c e ,  and by ex cess ive  
measures o f  r e p r e s s io n  th ey  were endeavouring to crush 
a c la s s  a lready  dragged down to the s ta rv a t io n  l in e  by 
corn laws, e n c lo su r e s ,  and f a c t o r y  co n d it io n s .  In 1815
-S O -
a t e r r i f i c  optimism had taken hold o f  the whole country 
as trade  and industry  revived  with am unlooked fo r  vigour*
By the beginning o f  1816 the in ev ita b le  a f t e r ­
math o f  the war had s e t  in .  Commerce was at a s t a n d s t i l l .  
Scandalous wages were pa id .  Thousands were unemployed, 
and bread rose  to an unprecedented p r i c e .  This degradation 
o f  the working c la s s e s  roused a strong f e e l i n g  of  resentment 
against the party  in Power, The Whigs, taking the opportun­
i t y  of  blending humanity with party p o l i t i c s ,  wished to 
condemn Castlereagh as an opponent of  popular r ights  and 
an enemy to freedom. Brougham, one o f  th e ir  ablest  spokes­
man, se ized  upon the Holy A l l ia n ce  Treaty as a means of 
exposure. When Parliament met he moved fo r  a copy o f  
the Treaty t o  be placed be fore  the House, He declared  
that i t  was a convention f o r  the ensla ving o f  maaakind under 
the mask o f  p i e t y  and r e l i g i o n ,  Castlereagh, without 
denying i t s  e x is te n c e ,  was able to d ec la re  that the Prince 
Regent had not signed i t , " a s  the form of  the B r i t i s h  
C onstitu t ion  prevented him from acceding to i t " . ^  Brougham's 
motion was de fea ted ,  but i t  had s u f f i c i e n t  support to in -
1, Parliamentary Debates. Vo 1.XXXII, Pages 350-3.
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d ic a te  what would have happened had the "form o f  the 
B r i t i s h  Constitution** not been observed.
This o p p o s i t i o n  to  the Holy A l l ia n c e ,  with 
i t s  " in t e n t io n  o f  en s la v in g  mankind**, found i t s  roo t  in 
antipathy to  the Tzar and h is  Empire, Russia was powerful. 
Since the time o f  Ivan I I I  she had been expanding and 
c o n s o l id a t in g ,  and, ex cep t in g  the Time o f  Troubles,  she 
had had no s e r io u s  s e t -b a c k .
Peter the Great had turned her a s p ir a t io n s  
westward, and had caused tremors in t h e  hearts o f  European 
n a t ion s .  Now Alexander had acquired the premier place  
amongst European so v e re ig n s ,  and the Western Napoleon 
having been overthrown, what wonder that men paused, f e a r ­
ing to take a step which might r a i s e  up an Eastern successor 
to the e x i l e  at S t ,H elena ,  At the f i r s t  P ar is  Conference 
his  haughty demand f o r  a recon structed  Kingdom o f  Poland, 
under h is  own so v e re ig n ty ,  caused a s e c r e t  a l l ia n c e  between 
B r i ta in ,  Prance and A ustr ia  in January 1815, His triumphal 
entry  into P a r i s ,  and h is  r e c e p t io n  there  as the guardian 
o f  French l i b e r t i e s  aga inst  Prussian v in d ic t iv e n e s s ,  
occasioned the alarm o f  the English Ambassador, S ir  Charles 
Stewart. With a nightmare v is io n  o f  the Tzar at the head
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of  a Franco-Russian A l l ia n c e  with Jacobinism, Stewart 
wrote to B athu rst ,  and, in answer, Castlereagh hurried to 
Paris  with h is  remedy. Alexander must be "grouped".
Here we have the l o g i c a l  outcome o f  h is f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .
Not n a t io n a l i t y  or democracy; these were almost unknown 
to  him as p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s .  But peace in Europe by means 
o f  the Balance o f  Power, And the "grouping* o f  Alexander 
was the very v i t a l  adjustment necessary  at the moment and, 
indeed, up to  the Crimean war.
With th e s e  adverse in f lu en ces  at work, the 
r e c e p t io n  o f  the announcement o f  the Holy A l l ia n ce  in 
England could not be anything but c o o l .  A great  dea l  o f  
c a p i t a l  was now in the  hands o f  the manufacturers, who 
were s t i l l  unen franch ised .  The Whigs, eager f o r  con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  re fo rm ,  were amongst the f i r s t  to show th e ir  
su sp ic ion  o f  any such proposa l  from th e  Russian autocrat .  
They, w ith  Brougham, regarded the A l l ia n ce  as a conspiracy 
o f  despots aga in st  the L i b e r t i e s  o f  Christendom, a confedera­
t i o n  o f  r e a c t i o n a r i e s  ready to  in t e r f e r e  in the in ternal  
concerns o f  any European State  attempting to secure p o l i t i c a l  
freedom. B es ides  t h i s  f e a r  there was one which possessed 
both Whigs and T or ie s  al ike ,  the fear that Russia intended
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to use the Hoiy A l l ia n ce  to sweep the Ottoman Empire out 
of  Europe. For cen tu r ies  the Slavonic  converts  to Greek 
Orthodoxy had turned envious eyes towards the a l i e n  in­
habitants o f  the home o f  th e ir  r e l i g i o n  on the  shores o f  
the Bosphorus. Since the beginning o f  her d e c l in e ,  Turkey 
had been held in a constant s tate  of  f e a r  by th e  menaces 
o f  succeeding Russian monarchs. By some, portions o f  her 
t e r r i t o r y  had been wrested from her, by others she had 
been merely t e r r o r i s e d .  But to  Europe t h i s  anti-Turkish 
p o l i c y  seemed to be inseparable  from the very ex istence 
o f  Russia, and Alexander, inspired both by his temporary 
zea l  fo r  the progress  o f  Christendom and his more permanent 
zea l  f o r  the progress  o f  Russia ,  apparently was aiming 
at the adm in istrat ion  of  the coup-de-grace to th is  pariah 
nation in his most C h r is t ia n  con t inent .  In the dismember­
ment o f  Turkey the r e s t  o f  Europe saw on ly  the addit ion  
o f  Power in ' ’Russia .  Jealous o f  her newly won supremacy in 
India, England presented a united f r o n t  o f  both Whigs and 
Tories in her m istrust o f  th is  menace a cross  her route 
to the East.
The r e p ly  was sent to Alexander on October 
6th. The o p in io n  o f  Castlereagh, as Foreign M inister ,  was
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the most i n f l u e n t i a l  in determining the tone o f  the 
o f f i c i a l  n o te .  L iv e rp o o l  was neither  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
capable nor s e l f - a s s e r t i v e  to  o r ig in a te  a p o l i c y ,  but he 
was p u n c t i l i o u s  in  the observance o f  the  forms o f  the 
B r i t i s h  C o n s t i tu t io n .
C a s t le r e a g h 's  advice  was g iven  in his 
o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r  to the Prime M inister  enclosed with the 
" l e t t e r  autographe" from the three sovere igns  to the 
Prince Regent, -
" P r in ce  M ettern ich ........... communicated to me in
"conf idence  the d i f f i c u l t y  in which the Emperor o f  Austria 
" f e l t  h im self  to be p la ce d ;  that he f e l t  great  repugnance 
"to  be a party  to such an a c t ,  and yet  mas apprehensive o f  
" re fu s in g  h im self  to the Emperor's a p p l i c a t io n ;  that i t  mas 
" c le a r  that h is  mind was a f f e c t e d ;  that  peace and goodwill  
engrossed h is  t h o u g h t s . . a n d  that  he was un­
thwart him in a conception which, how^ever wild, 
him and the r e s t  o f  the world much trouble  so 
should l a s t .
"at  present 





" Foresee ing  the awkwardness o f  th is  p iece  o f
"sublime mysticism and nonsense, e s p e c i a l l y  to a B r i t i s h  
"Sovereign, I examined with  Prince Metternich every 
" p r a c t i c a l  expedient to s t o p  i t .
" I ventured to express to the Emperor my s a t i s -
" fa c t i o n  that  the sovere igns  had not given to th is  in -  
"strument an o f f i c i a l  ch a ra cter ;  that  th is  might have 
"rendered i t s  product ion  as a s ta te  document necessary;
"that i t  was b e t te r  i t  should pass as an autograph coramunica- 
" t ion  between Sovereign  and Sovereign, binding upon t heir
"own c o n s c i e n c e s ......... than that i t  äi ould be exposed to
"public  d is c u s s io n  as an act  advised by th e ir  m in i s t e r s . . .
" Upon the whole th is  is  what may be ca l led  a
"scrape, and y e t ,  in the  long run, i t  may be attended with
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"more b e n e f i c i a i  r e s u l t s  than many of  the acts  7;hich are
"in  p r o g r e s s ................ The f a c t  i s ,  that the Emperor's mind
" i s  not com p le te ly  sound* Last year there  was but too 
"much reason  to  f e a r  that  i t s  impulse vxjuld be to con -  
"ciuest and dom in ion . The general b e l i e f  now i s ,  that  
"he i s  d isposed  to found his  own g lo ry  upon a p r in c ip le  
■'of peace and ben ev o len ce .  S ince the p o in t  o f  Poland was 
"disposed o f ,  there  has been nothing in h is  p o l i t i c a l  
"conduct in the p rogress  o f  arrangements v;hich indicated 
"another purpose and he r e a l l y  appears to be in earnest.  
" I t  i s ,  at a l l  e v en ts ,  wise to  p r o f i t  by th is  d i s p o s i t i o n
"as f a r  as i t  w i l l  ca rry  u s ......... I am d e s i r e d  by the
"Emperor o f  A u s tr ia ,  through M etternich , to express 
“ h is  earnest  hope that the Prince w i l l  not r e fu s e  him- 
" s e l f  to th is  o v e r tu r e ,  however much he may f e e l  w ith  him 
"the embarrassment o f  the p r o c e e d i n g . , M y  own opinion 
"very  much concurs  w ith  that  o f  His Im perial  M a je s t y , . . ,  
"I think no person w i l l  blame the Prince f o r  not re fus ing  
"h im self  to a p r o p o s i t i o n  so made to him where the 
" o b je c t i o n  l i e s  ra ther  aga inst  the e x c e s s iv e  ex ce l len ce  
“ than the q u a l i t y  and nature o f  the engagement, but feien 
"I think the Pr ince  must take i t  upon h im self  and s ig n  
" i t  without the in te rv e n t io n  o f  his m in i s t e r s . . . .  to 
"d e c l in e  doing  so might produce very unpleasant con-  
" se q u e n ce s . " 1
I t  i s  necessary  to  examine th is  l e t t e r  
c l o s e l y  as the o p in io n  expressed in i t  remains f a i r l y  
s ta b le  u n t i l  1818. The f i r s t  thing to be noted i s  the 
unanimity and lack  o f  reserve  between England and Austria, 
At Vienna C astlereagh  and M etternich had acquired a con­
s id era b le  r e s p e c t  f o r  each o t h e r ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  There
1. W e l l in g to n 's  Supplementary Despatches. Voi ,  XI. Page 
175 , Sept .  28th.
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is  no doubt that  C ast lerea gh  r e a l i s e d  the d u p l i c i t y  o f  
the Austrian  m in is t e r ,  and he a ls o  kept in mind the 
narrowness o f  h is  v iew s,  but he a lso  knew that he was the 
only  other capable  diplom at amongst the A l l i e s .  Besides 
t h i s ,  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  A u str ia  and England lay  along the 
same l in e s  o f  p o l i c y .  In trade Russia was a r i v a l  to  
England, e s p e c i a l l y  in the Mediterranean. Her t e r r i t o r i a l  
expansion at the Ottoman expense in the Danubian Prin­
c i p a l i t i e s  would be a menace to A ustr ia .  Any further 
d isturbance  in France might end in a F ran co^ u ss ian  
a l l i a n c e ,  and se t  a l l  Europe by the ears .  This would 
ne ither  su it  England’ s d e s i r e  for  increased trade and 
c o l o n i a l  expansion, nor would i t  forward the asp ira t ions  
o f  Austria  in th e  German C onfederation .  Very soon 
Castlereagh was to f in d  dangers in t h i s  understanding 
which he had d i f f i c u l t y  in a v o id in g ,  but f o r  the moment 
unanimity was complete.
The second item o f  importance to be deduced 
from th e  l e t t e r  i s  C a s t ie rea g h 's  opin ion  o f  Alexander.
He had not l o s t  the o p p o r tu n i t ie s  a fforded  by th e  con­
feren ce  o f  Vienna and P a r is  o f  studying the character and 
motives o f  the Tzar. At the former Congress, where each
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statesman eyed h is  f e l l o w  p len ipoteatie ir ies  with suspicion, 
the English Foreign M in is ter ,  and also  Metternich, soon 
discovered the n a t ion a l  ambitions of  Alexander. His altruism 
was s t i l l  d i lu ted  by the idea o f  Empire expansion, rek ind led  
by the s h o r t - l iv e d  a l l ia n c e  with Napoleon. In any case 
the th eor ie s  o f  leg it im a cy  and the Balance of  Power l e f t  
no scope f o r  i d e a l i s t i c  experiments. Had the Tzar brought 
forward his p r o je c t  at Vienna, any sympathy would have 
been n u l l i f i e d  by his a t t i tu d e  towards the Polish  Question, 
and his r e fu s a l  to consider any a r t i c l e  to guarantee the 
independence o f  Turkey. The only step made in the 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  a Confederation  was his suggestion o f  a 
system o f  general  p u b l ic  law and an international  p o l i c e ,  
but Castlereagh was instrumental in the  r e je c t i o n  o f  this  
plan, "I  agree with you ,"  he wrote to L iv e rp o o l , '=that 
our in te re s ts  are with Austria  and Prussia rather than with 
Russia."^  The in te r fe re n ce  o f  a Russian p o l i c e  in the  
a f f a i r s  o f  the Mediterranean peninsulas would have been 
almost as ser iou s  a blow to English commercial development
1. Memoirs and Correspondence o f  Viscount Castlereagh. 
V o l .  X. Page 4S4.
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and naval supremacy in  that  reg ion ,  a s t he Russian ac­
q u i s i t i o n  o f  Turkey mould have been a set  back to our 
Power in India .
In PariS; the atmosphere cleared somewhat. 
Alexander ’ s "impulse to conquest and dominion" was submerged 
in h is  d i s p o s i t i o n  to  found his own g lo ry  upon a "pr in c ip le  
o f  peace and benevo len ce" .  The d ip lom at is ts  soon r e a l i s e d  
his  cnange o f  a t t i t u d e .  For the present he was not to 
be feared but to be regarded with an amused contempt,
"the Emperor’ s mind i s  not completely  sound". But this  
contempt had to be tempered by the knowledge that Russia 
was s t i l l ,  to  a l l  in ten ts  and purposes, omnipotent in t he 
Councils  o f  Europe, and that unscrupulous aggression might 
e a s i l y  be su b st i tu ted  f o r  benign to le ra n ce .^
But though Castlereagh and Metternich, from 
th e ir  personal con ta ct  with Alexander, could appreciate 
the s i n c e r i t y  o f  h is  c o n v i c t i o n ,  i t  was obvious that the 
nations at la rg e  vsould look  a t  the matter in a d i f f e r e n t  
l i g h t .  The power o f  an autocra t  was a vague quantity
1. W el l in gton 's  Supplementary Despatches. XI. 175.
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to the c o 'n s t i t u t i o n a l ly  ea lightened  people o f  England, 
where the whim o f  a k ing  would have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on 
nat iona l  p o l i c y .  Even then, i f  the Tzar had become a 
victim  to  r e l i g i o u s  mania, which was very much doubted, 
how could t h i s  p u r i f y  th e  m i l i ta n t  energ ies  o f  a whole 
nation? There was l i t t l e  doubt as to the re c e p t io n  
which the Holy A l l ia n c e  Treaty would r e c e iv e  from the 
Commons. The s a f e s t  course  would be to avoid parliamentary 
d is cu ss io n  on the  matter. There would be ser ious  opposi­
t i o n ,  i f  not complete r e j e c t i o n ,  and they"might produce 
very unpleasant consequences" .  The peace o f  Europe was 
too much in the hands o f  the Tzar, and h is  f r i e n d s  were 
too s tron g ,  t o  a llow  t h e  r i s k  o f  d is tu rb in g  his unstable 
mind. The problem a t  hand was to s t e e r  a coxirse between 
the rocks o f  E nglish  L ibera lism  and Alexander ' s^excessive 
exce l lence* ' .  To a s k i l f u l  p i l o t  the channel was s u f f i c i e n t ­
ly  b road .
L a s t ly ,  Castlereagh*s op in ion  as to the  course 
to be s teered  needs co n s id e r a t io n .  It  i l l u s t r a t e s  the 
cause of  h is  la ck  o f  s u c c e s s  as a party leader .  His 
sweeping i n t e l l e c t  f a i l e d  to r e c o g n is e  the importance of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e t a i l ,  nor did he allow fo r  narrowness and
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pre ju d ice  in h is  opponents .  He was c e r t a in  o f  the 
r igh teousness  o f  h is  own p lans ,  and his  lack  o f  exper­
ience o f  party  p o l i t i c s ,  which had been in the background 
during the war, led him to  th in k  th a t  there  would be no 
o p p o s i t io n  to  any p o l i c y  pursued fo r  the country ’ s good. 
Besides th is  there  i s  ev id en ce  o f  another d e fe c t  o f  which 
he was accused by h is  c r i t i c s ,  that i s  the  lack o f  balance 
when f la t t e r e d  by the company o f  f o r e ig n  monarchs. Per­
haps t h i s  i s  to a c e r t a in  ex ten t  tru e .  Perhaps he f e l t  
that the very f a c t  that  the p o l i c y  which he advised had 
been advocated by the Emperor o f  A ustr ia  was s u f f i c i e n t  
to  convince th e  E nglish  p o l i t i c a l  p u b l i c ,  that is i f  they 
bothered th e ir  heads about t h e  matter at a l l .  His f o r g e t ­
fu lness  o f  the n ecessa ry  form a lity  accompanying the 
Regent 's  s ignature  might po in t  to t h i s ,  a s  might his 
advocacy o f  the exact s o lu t io n  advised by Francis ,  that 
o f  a personal  acceptance by th e  Regent. At any r a t e  to 
Castlegeagh the way out o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  was fo r  the 
Prince  "to  t  ake i t  upon himself  to s ig n  i t  without the 
in te rv en t ion  o f  his m in is te r s " .  This d r a s t i c  means o f  
cu tt in g  the knot was not a t  a l l  a t t r a c t iv e  to the scnupulous
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and o f f i c i a l  mind o f  the Prime M in is ter .  Castlereagh might 
dominate him by h is  keener i n t e l l e c t  and more f o r c e f u l  
p e r s o n a l i ty  in the  matter o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i t i c s ,  but here 
he found h im se lf  con fronted  by the immovable rock  o f  the 
B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n . L i v e r p o o l ' s  r e p ly  is  d e f i n i t e : -
" I t  i s  qu ite  im poss ib le ,  however, t o  a dv ise
"the Prince  to s ign  the Act o f  Accesj^on which has been 
"transmitted to  him. Such a step would be in con s is ten t  
■with a l l  the forms and p r in c ip le s  o f  our government, and 
"would su b je c t  those who advised i t  t o  a very serious 
" r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . . . .The very best  course f o r  th e  Prince to 
"adopt i s  to w rite  an a utob iog ra p h ica l  l e t t e r  to the three 
"sovere ig n s  a cco rd in g  to the  enclosed d r a f t s " . 1
Both wished fo r  the same p o l i c y ,  that o f  per­
sonal a c c e s s i o n  o n ly .  C ast le rea g h 's  mehod would have 
caused the Regent to have usurped the r ig h t s  o f  Parliament, 
and fo rced  the Treaty b e fo r e  the Houses. L iv e r p o o l ,  more 
accustomed t o  parliamentary c r a f t ,  succeeded in avo id in g  
t h i s .  As mentioned b e fo re  Brougham l o s t  h is motion fo r  
the p la c in g  o f  the Treaty b e fo r e  the Commons, because i t  
had not been s igned.
The R egen t 's  r e p ly  then is  comparatively  
va lu e less  from the p o in t  o f  B r i t i s h  Foreign P o l i c y
1, W e l l in g to n 's  Supplementary Despatches, XI, 182, Oct- 3rd.
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" S i r ,  My Brother  and Cousin,
** . . . . A s  the form o f  the B r i t i s h  C on st itu t ion ,
"which I am c a l l e d  upon to administer in the name and on 
"behalf  o f  the King my*father, prevents me from a cced ing  
" form a lly  to  t h i s  T reaty  in t  he shape in which i t  has been 
"presented to me, I adopt t h i s  cotirse o f  conveying to the 
"august sov ere ig n s  who have signed i t ,  my e n t i r e  concurrence 
" in  the  p r i n c i p l e s  they have la id  dow n. . . ,and  i t  w i l l  be 
"always ray ea rn est  endeavour to  regu la te  my co n d u c t . . .  .by 
"these sacred maxims, and to co -op era te  with my august 
« a l l i e s  in  a l l  measures which may be l i k e l y  to  contr ibute  
"to  the peace and happiness o f  mankind, '^l
A so o th in g  l e t t e r ,  which Alexander might 
in te r p r e t  to h is  own s a t i s f a c t i o n .  I t  might g iv e  England 
an a l l y ,  i t  c e r t a i n l y  did not bind her by an a l l i a n c e .  Any 
"unpleasant consequences"  v^ere avoided ,  and Castlereagh took 
advantage o f  t h i s  genera l  g o o d w i l l  to e s t a b l i s h  an under­
standing somewhat more ta n g ib le  than the im practicable  
brain  o f  the Tzar cou ld  d e v is e .
His e f f o r t s  re s u lte d  in the s ign ing  o f  the 
Treaty o f  the Quadruple A l l ia n c e  between R u s s ia ,A u s tr ia , 
France, and England on November 20th, The primary o b je c t  
o f  t h i s  was to  watch over the a f f a i r s  of '  France. The
1. "Map o f  Europe by Treaty" ( H e r t s l e t ) .  I ,  No.36.
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excesses  o f  Louis  X V I I I ' s  Parliament, ”niore r o y a l i s t  than 
the k ing" ,  wir*, c a u s in g  con s id era b le  d is turbance ,  and that 
country  was s t i l l  r eg a rd ed  as a cauldron from which any­
thing might is s u e .  I t  had taken to i t s e l f  a lso  a further  
fu n c t ion  o f  ho ld in g  p e r i o d i c a l  meetings " to  con cert  measures 
f o r  the r e p o s e  and property  o f  the p e o p le s " .  A 
d i c t a t o r s h ip ,  d i f f e r i n g  g r e a t l y  from the  Christ ian  b r o th e r ­
hood proposed by Alexander, But to C astlereagh  and Metter­
n ich  the arrangement seemed highly  s a t i s f a c t o r y .
But the consummation o f  the Congress had not 
been reached w ithout some d i f f e r e n c e  o f  op in ion .  Both 
Russia and A u str ia  were t r y i n g  to bind England more c l o s e ­
l y  to a C ontinenta l  p o l i c y ,  Alexander made a great e f f o r t  
at Vienna when th e  f i r s t  d r a f t  o f  a prelim inary Quadruple 
A l l ia n ce  was drawn up. Castlereagh saw that i t s  aims and 
scope were too  i n d e f i n i t e  to appeal to h is  temper, o r , th a t  
o f  the Houses o f  Parliament.
" I t  appeared to me that the proposed d ra f t  o f  
“a Treaty was open to  very con s id era b le  o b j e c t i o n s .  F ir s t  
"as not being s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e f i n i t e  in the scope and 
"nature o f  i t s  s t i p u l a t i o n s ,  secon d ly  as bearing , on the 
" face  of  i t ,  to o  s t r o n g  and undisguised a complexion o f
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" in te r fe re n ce  on the part o f  th e  A l l ie d  Sovereigns in 
"the in ternal  concerns o f  France."^
Never had England concerned h e rs e l f  so much 
in European a f f a i r s  as during the time when Castlereagh 
was at the Foreign O f f i c e .  But his o b j e c t  was to secure 
such t r a n q u i l l i t y  by his in f luence  that there should be 
no need o f  in te rv e n t io n .  The l e t t e r  r e fu te s  many o f  the 
harsh c r i t i c i s m s  o f  h is  p o l i c y  and character .  He hated 
intervention  in in tern a l  a f f a i r s  o f  f o r e ig n  nations 
knowing, as he sa id ,  th a t  h is to ry  had s u f f i c i e n t  examples 
of  i t s  f u t i l i t y ,  and o f ten  o f  a r ea c t ion  against the 
intervening s t a t e .  Even France must be allowed a consider­
able amount o f  p r ivacy .
But ne ither  a-Castlereagh*s a t t i tu d e  towards 
the f i r s t  Vienna proposal , ñor the R egent 's  r e fu s a l  t o  s ign 
the A l l ia n c e ,  caused Alexander to  leave his path of  f r i e n d ­
sh ip . ,  At the end o f  th e  year (1815) the Regent sent a 
despatch to Alexander s e t t in g  out England's guiding p r in ­
c ip le s  in f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  C ath cartrea d  i t  to him and 
sent back an account o f  the interview.
" On r eading the paragraph which begins, ' In
"trea t in g  o f  the system o f  your own Court*, h is  Imperial 
"Majesty observed that the conso latory  sentiments therein  
■stated, v i z . ,  ' th a t  there is  no longer any o b je c t  which
F.O. 92. (Continenta l  Treaty Papers) £9. No. 30
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*the Prince Regent can d e s i r e  f o r  the B r i t i s h  Empire and 
"that his o n ly  d es ire  must be to employ a l l  his in f luence  
"to preserve the peace*, was one in which he for  one f u l l y  
"p a r t i c ip a te d ,  that ,  thank God, he had no o b je c t  o f  
"ambition, and that  h is  own wish and, he t r u s te d ,  th e  wish 
" o f  a l l  other sov ere ig n s ,  could only be to preserve p e a c e . , . ,  
"and in th e  next paragraph, where i t  i s  s a i d ,  »Hie Royal 
"Highness»s v o ice  w i l l  on ly  be r a i s e d  to discourage the 
"pursu it  o f  Secondary and Separate I n t e r e s t s ' ,  h is  Imperial 
"Majesty dec lared  th a t  he was p e r f e c t l y  in unison w ith  his 
Royal Highness in that  'The Emperor read with great  a tten t ion  
"the la s t  paragraph a f t e r  he had a rr ived  at the phrase ' t o  
"combine the Powers o f  Europe against the State  whose per -  
"verted p o l i c y  or c r im in a l  ambition sh a l l  f i r s t  menace 
"the repose in which al 1 have a common i n t e r e s t ' , and then 
"said he thought i t  would be long be fore  any s t a t e  would 
"venture to troub le  that rep ose ,  and that  the precautions 
"taken to prevent that case  were wise and s a lu t a r y " . !
This l e t t e r  was rece ived  February, 1816.
The T zar 's  mind was s t i l l  obsessed with his  benevolent 
to le ra n ce .  Whatever r e b u f f s  he had rece ived  were so 
well presented that they  had seemed l ik e  express ions  o f  
acquiescence .  But as soon as th is  f l a t t e r y  began 
to r in g  hollow , which i t  was bound to do so o f t e n  repeated, 
then Alexander gave up his ambition to  be a second Christ 
and his d e s i r e  to be another Napoleon was reborn . His 
nature was one which had to have su ccess ,  a d u la t ion  and 
omnipotence in some sphere or another. I f  not in the L ibera l
1. F.O. 65 (R u s s ia ) .  103. No, 11,
and u n iv e rsa l ,  then in the a u tocra t ic  and national .  At 
the beginning of  1816 his Liberalistn was s t i l l  unimpaired, 
but his a u to c ra t i c  court  and d ip lom atic  corps was a lready  
impatient o f  o p p o s i t io n ,  and eager f o r  a more o f fe n s iv e  
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  This atmosphere was not long in a f f e c t in g  
Alexander. I t  was a s tru gg le  between Liberalism , modified 
and guided by Gastlereagh*s f la t te r y ,a n d  anb it ion ,  f e r t i l i s e d  
by Court atmosphere. The f ig h t  lasted  long. By 1818 
the Court atmosphere was triumphant, but for  some years 
afterwards f l a t t e r y  had i t s  r e s u lt s  a t  the Russian c a p i ta l .
The Congresses having been f in is h e d ,  and the 
A l l ia n c e  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d , monarchs and ministers back in 
th e ir  various c a p i t a l s ,  p o l i t i c s  gradually  began to 
descend from the rarer  atmospheres to  l e v e ls  more w or ld ly  
and more n a t io n a l .  In the years now t o  be dea lt  w ith  in 
th is  ch a p ter ,  1816 and 1817, i t  is  the Austrian p o l i c y  
which concerns England the most. Metternich and Castlereagh 
together in Vienna and Paris  had worked to a great ex tent  
with unanimity, agreeing to  pursue an A l l ia n ce  p o l i c y ,  
p a c i f i c ,  but with a watchful eye on Russia .  Metternich, 
alone in Vienna with Russia c lo s e  on th e  f r o n t i e r  and with
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Castlereagh. away over the Channel, began t o  show signs 
o f  nervousness. An a l l ia n c e  against Alexander appeared to 
become more and more d e s i r a b le  and urgent, and England was 
the country whose in te r e s t s  and p o l i c y  should co inc ide  
with his own. From the beginning o f  1816, we find 
l ietternlch  t  rying to draw Castlereagh f  rom his p o l i cy  
o f  sem i-a loo fness .  He thought that the fr iendsh ip  formed 
at Vienna could be the basis o f  a c lo s e r  union. On every 
poss ib le  occas ion  he brought to Stewart’ s not ice  the 
h o s t i l e  a ct ion s  of  Russian agents against England and 
Austria .  He exaggerated g rea t ly  but fa i le d  to move 
Castlereagh, There c e r t a in l y  was much i l l - f e e l i n g  between 
B r i t i sh  and Russian o f f i c i a l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  at Madrid and 
Naples, but the p o l i c y  was not orig inated at the Russian 
Court. Metternich t r ie d  to f o r c e  th is  into the open, and 
the nervousness o f  th e  le sse r  countries  assisted him. On 
January 5th. 1816, Castlereagh wrote to Stewart -
"The Courts o f  Madrid and Naples have conceived 
"a very unnecessary alarm as to the views o f  the Russian 
"Government".
Stewart is ordered to do his best to  heal the breach, "as 
nothing can be more l ik e ly  t o  disturb the harmony o f  the
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A ll ia n ce  upon which the se r e n ity  o f  Europe r e s t s , "
A week prev ious  t o  t h i s  l e t t e r  he had 
w r it ten  to  Mr. Rose, th e  B r i t i s h  Ambassador in 
B er l in  -
“ I  p e r ce iv e  in more than one quarter a
"tendency t o  alarm as to the d e s ig n s  o f  p a r t i c u la r  
"Powers, but e s p e c i a l l y  o f  Russia, f o r  which I have reason  
" to  suppose there  i s  not th e  smallest f o u n d a t i o n , . H i s  
" la n g u a ge ,th is  engagements and h is  p 'o c e e d in g s ,  a s f a r  a s  
"they are known t o  me, are in d i r e c t  o p p o s i t io n  to such a 
" c o n c lu s io n . . . . In t he present s t a t e  o f  Europe i t  i s  the 
"prov ince  o f  Great B r i ta in  to turn the con f idence  she has 
" insp ired  to the account o f  peace by e x e r c i s in g  a con -  
" c i l i a t o r y  in f lu e n c e  between th e  Powers, ra ther  than t o :  
"put h e r s e l f  at the  head o f  any Combination o f  courts  to  
"keep others  in c h e c k . . , . A l l  appeared to separate (from 
"P aris )  deeply  impressed with the value o f  t h e i r  common 
"connexion to themselves and to the world, and I t r u s t  
"nothing may a r i s e  t o  shake th is  im p r e ss io n .”2
With re fe re n c e  to the unrest  in Germany and
France -
" The in t e r p o s i t i o n  o f  Great B r i ta in  w i l l  be
"always most a u t h o r i t a t iv e  in proport ion  as i t  i s  not com- 
"promised by being unduly mixed in the d a i l y  concerns o f  
"these s t a t e s . " £
C astlereagh  had reason la t e r  to modify th is  
view o f  A lexander, Written o f  th e  end o f  1315, the Tzar
T. F.O. ï~. (Âustr^aT. ïTô, No. 1,
2. C a st le rea gh 's  Correspondence. V o l .X I .  page 104.
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was s t i l l  in the f i r s t  f l u s h  o f  h is ho ly  z e a l ,  anti 
Russian in tr ig u e  anti a ggress iveness  was s t i l l  v e i y l o c a l .  
Fresh from personal  c o n ta c t  with the idealism of  Alexander, 
the disturbed f e e l i n g s  in Naples and Madrid were a scr ib ed  
to personal sentiments rather than a nat iona l  p o l i c y  .
In J u ly ,  1816, Metternich again t r i e s  to rouse 
the fears  o f  England. In answer Castlereagh wrote to 
Stewart,
" I have no doubt that upon a i l  great p r in c ip le s
"o f  European p o l i t i c s ,  the B r i t i s h  and Austrian Governments 
"are a g r e e d . P r i n c e  Metternich mistakes the sentiments o f  
■this Court i f  he supposes that we urge him to  adopt a 
■submissive or  a conced ing  p o l i c y  towards R u s s ia , , , .w e  
^only wish to moderate that  C^ri  de Bureau*against 
Russia"^
The quest ion  o f  armaments was one upon which 
Metternich enterta ined  the l i v e l i e s t  su s p ic io n s  o f  Russia. 
Proposals had been put forward and approved by the great 
powers f o r  a mutual r e d u c t io n  o f  armies.  But, with  
schemes f o r  an in te r n a t io n a l  p o l i c e ,  and f o r  m i l i ta ry  
in tervent ion  in the a f f a i r s  o f  l e s s e r  s t a t e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
Turkey, Russia  wished fo r  s p e c ia l  co n s id e ra t io n  with 
regard to the time taken t o  reduce her armies, and 
her f in a l  m i l i t a r y  s tren gth .  The German Confederation
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had f i r s t  approached C astlereagh  with regard to the 
scheme. He wrote to C lancarty ,  the E n g l ish  Ambassador at 
Frankfurt in August 1316.
” As the Emperor l ik e s  an army, as he l ik e s
“an in f lu en ce  in Europe, and ia under an impression o f  
“some alarm w ith  r e s p e c t  to  t h e  e f fe r v e s c e n c e  o f  the times 
"I  do not expect  him very r a p id ly  to part  with the t roop s  
“he has formed, nor shou ld ,  from t h i s  circumstance a lone, 
" c a l l  in quest ion  h is  p a c i f i c  d i s p o s i t i o n . "  ^
To Stewart he wrote in th e  same month
" Upon the main point o f  your despatch, v i z , ,
“the quest ion  o f  armaments, I see no d i s t i n c t i o n  in th e  
“reasoning o f  the two Governments other than that the 
"same arguments are urged by Prince Metternich w ith  le s s  
"reserve  in h is  comments than i t  would have become the 
"Prince Regent*s M in is te rs  to press them in a memoir when 
" rep ly in g  to  the Emperor o f  R u ss ia 's  ov ertu re .  Upon a 
" p o l i c y  o f  a mutual and r e l a t i v e  red u ct ion  a l l  are a g r e e d , ,  
"that the magnitude o f  t h e i r  armies is  amongst the most 
"ser iou s  o f  the dangers to which the cause o f  leg it im ate  
"sovere igns  i s  exposed at th is  day, no one can doubt, who 
"knows o f  the e x i s t in g  s ta te  o f  the f in a n ces  o f  every 
"European power“ .2
In another sphere the fea r  o f  Russian 
a c t i v i t y  was t r o u b l in g  M etternich, The Mediterranean 
p ira tes  at t h i s  time were a t e r r o r  to a l l  Europe. The Tzar 
proposed that  his f l e e t  should be used to exterminate them.
1 .  F.O. 8 ,  (Germany). 3. No. 6 .
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Metternich. looked upon the proposal as an excuse fo r  the 
extension  o f  Russian sea-power.
In the same l e t t e r  to Stewart, Gastlereagh 
r e f e r s  to th e  su b je c t  -
” Prinoe M ettern ich  seems to understand the
"Russian overture  as a p r o p o s i t io n  coming from the 
"Emperor to put h im self  at the head o f  a Maritime Con- 
" f e d e r a c y , . . .Quite agree ing  with the Austrian Minister in 
"not wishing to see  the Mediterranean made the theatre 
"o f  Russian Maritime e x e r t i o n s ,  I r e a l l y  cannot see a 
" trace  o f  such a p o l i c y  d i s c l o s e d . "  ^
The excuse ,  i f  excuse i t  was, had a good 
foundation . In 1814 A ustr ia  had had to put her ¿ l ip p in g  
under Turkish p r o t e c t i o n .  English trade ,  the  la rg est  in 
the feadtterranean, had su f fe red  severe ly  both in ships 
and in range o f  a c t i v i t y .  Yet i t  was the j o in t  opp os it ion  
o f  these two cou n tr ies  which caused the Russian o f f e r  to 
be r e j e c t e d ,  the nuisance to remain unchecked, Russian warships 
in the Mediterranean would have been too much fo r  the 
nerves o f  any nation  e x ce p t  Pruss ia .  Yet ,  in s p i t e  o f  th is  
j o i n t  r e j e c t i o n ,  England refused to agree  with Austria  
that Russia was d i r e c t l y  out f o r  aggress ion .  Castlereagh
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said that the Austrian fea rs  were groundless, and 
then took precautions in case they had some foundation.
His f i r s t  anxiety  in European p o l i t i c s  was his  fear o f  
Russian ambition d is tu rb in g  the newly-won peace, h is  second 
was to keep his f i r s t  fe a r  hidden from Metternich. In 
July, 1816, to Stewart -
" I always look  upon Russia as the power which
"without e s s e n t i a l l y  exposing I t s e l f ,  is  most capable o f  
"m isch ie f ,  and that in proportion as her connection with 
"France is C lo se ly  connected the danger is  increased ,"  1
 ^ At th is  time Castlereagh launches a b r i l l i a n t  
d ip lom atic  a ttack ,  which i s ,  and indeed, can be, only 
p a r t ia l l y  s u c c e s s fu l .  He proposed that the questions o f  
the Barbary p ir a te s  and the A b o l i t ion  o f  Slavery sh a l l  be 
combined, and, in po in t  o f  f a c t ,  re fuses  to consider the 
former by i t s e l f .  I f  both were re jec ted  then the fear  of 
Russia in the Mediterranean would be removed, and a l s o ,  
in consequence, Austria  would lose  an excuse for  an a n t i ­
Russian a l l i a n c e .  I f  both were accepted by Russia then 
the Emancipation o f  the Slaves would mean a considerable 
increase o f  power to Castlereagh In Parliament, and 
Austrian jea lousy  would s t i l l  n eutra l ise  Russian Maritime
1. F.O.  7. ( A u s t r i a ) .  125. Uo. 7 .
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power. - The Holy A l l ia n c e  here proved u s e fu l ,  and C a s t le -  
rsagh appeals to the p r in c ip l e s  stated there in  as f  ar 
as he dared without compromising England 's  a lo o f  a t t i t u d e .  
He wrote to  Cathcart urging the  Tzair to support the a b o l i ­
t i o n  o f  the S lave Trade with th e  g r e a t e s t  z e a l .  I t  had 
a lready  been condemned at the Congress o f  Vienna.
* I can have no doubt that th e  Emperor o f  Russia
"and th ose  sov ere ig n s  who have given t h e i r  sanction  to the 
"Treaty o f  September 1 4 th . ,  w i l l  f e e l  th a t  i t  i s  one, not 
" o f  mere c h o i c e ,  but o f  ind ispensab le  moral o b l i g a t i o n ,  
"and you may t h e r e fo r e  assure  the Emperor that in th is  
"enlarged view o f  the in t e r e s t s  o f  humanitv, th e  Prince 
"Regent is  f u l l y  prepared to do his d u t y " . i
This l e t t e r  was w r it ten  b e fo re  the question  
o f  Russia and the Barbary p i r a te s  became acute .  His p o l i c y  
at t h i s  time was to gain  Whig support. Slave emancipation 
was a great  advance in humanitarian thought,  e s p e c i a l l y  
o n t h e  part o f  one who was, now, considered as the arch­
enemy o f  freedom by h is  opponents. But apart from the 
desireXor Whig support the proposa l  was a d is in te r e s te d  
one, and t y p i c a l l y  B r i t i s h  in i t s  s cope .  Far from a tta in ing  
the u n iv e r s a l i t y  o f  the scheme o f  Alexander, neverthe less  
i t  aimed at something o f  which the Tzar was not capable ,
1. F .O.  7,  ( A u s t r i a ) .  102 . No. 9 .
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the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e o r i e s  to e x i s t in g  c o n d i t io n s .
But the Russian menace again loomed large 
and the im portunity  o f  A u str ia  was becoming troublesome.
The u n it in g  o f  the two quest ions  assured to Castlereagh 
a p a r t ia l  su ccess .  On May 18th. 1816, he explained his 
po in t  o f  view to  C athcart ,
" Your Lordships w i l l  p e r ce iv e  that i t  i s  only
"by making the Slave Trade and the Question o f  the Barbary 
Powers go p a r l -p a ssu  that we can f u l l y  meet the wishes o f  
"the Emperor and o f  the other  Powers who press the l a t t e r  
"po in t  as one o f  u n iv e rsa l  in t e r e s t .  I th ink his  Imperial 
"Majesty w i l l  enter  c o r d i a l l y  into  the views i f  the B r i t i s h  
"Government upon thus combining them in one common cou rse ,  
"and I have no doubt i f  væ a l l  draw h e a r t i l y  together  upon 
"the broad ground o f  g iv in g  reposé upon C h ris t ian  p r in c ip l e s  
" to  the Human Race, o f  whatever c o lo u r ,  and in every part 
" o f  the g lo b e ,  that we sh a l l  d o  ou rse lv es  c r e d i t  and render 
"a la s t in g  s e r v i c e  to mankind".^
"Whatever c o lo u r "  i s  as a p p l i c a b le  to Turks
/
as to negroes ,  and d e s p ite  the idea lism  o f  the l e t t e r ,  i t  
was re ce iv ed  w ith  s u s p ic io n .  The idea o f  E nglish  warships 
searching  out the s lave  t ra d ers  was looked upon as another 
move o f  "egoism and commercial c a l c u l a t i o n " .  Another 
nat ion  lea d in g  a humanistic crusade would depr ive  Alexander 
o f  much C h r i ^ i a n . ' g l o r y ,  b e s id e s ,  h is  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  would 
be a t a c i t  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  the r ig h t s  o f  co loured races  
whether C h r is t ia n  or n o t .  So the scheme f e l l  through, but
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the Tzar was not a b le  to blame Castlereagh. that the Barbary 
p ir a te s  s t i l l  remained a t  l a r g e .  I f  any nation  l o s t  some 
o f  the con f id en ce  o f  the l e s s e r  s ta tes  over  the business 
that nation  was R ussia ,  In England much Whig op p o s i t io n  
had been aroused by t h i s  apparent surrender to the p r in ­
c i p l e s  o f  the Holy A l l ia n c e  o f  the Tzar. The independent 
a c t io n  o f  the n at ion  seemed to  be im p e r i l le d .  But i t  was 
not as a member o f  the A l l ia n c e  that C astlereagh  asked 
f o r  the T z a r 's  supp ort .  He merely asked him to put 
h is  C h r is t ia n  p r i n c i p l e s  in to  p r a c t i c e .  This apparent 
pandering to R u ss ia ,  and i t s  lack  o f  r e s u l t s ,  was much 
more obvious to the genera l  p o l i t i c a l  publid  than was the 
h igh ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y  d ip lom a t ic  success  ach ieved .  The Tzar 
had a n g r i ly  r e j e c t e d  the combined p r o j e c t s .  There fore ,  
as there  was no fear  o f  Russian naval aggress ion  in the 
Mediterranean, M e t t e r n i c h 's e x cu se  fo r  an anti-Russian  
A l l ia n ce  was rendered u s e l e s s .
For a time the Austrian d ispatches  became 
calmer, M ettern ich  had apparently  given up the idea o f  a 
c l o s e r  understanding. But in 1817 Russian in tr ig u e  at 
Madrid, and h is  fe a r  o f  her des igns  on Turkey, again 
s t i r r e d  him t o  a c t i o n .  He hoped once more to rouse  England's
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fear  f o r  tier Mediterranean commerce, and to  ob ta in  a 
secre t  T r i p l e  A l l ia n c e  with, the French, The o b je c t  o f  
th is  d e s i r e  to " i s o l a t e  R ussia"  was made c le a re r  by an 
interv iew  which M ettern ich  had with the  English  Ambassador 
when the Turkish a n t i - C h r i s t ia n  p o l i c y  came under rev iew .
“ I t  appeared to  me (wrote Stewart) that the
“Austrian M in ister  was very  des irous  o f  a s ce r ta in in g  from 
"us the utmost length  we should be prepared to go in the 
" ton e ,  language, and even means we should employ in the 
"event o f  the n e g o t ia t i o n s  at Constantinople  taking an 
"unfavourable  turn. A l l  t h i s ,  however, was covered by an 
"ardent d e s i r e  f o r  com plete u n t i o n . , . .The Prince sa id  th a t  
" i t  was true  e v e ry th in g  was in the best  t r a i n ,  but the 
Sample exp lanat ions  o f  A u str ia ,  England, Prussia  and, he 
" t ru s te d ,  France, must s t i l l  be more ex te n s iv e .  To secure 
"the l a t t e r  from the in f lu e n c e  o f  Russia and p lace  her on 
"the same l i n e  with o u r s e lv e s  was unquestionably  the po int  
"o f  the g r e a t e s t  s o l i c i t u d e ,  and th is  he t r u s t e d ,  by the  
“r e t i r i n g  t r a n q u i l l i t y  and stead iness  o f  the King o f  
"F rance 's  government, would be a f f e c t e d .  For h is  own part 
"he cons idered  the Quadruple A l l ia n ce  as the great  palladium 
"upon which the peace o f  Europe depended. In th is  the 
"Emperor o f  Russia was so bound up th a t  he could not 
" e x t r i c a t e  him self  from i t s  o b l ig a t io n s  w ithout  s a c r i f i c i n g  
" a l l  h is  p r i n c i p l e s .  To t h i s ,  th e r e fo r e ,  we must endeavour 
"that R ussia  should f o r  ever c l i n g .  But a t  the same t in e  
" i t  became necessary  t o  prevent an ex ten s ion  o f  th e  means 
"o f  one Empire, a lready  too  powerful,  to counteract  des igns  
"o f  a s u s p ic io u s  n a tu r e . "  ^
Immediately a fterwards , A p r i l  1817, Metternich 
sent an appeal to  C ast iereagh  through Esterhazy, But the
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persuasion was i n e f f e c t i v e .  He was bent on peace anâ to 
achieve t h i s  he had t o  make England 's  p o l i c y  as unemotional 
as his own ch a ra cte r .  He f u l f i l l e d  h is  o b l ig a t io n s  to 
the Quadruple A l l ia n c e  but nothing beyond. He had stated  
these aims and l im i t a t i o n s  in a c i r c u la r  sent round to 
the B r i t i s h  M in is te rs  in Fore ign  Courts on January 1st .  
1816.
S The f i r s t  o b j e c t  o f  the A l l ia n c e  being to
"serve  both , (L ou is  XVIII and his Kingdom) and through 
"them the r e s t  o f  Europe, from becoming a pr ey to 
r e v o lu t io n a r y  anarchy and v i o l e n c e . , , .
" Such an a l l i a n c e  could o n ly  have ov;ed i t s
" o r ig in  to a sense o f  common danger, in i t s  very nature 
" i t  must be c o n s e r v a t iv e .  I t  cannot threaten  e i th e r  the 
" s e c u r i t y  or the l i b e r t i e s  o f  other s t a t e s " . !
England was the one nation  which could be , 
trusted to pursue a d i s in t e r e s t e d  p o l i c y  in Europe, the 
one power on which the l e s s e r  s ta tes  could r e l y .  The 
Peace o f  P a r is  had shown that her ambitions lay  in a 
w id e r f i e ld .  C ast lereagh  knew that the nervous ten s ion  o f  
Europe had not yet  re la x e d ;  that a s ign  o f  panic from 
any one o f  the g rea t  powers might sh a tter  the unstable 
s tructure  o f  peace so l a b o r i o u s ly  con s tru cted .  As long as
1. F ,0 .  83 (C on t in en t)  81 ( C i r c u l a r ) .
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England remained calm the  Quadruple A l l ia n c e  would 
remain unbroken, and i t s  p r e s t ig e  high, C ast lereagh  s t r o v e  
to  stay  apart  u n t i l  in te rv e n t io n  should become in e v i t a b l e .  
The nations had no doubts about England’ s commercial egoism, 
but they had f a i t h  in her d is in te r e s te d n e s s  on the 
Continent.  Any "meddling'* would undermine t h i s ,  any 
nervousness in her p o l i c y  would undo C ast lerea gh ’ s l i f e ' s  
work.
With r e f e r e n c e  to h is  in terv iew  with E s te r ­
hazy, and M ette rn ich ’ s d isp a tch ,  he sent a l e t t e r  to 
Ste?;art in t h e  next month, May.
"The p r in c ip l e s  la id  down by Prince  M etter-  
"n ich ,  when taken in  the  a b s t r a c t ,  and with due caution  
" in  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  are p e r f e c t l y  wise and sound and no 
" d i f f e r e n c e  o f  op in ion  can a r i s e  upon them, but, w h i l s t  we 
"agree in c o n s id e r in g  the Quadruple A l l ia n c e ,  combined with 
" a system o f  c o n c i l i a t i o n  and support to  th e  e x i s t in g  
"order o f  th ings  e s tab l ish ed  in France, as the  b a s is  o f  
" a l l  our p o l i c y ,  we must proceed with c ircum spect ion  
" in  adopting  any measure o f  precautionary  p o l i c y  upon 
" s p e cu la t iv e  grounds which might be f a t a l  to th e  system 
" i t s e l f .  In our p r a c t i c a l  views upon th e  s u b je c t ,  I am 
"persuaded we must mean the same th in g ,  namely t o  p r e -  
"serve the system which e x i s t s  as long as p o s s ib l e ;  that 
" i f  i t  i s  shaken the f a u l t  s h a l l  not be with e i t h e r  co u r t ,  
"and to secure  t h i s  o b j e c t  that nothing should be done 
"e i th er  upon chance or upon s u s p ic io n  in c o n s is t e n t  
Swith our d ec la red  r e l a t i o n s ,  and th a t ,  w h i l s t  the 
e^lements o f  s e c u r i t y  in the  g o o d w il l  o f  other rowers are 
" c u l t i v a t e d ,  i t  should be l e f t  to n e c e s s i t y  to  combine 
" t h e m . . . .a s  the development o f  an ascerta ined  danger sh a l l  
•point o u t . " l
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The absence o f  an "a scerta ined "  danger made 
the success  o f  H e t t e r n i c h 's  advances im poss ib le ,  and he 
had to abandon h is  d es ig n  o f  a s e c r e t  a l l i a n c e  o f  the re s t  
o f  Europe against  R uss ia .  In England, Castlereagh was 
exper ienc ing  an in c r e a s in g  o p p o s i t i o n .  His con s id era t ion  
towards Alexander, both now and a lso  la t e r  at A i x - l a -  
Chapelle ,  o cca s ion ed  great c r i t i c i s m  from the  Whigs and 
a lso  from a s e c t i o n  o f  the Tor ies  who fe a re d  the Russian 
menace in the E ast .  The great share which he had had in 
the triumphs and : t r e a t ie s  o f  1814, and 1815 had doubtless  
attached him s t r o n g ly  to  th e  maintenance o f  the Quadruple 
A l l ia n c e .  He was accused o f  having become enamoured o f  
the homage and f l a t t e r y  paid by Emperors and Kings to the 
re p re se n ta t iv e  o f  England, and he was ob v iou s ly  l e s s  at 
ease in Parliament, faced  by a strong and v itu perat ive  
o p p o s i t i o n ,  than among the diplomats o f  Europe, each 
seeking the f r i e n d s h i p  o f  h is  country. In England the 
general f e e l i n g  was moving away from an a c t i v e  con t inenta l  
p o l i c y  and the f o r c e f u l  speeches o f  Canning at th is  time 
foreshadow h is  p o l i c y  when, as C ast le rea g h 's  su ccessor ,  
he d e f i n i t e l y  breaks the connect ion  o f  England with the
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Holy A l l ia n ce  p o l i c y .
The funera l  o ra t ion  o f  M ette rn ich 's proposed 
anti-Russian a l l i a n c e  is  contained in a l e t t e r  from Stewart 
to Castlereagh w r it te n  on June 21st.  1817, Esterhazy 
had returned to Vienna.
" Prince Esterhazy observes with r e g r e t  that
"your Lordship does not  seem disposed to enter into a more 
"a c t iv e  system o f  p reca u t ion  against Russian encrcach- 
"ments which he co n c e iv e s  would be more acceptable  to his 
"own government and to  Prince  M ettern ich 's ideas; and I 
"am thus more confirmed in my opinion that the Austrian ' 
M in is te r 's  f j r s t  d e s i r e  was to  secure without 
" lo s s  o f  time the Courts of London, Paris and B erl in ,  in 
"some engagement that would bind them to act together in 
“ the p o s s ib le  contingency  o f  R ussia 's  overstepping the 
"bonds in which she is  now h e ld “ . l
The s u b je c t  was not mentioned again and the 
r e la t i o n s  o f  the two statesmen continued to be o f  the c l o s e s t  
but no more i s  heard o f  a s e c re t  a l l ia n c e .
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C H A P T E R IV,
AIX -  LA -  CHAPELLE.
CHM^TER IV .
AIX -  LA -  CHAPELLE
C astlereagh  now began to think the time r ipe  
for  one o f  the reunions o f  s t  atesmen and monarchs provided 
f o r  by the terms o f  the Quadruple A l l ia n c e .  He knew well 
how much o f  the d i s t r u s t  in Europe, e s p e c i a l l y  between 
Austria  and Russia ,  mas due t o  misunderstanding, and petty  
o f f i c i a l  in t r ig u e ,  and he hoped to ensure a continuance of 
European amity by r e - e s t a b l i s h in g  a c l o s e r  acquaintance 
between th e  p r i n c i p a l s .  There mere also important questions 
with regard to the sett lem ent o f  France. The Army o f  
Occupation had accomplished i t s  purpose. France was ready 
to n e g o t ia te  immediately f o r  the payment o f  reparations 
and W ellington  had stated that a further extension o f  the 
occupation  period  would on ly  rouse the peasants against 
both th e  army and the e x i s t in g  government. Besides these 
matters there  was the question  o f  the future o f  France 
and the A l l ia n c e .  What was to be her p o s i t io n  i n r e l a t i o n  
to the other Powers.
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The proposa l  o f  a Conference to s e t t l e  these 
problems would meet with l i t t l e  op p os i t ion  even in 
England, where the idea  o f  p e r io d ic  meetings, being new, 
was suspect ,  but there  were other d is tu rb in g  f a c t o r s  in 
Europe, which C ast lereagh  hoped to ren d er  less  dangerous 
through calm c o n s id e r a t io n  at the Congress. There was the 
Slave Trade H t i i l  a c t i v e ,  c h i e f l y  because o f  the denia l  
o f  the B r i t i s h  Right o f  Search by Spain and Portugal.
The Barbary P ira tes  were s t i l l  t e r r o r i s i n g  the Mediterran­
ean; the Bavaria-Baden q^uestion o f  su ccess ion  was s t i l l  in 
d ispute ;  the r e l a t i o n s  o f  Spain and Portugal were 
g r e a t ly  stra ined  and, most important o f  a l l ,  th e  independence 
or submission o f  the Spanish Colonies .
There was a general d es ire  in Exirope for  the 
Congress to  take  p lace  as e a r l y  as p o s s ib le .  The Tzar was 
s t i l l  pondering over h is  extensive  schemes o f  f ra tern a l  
peace, and perhaps three years o f  the Russian c l im a te  made 
the prospect  o f  a ho l iday  a l l  the more p leasant.  Metter­
n ich  was anxious to meet Alexander both to get some further 
ins ight  in to  his cur ious  mind; and a lso  to  in fluence him 
in a more r e a c t io n a r y  p o l i c y .  Recent s tudent r i o t s  at 
Wartburg had alarmed both the Emperor Francis and the
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King o f  Pruss ia ,  but Russian fr ien d sh ip  was c e r ta in ly  
adv isab le  be fore  any ex ten s ion  o f  Austro-Prussian supremacy 
and autocracy  was to be attempted i n t h e  Confederation.
The date o f  the Conference being f ixed  the 
next item to  be arranged was the form which i t  was to 
take. Castlereagh knew that the B r i t i s h  public  v/ould be 
against any unnecessary in ter fe ren ce  in European p o l i t i c s .
Any i d e a l i s t i c ,  extravagant,  or incomprehensible form o f  
reunion would r a i s e  a storm o f  o p p o s i t io n .  Only the 
matters connected with France in terested  Englishmen, and 
only  the  nations immediately concerned in those  matters 
ought to be present at the Conference, There must be no 
General Congress, On March 27th, 1818, Castlereagh 
wrote to  Cathcart -
" As fa r  as the Prince -Regent has been enabled
"to weigh th is  Ciuestion without e ither  having the opportun- 
" i t y  o f  being informed o f  the sentiments o f  Kis A l l i e s ,
" i t  has appeared to  His Royal Highness d e s ira b le  to g ive  
" th is  meeting, as much as p o s s ib l e ,  the character o f  Specia l  
"Conferences held under the s t ip u la t io n s  o f  the Treaty o f  
"A l l ia n ce ,  and, as l i t t l e  as may be, that o f  a European 
"Congress, and that the o b je c t s  o f  i t s  d e i ib e r a t i o n s  should, 
"as far  as p o s s ib l e ,  be understood beforehand.........
" The r ea l  q,uestion i s ,  whether a General
"Cdngress be d e s i r a b le  or not .  As there does not appear 
"to  be new matter f o r  d e l ib e r a t io n  s u f f i c i e n t  to c a l l  f o r
"so ex traord inary  a measure............and as i t  might be productive
"o f  more embarrassment than u t i l i t y ,  and give r i s e  to ideas 
"o f  change which i t  cannot be des ira b le  to encourage, I
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'‘ cannot h es ita te  to acquaint Your Excellency  that the 
^opinion o f  the Prince Regent’ s Government, as at present 
"informed, leans s t r o n g ly  in favour o f  the most simple 
"and ex p e d i t io u s  course o f  procedure,"  1
This hardly suited the T zar 's  scheming 
ministers Pozzo d i  Borgo in Paris and Capo d ' I s t r i a ,  who 
were hoping to bring in the lesser  powers, e s p e c ia l ly  Spain, 
in order to counterbalance the A ustro -B rit ish  understanding. 
Even Castlereagh h im self  wished the agenda o f  the Conference 
to be more e l a s t i c  than he dared admit to the Cabinet. Wor 
did he mention his scheme fo r  fu r th er  reunions to th i s  
body.
Metternich agreed with Castlereagh over 
l im it in g  the s ize  o f  the Conference. He was too uneasy to 
wish t o  see  the Tzar re in fo rced  by Spain and p oss ib ly  by 
other s ta te s ,  and he even suggested a preliminary d iscussion  
with Castlereagh in Paris . This suggestion the la t te r  
ignored but the general f e e l in g  forced Alexander to come 
into l in e ,  and to agree to  t he Quadruple A ll iance  alone 
being represented  and even t o  rebuke his over zealous 
m in is te rs .
The town o f  A ix - la -C hapelle  was chosen on
1. F.0. 65 (Russia). 112. No. 6.
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account o f  i t s  c e n tr a l  s i tu a t io n  and i t s  a b i l i t y  to 
a fford  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  r e c r e a t io n ,  necessary accompani­
ments to  any d ip lom a t ic  gatherings at th is  time, and 
ce r ta in ly  much d e s i r e d  by the Russian se c t io n .  Metternich 
v/as lo s in g  his  a p p e t i t e  fo r  g a ie ty .  Besides these ad­
vantages the journey t o  A ix - la -C h a p e l le  protided an 
opportunity f o r  the Emperor Francis to t rav erse  the Rhine­
land states  where he was r e c e iv e d  as though the Imperial 
crown were s t i l l  on a Hapsburg head,
C ast lereagh  arrived with two Memoranda, both 
of  which had been approved by th e  Cabinet. The f i r s t  
dea lt  with France and j u s t i f i e d  the proposal of vjithdraw- 
ing the Army o f  Occupation by A r t i c l e  V o f  the Treaty o f  
P a r is .  I t  proposed that France should make arrangements 
to pay rep arat ion s  p a r t ly  through bankers and p a r t ly  by a 
Government loan , and that  any further m i l i ta ry  surveil lance  
should be l e f t  to th e  Army o f  the German Confederation 
across  the f r o n t i e r .  The most d i f f i c u l t  question d e a i t  with 
in th is  f i r s t  Memorandum was that o f  the future r e la t i o n s  
o f  France and the A l l ia n c e .  This l a t t e r  had been r e ­
formed in 1815 to s e e  that France c a r r ie d  out t  he Treaty
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or p o l i c y  when he presented the scheme to the Cabinet. It  
was Hot so f a r  from London to Aix as from London to 
Vienna in 1815, C r i t i c i s m  was near at hand and more 
h o s t i l e ,  but Castlereagh wished to allow himself as f r e e  
a hand as p o s s ib le  f o r ,  in such matters as the Slave ^rade 
and the Barbary P ir a te s  much depended on the support he 
mould get from Russia and Austr ia .
Stewart warned Castlereagh o f  the a t t i tu d e  
to be expected from the  Austrian rep resen ta t iv es  in a 
despatch sent on August 24th, 1818., He also suggested 
that the probable  p o l i c y  o f  Russia to uld lean towards 
an a d d it ion a l  Q u in tr ip le  A n ia n c e  and the evacuation o f  
France,
" That the Sinperor o f  Russia w i l l  s t i l l  uphold
"the Quadruple A l l ia n c e ,  there  can be no doubt, and uphold 
" i t  so long as he f a n c i e s  himself the champion and Founder 
"of  i t ,  and i s  s t i l l  a l iv e  to the work o f  the Holy Treaty. 
"But th is  Government is  keenly a l iv e  to the consideration  
"that the time is  not very f  ar d istant when t h is  greatest  
" l in k  m il l  be torn asunder, and that the approximation o f  
"Russia and France w i l l  sooner or later  be the r e s u l t .  The 
"longer and more remote such a p o l i t i c a l  change can be 
"deferred ,  th e  b e t te r  on every p o s s ib le  cons iderat ion ,  and 
"the ju s t  and wise p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  may be to turn from the 
"contemplation o f  such ^.-ossible unfavourable p rosper ity ,  
"but unhappily with these  men l ik e  Prince Metternich, who 
"have b r i l l i a n t  and inventive  imagination, they are gener- 
" a i l y  d isposed to look  fur th er  than the present moment, and 
? i t  i s  im possib le  to turn  a dea f  ear to t h e i r  reasoning.
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"Already i t  i s  said that the 'Quadruple A l l ia n ce  only forms 
"a great sk e le to n ,  from which a T r ip le  A l l ia n ce  w i l l ,  in 
" fu t u r i t y ,  a r i s e  between the Central i-owers," 1
Capo d ' I s t r i a ' s  ambitious schemes were in no 
7;ay accep tab le  to  Stewart.
" I tnought he ta lked with respect  and advantage
"o f  the Quadruple A l l ia n c e ,  s t i l l  he implied that i f  the 
"Sovereigns came together  with ï ’rance and Spain, more ex -  
" tens ive  arrangements seemed probable .  In short from the 
"d e t a i l s  I r e c e iv e d  I should conclude his  doc tr in e  to be 
"g en era l ly  in  o p p o s i t i o n  to those  which in p r in c ip le  at 
" l e a s t ,  a re  e n t i r e l y  the same between the Austrian and 
"B r i t i s h  Governments". ^
D iscu ss ion s  having been opened at Aix, 
Castlereagh*s optimism was soon j u s t i f i e d .  The enthusiasm 
and s i n c e r i t y  o f  Alexander l e f t  nothing to be des ired .
He was in f u l l  accord with his a l l i e s .  His love o f  peace 
was unbounded, and his f a i t h  in the Quadruple A l l ia n ce ,  
and in future  con fe ren ces ,  was as great as ever; "my army 
as w e l l  a s  m yself  i s  at the d is p o sa l  o f  Europe", he said 
to Metternich  who, cy n ic a l  as  he was, could  not help but 
be struck by the e x a l t a t io n  o f  h is  mind. Castlereagh 
wrote to Stewart on September lOth, from Aix, with r e f e r ­
ence to a con versa t ion  which he had had with the Tzar.
1, F.O, 7 (A u s tr ia )  139. No, 4.
2, F.O. 7 (A u s tr ia )  139. No. 10.
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» His Im per ia l  Majesty then adverted to the
" in s in u a t io n s  which were a f l o a t ,  that he Icept up his Army 
" fo r  purposes o f  war and conquest ,  and that  he wished f o r  
"an expo-n^S ion o f  dominion. "The Emperor said that the 
"same s t o r i e s  mere c i r c u l a t e d  in the f i r s t  years o f  peace 
•"I con s id er  my army as the army o f  Europe, and as such 
"alone s h a l l  i t  be employed^,"
W el l in gton  enclosed  a despatch  in t h i s  l e t t e r : ­
" I observed to His Im perial  Majesty th a t ,
"although me ought to do everyth ing  to c o n s o l id a te  and 
"render e f f e c t u a l  the Quadruple A l l ia n c e ,  yet i t  appeared 
" to  me that we ought to  endeavour to c o n c i l i a t e  Prance,
"and shorn th a t  country  that the other Powers o f  Europe mere 
"not d isposed to  exc lude  her from th e i r  c o u n c i l s ,  i f  she 
"conducted h e r s e l f  w ith  moderation. *0 u i .  La France 
"gouvernée par ses  Souverains leg it im es^ ,  and accord ing  
"to  the e x i s t in g  system' he s a i d , ' ’but not Revolutionary 
"France ’ " 1 ■
But the T z a r 's  s o l i c i t u d e  f o r  the future  o f  
France s t i l l  worried  M ettern ich .
The f i r s t  B r i t i s h  Memorandum formed the 
b a s is  o f  n e g o t ia t i o n s ,  and was soon approved by Metternich 
and Kardenburg. The T z a r 's  m in isters  withheld th e ir  
op in ion  f o r  a time. The questions  o f  evacuation  and r e ­
paration  mere soon s e t t l e d ,  and the proposa l  to in v i te  
France to j o i n  in the  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  o f  the Powers under 
A r t i c l e  VI mas agreed upon. So fa r  A lexander 's  hol iday
1. F.O. 7. (A u s tr ia )  139. No. 10.
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had been p e a c e fu l  and p leasant ,  and Castlereagh f e l t  able  
to j u s t i f y  his Conference system to the Cabinet. On, October 
4th , he wrote to L i v e r p o o l : ­
“ My b e l i e f  i s  that in the main the Emperor o f
'•Russia is  in earn est  in what he s a y s . . . ,M y  persuasion is  
"that he means to  piirsue a peace p o l i c y ,  that he aims at 
"sway, but that he has no d es ire  to change his connexion, 
"or to render  the r e v o lu t i o n a r y  s p i r i t  in Europe more 
" a c t i v e .  Upon the whole i t  seems working as well  as we 
“ could wish, and we have only  to  encourage the sentiments 
" o f  attachment o f  which we are a l l  so p rod iga l  towards 
"each o th er ,  and which I b e l ie v e  at th is  moment are s in -  
" c e r e ly  e n te r ta in e d .  I am quite  convinced that the past 
"h a b its ,  common g l o r y ,  and these o c c a s io n a l  meetings, d i s -  
"p la y s ,  and r  ep ledgea ,  a r e  among the best s e c u r i t i e s  Europe 
"now has fo r  durable  peace, ■ 1
The Cabinet however had been su f fe r in g  from 
the lack  o f  Castlereagh^ s reassuring  presence ,  and i t s  
apprehensions had been played upon by the i r r e p r e s s ib le  
Canning, b i t t e r l y  h o s t i l e  t o f u r t h e r  con feren ces ,  "which 
w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  invo lve  uq deep ly  in a l l  the p o l i t i c s  o f  
the C ontinent ,  whereas our t r u e  p o l i c y  has always been not 
to in t e r f e r e  except in great  emergencies and then wi th 
commanding f o r c e . "  He was the only Cabinet Minister who 
was aga in st  the system i t s e l f ;  the others  on ly  d i s l ik in g  
any f ixed  dates f o r  the meetings. Bathurst sent a r e p o r t
1. C a s t le re a g h 's  Correspondence, X II ,  47.
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o f  the v i t a l  Cabinet meeting to  Castlereagh on October 
19th. o u t l in in g  Canning’ s o b j e c t i o n s ; -
"My dear C ast le rea gh  -  You w i l l  be d e s iro u s  o f  r e c e iv in g  
"some account o f  »vhat has passed in C abinet . . .  .We were a l l  
•^ more or l e s s  impressed with the  apprehension o f  great 
" inconvenience a r i s i n g  from a d ed is ion  being now p u b l i c ly  
"announced o f  continued meetings at f ix e d  p er iods .  I t  
" i s  very n atura l  in you to f e e l  a strong  wish that they 
"should con t in u e ,  from having experienced  the advantages 
"which have been der ived  by th is  which has taken p lace ;  but, 
"even i f  we cou ld  be sure that the subsequent meetings 
"would be e q u a l l y  c o r d i a l ,  i s  there any advantage in 
" f i x in g  beyond the next p e r io d ,  and we a l l ,  without ex -  
" c e p t io n ,  in the Cabinet ,  concur in t hinking that the  next 
"meeting should be f ix e d  and a nnounced . , . .
” The o b je c t io n s  which Canning f e e l s  on th i s
" s u b je c t  are not con fined  to  the  inexpediency o f  announcing 
"a d e c i s i o n  o f  m eet ings  at f i x e d  periods, but to  th e  system 
" i t s e l f .  He does not cons ider  the ninth a r t i c l e  as having 
"been g e n e r a l ly  understood to  apply to  any meetings, e x c e p t  
" f o r  the purpose o f  watching the in tern a l  state  o f  France, 
"as fa r  as i t  may endanger t r a n q u i l l i t y .  He thinks that 
"system o f  p e r i o d i c a l  meetings o f  the four Great Powers, new 
"and o f  very q u es t ion ab le  p o l i c y ;  that i t  wi 11 n e ce s sa r i ly  
'■'involve us deep ly  in a l l  the p o l i t i c s  o f  the  Continent, 
"whereas nor true  p o l i c y  has always been not to in te r fe r e  
"except  in great  emergencies, and then with a commanding 
" f o r c e .  He th in k s  that  a l l  other s ta tes  must p ro tes t  
"against  such an attempt to p la ce  them under su b je c t io n ,  
"that the meetings may become a scene o f  cabal and in -  
" t r ig u e ,  and that the people  o f  th is  country may be 
"thought to lo o k  with grea t  jea lousy  fo r  th e ir  l i b e r t i e s  
» i f  our c o u r t  is  engaged in meetings with great despot ic  
"monarchs, d e l ib e r a t in g  upon what degree o f  re v o lu t io n a ry  
" s p i r i t  may endanger the p u b l ic  s e c u r i t y ,  and there fore  
»require  the in t e r f e r e n c e  o f  the A l l ia n c e . "
" I do not subscr ibe  to Canning’ s op in ions ,
"nor did any o f  the Cabinet who attended. But i f  th is  i s
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" f e l t  by him, i t  
"be f e l t  by many 
"opponents,
"bull  by%the horns
is not unreasonable to apprehend,it may 
other  persons as well  as by our d ecided 
And what I wish to ask you i s ,  why take the
h  n  c ! ^
caution -
Lord L iverpoo l  a lso  sent adv ice ,  urging
I f  i t  i s  thought adv isab le ,  with__ a^ view of
"keeping France in some order to f i x  a perio(f^"the 
"Sovereigns w i l l  again assemble, we see no o b je c t io n  to 
"such a d e c i s i o n ,  and,though i t  might be open to  some mis- 
" r e p re s e n ta t io n , the good might perhaps counterbalance the 
"inconveniences o f  such a proceeding, but i t  is  o ften  as 
"unwise to look  too far  into  fu tu r i ty  as to put narrow and 
"contracted l im it s  to our views.
" We must r e c o l l e c t  ourselves in the whole o f
" th is  business and ought to make our A l l i e s  f e e l  that the 
"General and European d is cu ss io n  o f  th e ir  q,uestions 
"w i l l  be in the B r i t i s h  Parliament, that ive have a new 
"Parliament to meet which has not been t r ie d ,  o f  doubtful 
"character and c e r t a in ly  not accustomed to look at fore ign  
"questions as Parliaments were some years ago when under 
"the pressure or immediate r e c o l l e c t i o n  o f  great fo re ign  
"danger. "  2
While these l e t t e r s  were on th e  way t o  Aix, 
a d ispatch  from Castlereagh was t r a v e l l in g  in the opposite  
d i r e c t i o n .  In t h i s ,  sent on October 19th .,  he shows him­
s e l f  hardly le s s  anxious than the Cabinet to keep B r i t ish  
o b l ig a t io n s  within  reasonable  bounds. The Tzar and Capo 
d ' I s t r i a  had brought forward the ir  prepared scheme o f  a
1, C a st le rea gh 's  Correspondence, XII .  55.
2. Castlereagh*s Correspondence. X II .  61,
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Common League o f  a l l  nations guaranteeing both t e r r i t o r i e s  
and thrones. This guarantee was to be secured by a 
i^rotocol d e f in in g  the casus f o e d e r i s , and the  m ilitary  
measures to be taken should the n ecess ity  a r i s e .  This 
meant the cre a t io n  o f  a s in g le  state in which the nations 
were to be treated as in d iv idua ls .
Although the Tzar had broached the matter 
as gently  as p o s s ib le  in order not to embarra%the B r it ish  
rep resen ta t iv e ,  yet the proposal had a h o s t i l e  reception .  
Castlerea^h could not think o f  acquiescence, and Metternich 
agreed with him, -  perhaps r e g r e t fu l l y ,  with his ear 
turned to the growing murmur o f  r e v o l t  in Naples. So 
Castlereagh and Gentz drew up a ser ies  o f  proposals wrapped 
up with many i d e a l i s t i c  expressions,  which he hoped would 
gently  d i s i l l u s i o n  the Tzar. He sent a copy o f  the pro­
posals to London with an accompanying dispatch on 
October 19th.
" I observe that both the Emperor and His
"Minister, Count Capo d ' I s t i r a ,  were, in conversa- 
" t ion ,  d isposed  to push th e ir  ideas very f a r  indeed in the  
"sense o f  a l l  the Powers o f  Europe being bound together in 
"a Common League guaranteeing to  each other the e x is t in g  
"order of  things in Thrones as well  as in T e r r i t o r i e s , . .
"I thought the best  chance o f  preserving the Emperor’ s mind 
"within the p r in c ip le s  which we could maintain in Parliament, 
"was by t ry in g  to present something that night at once keep
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"within our own l in e ,  and at the same time present the 
"sub ject  in the one o f  h is own id ea s ,"
He went on to consider the Russian proposals 
in greater  d e t a i l  -
" The Russian paper, much of  XThich I have r eason
"to b e l ie v e ,  was brought in a prepared shape from St. 
"Petersburg, goes v;ide in to  the f i e l d  o f  European A ll iance .
" When the Duke o f  Wellington and myself came
"to consider th is  paper together ,  though abounding in the 
"p r in c ip le s  o f  Union and Peace, me f e l t  some dismay in 
"observing the a b s tra c t io n s  and sweeping g e n e r a l i t ie s  in 
"x'shich i t  mas conceded. I t  appeared to us that vshilst 
"we could by no means subscribe  to i t s  doctr ine  in the 
"extent to which i t  was pushed, i t  would be hazardous to 
"attempt a w r it ten  answer to i t . " l
When Alexander put his ten tat ive  suggestions
into a d e f i n i t e  form, in which a l l  S tates  were to
j o in  together in suppressing any rev o lu t ion ,  Castlereagh
thought i t  time to  c a l l  th e  powers together .  He severe ly
c r i t i c i s e d  the Russian proposals  a t  t h i s  meeting, and r e -
fused to countenance any o b l ig a t io n  beyond the maintenance
o f  e x i s t in g  boundaries, o f  the Quadruple A ll iance  including
A rt ic le  VI. He sent a Memorandum to the  Cabinet.
" The Benign P r in c ip le s  o f  the A ll iance  o f  the 2 0th,
"September 1815, having been e ither  formally  or substantia l ly  
"adhered to by a l l  Powers, may be considered as const itu t ing  
"the European System in matters o f  p o l i t i c a l  con sc ien ce .  It  
"mould, however, be derogatory  t o  th is  solemn a c t  o f  the 
"Sovereigns to mix i t s  d iscu ss ion  w ith  the ordinary diplomat-
l .F .O .  92. (C ont inenta l  Treaty Papers) 35, w ith  GevAz 
document.
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'■ic o b l i g a t i o n s  which bind s ta te  to s ta te  and which are 
"alone to be looked f o r  in the T reat ies  which have been 
“concluded in the accustomed form ,"
Then f o l l o w s  one o f  the f i r s t  d e c la ra t ion s  
o f  the d o c t r in e  o f  n o n - in te r fe r e n c e .  The f i r s t  in sert ion  
o f  the wedge which was to  s p l i t  the A l l ia n c e ,
"o f  Nations
The on ly  s a f e  P r in c ip le  is  that o f  the La?; 
that no s ta te  has a r i g h t  to endanger i t s
i f  i t  
t hen
"neighbours by i t s  in te rn a l  proceedings ,  and that 
“does ,  provided they e x e r c i s e  a sound d i s c r e t i o n ,  
" r igh t  o f  in t e r f e r e n c e  is  c l e a r .
" The d e s i r e  o f  the Prince Regent always is  to
"act  c o r d i a l l y  with h is  A l l i e s ,  but in doing so ,  to  
"stand q u ite  c l e a r  in the view o f  h is  own engagements, not 
f t o  be supposed to have taken engagements beyond the Text 
and Import o f  the T r e a t ie s  signed. The Problem o f  an 
"Universal A l l ia n c e  f o r  the peace and Happiness o f  the world 
"has always been one o f  sp ecu la t ion  and o f  Hope, but i t  has 
"never been y e t  reduced to  p r a c t i c e ,  and, i f  an opinion 
"may be hazarded from  i t s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  i t  never can, but 
"you may, in p r a c t i c e ,  approach towards i t ,  and perhaf>s 
"the design  has never been so f a r  r e a l i s e d  as in t  he la s t  
" four  y ea rs ,  during that  e v en t fu l  period o f  the Quadruple 
"A l l ia n ce ,  formed upon P r in c ip le s  a ltogeth er  l im ite d . "
" The idea o f  an A l l ia n c e  S o l id a i r e ,  by which
"each State  s h a l l  be bound to  support the State o f  Success-  
" ion ,  Government and P ossess ion ,  within a i l  other States 
"from v io le n c e  and a ttack  upon con d it io n  o f  r e c e iv in g  fo r  
" i t s e l f  a s im i la r  guarantee, must be understood as 
"morally implying the prev iou s  establishment o f  such a 
"system o f  general  government as may secure and enforce  
“upon a l l  Kings and Nations an internal  system o f  peace 
"and j u s t i c e .  T i l l  the mode o f  construct ing  such a system 
"xhall  be devised the consequence is  inadmissible  as 
"nothing would be more immoral or more p r e ju d i c ia l  to the 
"character o f  Government g en era l ly  than the idea that their  
" fo r ce  was c o l l e c t i v e l y  t o  be p ros t i tu ted  to the support 
"of  e s ta b l i s h e d  power without any con s id era t ion  o f  the
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"extent to  which i t  was atused. T i l l  a system o f  admin- 
mistering Europe Toy a General A l l ia n ce  o f  a l l  i t s  States 
"can be reduced to some p r a c t i c a l  form a l l  notions of 
"general u n q u a l i f ied  guarantee must be abandoned and States 
"must be l e f t  to r e l y  f o r  th e ir  se cu r ity  upon the ju s t i c e  
"and wisdom o f  th e ir  r e s p e c t iv e  systems." 1
Kow could the howers agree to maintain 
systems, some o f  which might be ro t ten  a lready , .  In the 
case o f  B r i ta in ,  there  were fu r th e r  sp e c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
The great advance o f  England towards d emocracy was a matter 
which the European autocrats  f a i le d  to r e a l i s e .  An auto­
cra t  and his m in is ters  might foresee  p er i lou s  complications 
in "small beginnings" o f  r e v o lu t io n  in f o r e i g n  s t a te s ,  but 
B rita in  could on ly  lend her support with the permission o f  
Parliament, and Parliament might be very slow in a pprec ia t ­
ing the se r iou s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  the s i tu a t io n .  The e x i s t ­
ing Parliament was bent on peace and retrenchment, and only 
when the danger threatened England as well  as other nations 
would i t  sa n ct ion  in te r fe re n ce  abroad.
C a st le rea gh 's  determination on these points 
produced the des ired  e f f e c t .  His c r i t i c i s m s  o f  "benign 
p r in c ip le s "  were as scathing in counci l  at Aix, as in his 
despatches home. He f u l l y  r e a l i s e d  that the only way to
1. F.O. 9£. iC ont inenta l)  3o, Memorandum.
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preserve h is  system was t o  keep a t ig h t  re i^ n  on. Alexander. 
I f  that member o f  the team were given his head the e x p er i ­
mental coach would soon be in the d i t ch .  Metternich agreed 
with Castlereagh and so did Prussia and th e ir  j o in t  e f f o r t s  
succeeded in su b s t i tu t in g  ”diplomatic ob l ig a t io n s "  
for  "benign p r in c ip l e s "  as the key-note o f  the settlement. 
The Quadruple A l l ia n c e  was s t i l l  maintained, while Prance, 
though s t i l l  on probat ion ,  was c o n c i l ia te d  by admission 
to  the A l l ia n ce  under A r t i c l e  VI. This l a t t e r  clause was 
strongly  supported by Metternich, irAio imagined that 
Alexander was try in g  to bring about the ex c lu s ion  o f  
France in order to make a Russo-French a l l ia n ce  p o s s ib le .  
The Tzar had to be "grouped".
Meanwhile B athurst 's  l e t t e r  arrived a t  Aix 
very much out o f  d a te .  C ast lereagh 's  l a t e s t  report  had 
calmed the Cabinet. Ke assured them that no dates  would 
be f ix e d ,  but a t  the same time he allowed no opportunity 
to pass o f  lauding the system o f  reunions. He enlarged 
on the many dangers avoided , and the many thorny questions 
amicably d is cu ssed .  He p a r t i c u la r ly  asked that the 
Cabinet should r e f r a in  from too  c lose  a c r i t i c i s m  o f  the 
actual languages o f  the documents. In a l e t t e r  to L iver -
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pool oa November 9th , he s a y s : ­
" The ex p ress ion  in a l lu s io n  to the Holy A l l ia n ce ,
"I think Canning, i f  he reads the Prince Regent's reply  to  
"the Sovereign^at P a r is ,  w i l l  f e e l  we could not o b je c t  to ;  
"and i f  we are to go on with Russia for  any time I fear 
" i t  i s  in vain  to hope fo r  a pure vocabulary".^
He had already caused many vague and ob­
je c t io n a b le  phrases to be expunged. He r e je c t e d  an a r t i c l e  
dec lar ing  the "threatened return  o f  revo lu t ionary  c r i s e s "  
to be a "casus f o e d e r i s ? and also re fused  to put his signa­
ture to an a r t i c l e  s ta t in g  that the A l l ia n ce  had become 
stronger and more d is s o lu b le  by the bonds of  Christian 
brotherhood e x i s t in g  between sovereigns and by the access ion  
of  a l l  the Suropean s ta tes  to the Holy A ll iance  which had 
concentrated these bo-iid'tff. Furthermore, he refused to en­
te r ta in  any suggestion o f  f ix e d  meetings, A reunion was 
automatic in the case o f  a fresh  F r e n c h r e v o l t ;  and in 
that case a lon e .  Alexander in his turn gained his point 
over the announcement o f  the d e c is io n s  o f  the Congress ■ 
to the smaller s ta te s .  Castlereagh wished for  an un­
ostentat ious  p r o t o c o l ,  and a c ir cu la r  to each nation. 
Alexander pressed fo r  a General D eclaration ,  and th is  was 
issued on November 15th. in the form o f  two instruments. The
1. C ast lereagh 's  Correspondence. XII .  76.
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f i r s t  renewed the  Quadruple A l l ia n ce  f o r  the express 
purpose o f  watching over France, and the second, t o  
which France was in v i te d  to adhere, asserted  that -
** The intimate union estab lished  among the
"monarchs o f f e r s  to  Europe the most sacred pledges o f  i t s  
(•future t r a n q u i l l i t y .  The o b je c t  o f  the Union i s  none 
"other than the maintenance o f  peace. The sovereigns,
"in forming t h is  august union, have regarded as i t s  funda- 
"mental bas is  th e ir  in v a r ia b le  r e s o lu t i o n  never to depart 
"from the s t r i c t e s t  ob serva t ion  o f  the Law o f  N a t io n s . . .  
"They solemnly acknowledge that the ir  duties  towards God 
"and the people  whom they govern make i t  peremptory on 
“ them to give to the w o r l d , . . . a n  example o f  ju s t i c e ,  con -  
"cord , and m oderation ."  1
So the Conference was over and Castlereagh 
s t i l l  in o f f i c e .  The Cabinet was even pleased with him 
and thanked him f o r  his " s p i r i t  of  accommodation, and yet 
firm when p r in c ip l e s  were invo lved" .  They knew that i f  
he had acted in a l e s s  accommodating manner, Brita in  would 
have had to withdraw from t h e  A l l ia n ce ,  and few wished 
that to happen even o f  the Opposition. He had kept B r i t ­
ain to her o b l i g a t i o n s  and had preserved a p iece  of 
machinery necessary  to European peace. Besides this the . 
Conference System was s t i l l  i n e x i s t e n c e  without having
r
1, "Map o f  Europe by Treaty" (H erts le t )  I .  573.
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been d e f in e d ,  and i t  had bee j u s t i f i e d  by resu lts .  Austre- 
Russian r e l a t i o n s  had been improved, and the fear  o f  a 
separate Russo-French A l l ia n c e  removed, France was in the 
European Concert and f r e e  from the leading  r e i n .  A ll  these 
r e s u l t s  were good ,  and i f  anything could poss ib ly  have 
j u s t i f i e d  the Conference System to the English people, the 
contents o f  the General D ec larat ion  would have done so. 
Castlereagh had been at the height of  h is  pcwers 
and in f lu en ce  abroad, and in none o f  the more v i t a l  
issues  o f  the Conference had be had to g ive  way to any 
important degree. His diplomacy had been crowned with 
success ,  but his  statesmanship had f a i l e d  to please his 
Parliament and p eop le .  Although he had used his great 
in f luence  and p e r s o n a l i ty  to bring the ideas o f  Alexander 
into l in e ,  w i th  h is  own yet he had f a i l e d  to l u l l  suspic ion ,  
except w ith in  the Cabinet i t s e l f .  Without knowing i t ,  he 
had made h is  supreme e f f o r t ,  and, though his plans had . 
met with every success ,  the res is ta n ce  wias deeper than 
he had suspected ,  and la te r  when the opposing f o r c e ,  which 
he had s u c c e s s fu l l y  counteracted at Aix, began to be f e l t  
once more, h is  Conference system was rent a sunder ard 
e n t i r e ly  d estroyed .
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On q.uestions other than, the o s ten s ib le  ones 
for  which th e  Conference was c a l l e d ,  though in some ca ses  
immediate danger was averted ,  yet no d e f in i t e  p ra c t ica l  
d e c is ion s  were reached . Spain was too haughty over her 
c o l o n ia l  quest ion ,  and neither  she nor Portugal would grant 
any further  Right o f  Search concession  in th e  Slave Trade. 
The in terna l  a f f a i r s  o f  the German Confederation took  up 
much time, Prussia  wished fo r  a guarantee o f  her possess­
ions against Prance. This type of  General Guarantee was 
what the Tzar wished to lead up to and even Metternich 
thought that Prussia  might be held in check herse lf  by 
t h i s .  But C astlereagh  could see a v is io n  o f  a Russian 
army marching across  Germany with it s in e v ita b le  complica­
t ion s ,  and had the idea "postponed” .
The question o f  the Bavaria-Baden success ion  
was more d isturbed  than s e t t l e d ,  and f i n a l l y  i t  was l e f t  
to the D ie t  at Frankfurt, but Bavaria, not consulted, f e l t  
aggrieved .
Castlereagh had, by astute diplomacy contrived 
to s tee r  h im self  through some dangerous waters. He had 
maintained the f r ie n d sh ip  o f  Austria and Russia by su f fer ing
-72-
g lad ly  the f o o l e r i e s  o f  the Russian monarch. He had 
estab lished  the in tcrm ediary  character o f  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  
in f o re ig n  a f f a i r s  and in doing so had la id  down a 
boundary beyond which England would r e fu s e  to commit her­
s e l f  to c o -o p e r a t io n  with her *^llies. The continuation  
o f  the A l l ia n c e  ensured the maintenance o f  f riendship 
with A ustr ia  to whom England looked as the pro tector  o f  
her in te r e s t s  in the Mediterranean and South E§stern 
Europe, But both Russia and Prussia vaguely rea l ised  that 
England was drawing away from the Eastern Powers. In 
s p i t e  o f  h is  f r a t e r n a l  e x t e r i o r  Alexander was chagrined 
at the vague s ta te  in which th e  Conference System was l e f t .  
Ke s t i l l  en terta ined  the idea o f  the r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  the 
Holy A l l ia n c e ,  and s t i l l  be lieved  in " l i b e r a l  p r in c ip l e s " .  
But his idea o f  l i b e r t y  had become paradox ica l .  I t  was to 
be " l im ited  by the p r in c ip l e s  o f  o rd er" .  This meant nothing 
less  than benevolent despot ism . In his complex brain the 
teachings o f  La Harpe were beginning to lose  ground. The 
hered itary  n o t ion  o f  the Tzar as Father o f  his people was 
superseding h is  sentimental attachment to the p r in c ip le s  o f
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Liberty ,  and what was good f o r  Russia must be good fo r  
Europe -  v/hether i t  was C h r is t ia n  p r in c ip l e s  or a b ene f icen t  
o v e r lo r d s h ip .  U n t i l  a f t e r  A ix  the fe a r  o f  France and o f  
each o th er ,  had kept the A l l i e s  to g e th e r ,  but from t h i s  
time onwards v;e f in d  Alexander gradually  s l ip p in g  from his 
p ed esta l ,  and hope f o r  the future  o f  the A l l ia n ce  
fading away. Had he had the moral f o r c e  to keep his own 
b e l i e f  untarnished, the d i s r u p t io n  o f  the C onfederation ,  
and the d e f i n i t e  breaking  away o f  England from th e  A l l ia n ce  
might have been i n d e f i n i t e l y  postponed. Had he pursued 
an a c t iv e  L ib era l  p o l i c y  as understood by Western L ib era ls ,  
the deep -rooted  s u s p ic io n  o f  him and his c re a t io n  would 
most l i k e l y  have g ra d u a l ly  d isappeared. But even during 
the years 1815-1818 he had g iven  no a c t i v e  proo f  o f  his 
c o n v ic t io n  and so ,  wihen h is  op in ions  changed and his r e ­
a c t ion a ry  ideas were emphasised by d eed s ,  t o  Europe at 
large th is  was in keeping with his general ch a ra c te r .
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CHAPTER V.
FROK AIX-LA-CHAPELLE to TROPPAU.
C H A P T E R V.
proil a i x - la- chapelie to troppau,
During the next three years the points a t  
issue  bet7/een the p r in c ip a l  nations become de f in ed .  Be- 
tiseen 1S15-1818 much o f  the d is t ru s t  and enmity had been 
occasioned by vague rumour and insinuation rather than 
by a ctual  cause .  There had been no d e f i n i t e  events during 
those years on which the stream o f  good m i l l  was l ik e ly  to 
divide,. The tens ion  be fore  Aix had been caused more
by apprehension than by a c t i o n .  But from 1818 to 1821 new
C U r'v 'iIc.U . b ti. is T it* '
events and d isturbances  forced  the cross-currenti.channels  ,A
and the Eastern Powers, leaving  England to foll07^ her 
narrow and d e f i n i t e  course , themselves turned aside into  
a more congenial  bed. Sovereigns and ministers had l e f t  
the Congress s a t i s f i e d ,  but Castlereagh, in his d e s ire  to 
placate both Tzar and B r i t i s h  nation ,  even to t h e e x t e n t  
of  r e j e c t i n g  a "pure vocabulary",  had found i t  necessary 
to whitewash much o f  the A l l ia n ce  structure in order t o  
hide i t s  cracks and flavifS. He hoped that p er iod ic  white-
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washings and renovat ions  would preserve i t  in d e f in i t e ly ,  but 
he reckoned without the wild weather o f  the succeeding 
y ears .
In almost every country in Europe revo lu t ions  
or r i o t s  broke out betv^een 1318 and 13£1, In England r e ­
pression  and c o e r c io n  led to the f e t e r l o o  massacre and 
culminated in the S ix  A cts .  Fear o f  the masses caused 
outspoken approval o f  i / ie tternich 's  Carlsbad Decrees by 
Wellington and the T o r ie s ,  who were e x c i t e d l y  advocating 
repress ion  o f  L iberalism  in every nation -  without external 
in te r fe re n ce .  In Germany and I ta ly  d iscontent  was in­
creas ing  r a p id ly  and events seemed to be moving towards 
a general outbreak,
 ^ A u s t r ia 's  i n t e r e s t  in these  countries  were
genera l ly  acknowledged but STietternich was s t i l l  a fr a id  
o f  Russian in te r fe re n ce  in what he considered to be domestic 
concerns and spared neither  paper nor ink in trying to make 
Castlereagh share his  views. He had grounds for  his sus­
p ic ion s  on many counts .  The Tzar had paid a v i s i t  to 
Vienna at the moment when the  French government was changing 
hands, and had s ta r t le d  the Emperor Francis by suggesting
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m ob il isa t ion  and in t e r f e r e n c e  in that country. He returned 
to Russia leav ing  M ettern icb  more alarmed than ever. In 
I t a ly ,  Russian agents were preaching r e v o lu t io n  against 
Austr ia ,  in Germany they were advocating  autocracy and 
rep ress ion  to the p e t ty  sovere igns ,  but i t  was La Harpe 
who occasioned M e t t e r n i c h 's most l i v e l y  f e a r s .  His., 
l e t t e r s  t o  C ast lereagh  began to  show signs o f  i r r i t a t i o n .
He remarks on the ” p u s i l l a n im it e “o f  Castlereagh, "captivated 
by the Tsar" as he says, and on the egoism of  England. He 
begged fo r  a c l o s e r  union, and "coups de batoa"not "c a . i o l e r i e " 
as the p o l i c y  to be pursued towards Russia, but Castlereagh 
made no s ign.
To f i n d  out the true s t a t e  o f  a f fa i r s  in 
I t a ly ,  M ettern ich  dec ided  to tra v e l  through the peninsula 
and with him went the Emperor and Gordon. Their r eception 
was co ld  in t  he extreme. La Happe and the Carbonari had 
been rous ing  the Duchiei. to a s tate  o f  r e b e l l i o n  encouraged 
by hopes o f  aid from Russia and perhaps from France, Metter­
nich had no d i f f i c u l t y  in c o l l e c t i n g  evidence o f  unrest 
and o f  f o r e ig n  intr igue which he handed on to  London w ith  
the usual e x a g g e r a t io n s .  The person on whom these  despatches
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had most e f f e c t  was not  C ast lereagh ,  but the Tzar. He 
began to g e t  alarmed at  A u s t r ia ' s  a t t i t u d e ,  a t  the general 
d isturbed  s t a te  o f  Europe and at the share taken in these  
d is turbances  by h is  own m in is te rs  and a gen ts ,  whose zea l  
f o r  L ibera l ism  had d o u b t le s s  caused them t o  exceed th e ir  
i n s t r u c t i o n s .  He began to damp down t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s  and soon t h i s  part  o f  h is  e x te r n a l  p o l i c y  
c e a s e d .
i i e t t e r n i c h  next proceeded to Carlsbad in a 
more s a t i s f i e d  frame o f  mind. This l a s t  move o f  Alexander 
had removed a c e r t a in  amount o f  anx iety  and h is  c h ie f  aim 
now was to keep him out o f  Germany. In t h i s  matter he 
hoped that  E ngland 's  f r i e n d s h i p  and p o l i c y  o f  advocating  
genera l  n o n - in t e r f e r e n c e  might stand him in good stead . 
L ibera l ism  had been crushed in the Confederation  a f t e r  
1815 a lthough  some o f  the lu l e r s  had p ro g re ss iv e  tendenc ies .  
Student e x ce ss e s  at Wartburg, be fore  the Congress o f  A ix ,  
had brought r e p r e s s i v e  measures and now the  Russian agent 
KotzebuE had been murdered f o r  condemning these U n ivers ity  
r i o t s .  Almost every  s t a t e  bad i t s  centre  o f - r e v o l t .  Hetter- 
n ich  a r r iv e d  at Carlsbad with a ready-made scheme sanctioned  
by P russ ia  by which both Press and U n iv e r s i t i e s  were r e ­
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s t r i c t e d ,  the gymnasiums c lo s e d ,  and a commission appointed 
to r o o t  out th e  great  con sp iracy  supposed to be permeating 
Germany.
In England the Carlsbad Decrees were an­
athematised by both press and people ,  but the Tories 
applauded th is  return  to high-handed methods. The Cabinet 
however refused to accede to M ettern ich 's  request f o r  
o f f i c i a l  approval o f  the Decrees nor would Russia give 
them her p u b l ic  s a n c t i o n .  Metternich had hoped to strengthen 
autocracy in the in d iv id u a l  s t a te s  in the Confederation 
by a system o f  Mutual Guarantee, but the B r i t i s h  Government 
considered each German s ta te  as an ind iv idual  member of 
the European system, and th ere fo re  protested  against th is  
guarantee as an unwarrantable in ter fe ren ce  with the 
l i b e r t i e s  o f  indpendent s ta tes  and pointed out th e  in­
a d v i s a b i l i t y  o f  an a l l i a n c e  between Governments against 
Peoples,  A lexa n d er 's  o b je c t io n s  were less  emphatic
though Capo d ' I s t r i a  expressed himself in strong  enough
/
terms. He vjas a fra id  o f  Austrian supremacy In Central 
Europe, and would only  agree to separate measures o f  r e ­
pression o f  l ib e r a l i s m  by the several c o u r ts .  He even went
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so far  as to  send a c i r c u l a r  round to the various nations 
asking f o r  a genera l  condemnation o f  t h e  D ecrees ,  and fo r  
support f o r  the South German s t a t e s ,  w-hich mere holding 
out against  M ettern ich .  C ast lereagh ,  taking the opportun­
i t y  o f  d r iv in g  home h is  n o n - in te r fe re n c e  p o l i c y ,  refused
to make any statement reg a rd in g  the D ecrees ,  and through
/
Neumann, Austrian  Charge d ’ a f f a i r e s  in  London, remonstrated 
with Metternich f o r  approaching Russia and England on the  
su b ject .  I f  the matter had been brought up in the Houses, 
the press and p u b l i c  would have fcr ced an anti-A ustr ian  
p o l i c y  on the Cabinet ,  and t h is  might have led to a Russo- 
B r i t i s h  a l l i a n c e  with th e  South-German s ta tes  against 
Austria .  M ettern ich  r e a l i s e d  his mistake, p a c i f ie d  and 
converted the Southern States  and so extracted  a confirma­
t ion  o f  the Decrees from t h e  D ie t .  The A u stro -B r i t ish  
fr ien dsh ip  now seemed stronger  than ev e r ,  and viii le  
Wellington and the Regent were congratu la t ing  the Austrian 
minister on h is  r e p r e s s iv e  measures, C ast lereaghw as e x ­
pressing p leasure  at h is moderation.
Meanwhile matters in France bad been engaging
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the a t te n t io n  o f  the Powers. With the c l o s in g  o f  the 
Aix Congress and the withdrawal o f  the a l l i e d  troops ,  the 
power o f  R ic h e l ie u  d ec l in ed  and his m in istry  f e l l ,  and his 
place was taken hy Decades, a L itera l  and a f r i e n d  o f  the 
King, This change in i t s e l f  troubled i-ozzo d i  Sorgo, 
but when the new War M in ister  began to rearrange the  army 
on Napoleonic l i n e s ,  and t o  r e c a l l  many o f  Napoleon's 
o f f i c e r s ,  he h u rr ied ly  wrote t o  Alexander. The Tzar was 
as alarmed and apprehensive a s  his m inister and immediate­
ly ,  in January 1819, asked the A l l i e s  to intervene in order 
to stop t h i s  progress  o f  the  L e ft .  In Paris Pozzo di 
Borgo l o s t  the p r e s t ig e  which he had possessed under the 
R iche l ieu  m in is try ,  and in consequence he was extremely 
jea lous o f  S ir  Charles Stuart who now r a p id ly  rose  into 
the favour  and con f id en ce  o f  Decades, Castlereagh warned 
him not to  l e t  t h i s  favour a f f e c t  his r e l a t i o m w i t h  the 
other ambassadors, and to keep the A l l ia n ce  so l id  in Paris . 
This p o l i c y  o f  re fu s in g  to  fo l l o w  up a temporary advantage 
shows great r e s t r a i n t  and wisdom and a determination to 
uphold the A l l ia n c e  and peace even a t  the co s t  o f  n eg le c t ­
ing a d ip lom atic  opp ortu n ity .
Castlereagh and M ettern ichw ere  agreed that  
in ter fe ren ce  in Franc© was both unnecessary and im p o l i t i c .  
The l a t t e r  wished fo r  a renewal o f  the Ambassadarial Con-
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ference  in P aris  but notn ing  more. Pozzo d i  Borgo next 
suggested j o i n t  in s t r u c t i o n s  on ( I )  a Remonstration against 
the new War M in is te r  (£ )  j o i n t  a ct ion  on th e  death o f  the 
French King. This l a s t  might be necessary  on account 
o f  the  d i s l i k e  e n te r ta in ed  by the people  f o r  the (feciining 
Louis* p r o s p e c t iv e  s u c c e s s o r ,  the  Comte d 'A r t o i s ,  C a s t le -  
reagh r e p l ie d  w ith  a c i r c u l a r  r e j e c t i n g  in te r fe ren ce  and 
asking f o r  u n i ty  between the A l l i e s ,  On A p r i l  l£ th .  
the Tzar again proposed a c t iv e  measures and a renewal o f  
the Ambassadors C on ference .  Metternich wrote to E ster­
hazy w i t h r e g a r d  to  the  Russian c i r c u la r  disapproving i t s  
suggestion  but p ropos ing  to make Vienna a centre  of 
d ip lom atic  c o n fe r e n c e s ,  and asks Castlereagh*s support fo r  
a proposal to  send j o i n t  "eventual instruct!oni! '  to the 
ambassadors in  P a r is  to  in d ic a te  th e ir  l in e  o f  a c t i o n  on 
the death  o f  the French k in g .  Castlereagh , b u s i ly  occupied 
with home a f f a i r s ,  r e f r a i n e d  f  rom any d e f i n i t e  answer t o  
th is ,  but opposed the idea o f  the Vienna Conferences.
At l a s t  the fu r th e r  in tr ig u es  o f  Pozzo di 
Borgo and the appearance in England o f  Capo d ' I s t r i a ,  
s t i l l  t r y in g  to e x t r a c t  a promise o f  in te r fe re n ce ,  caused 
Castlereagh to issu e  his  important Memorandum o f  September
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The f i r s t  claimed that  there  had been no change in the 
French c o n s t i t u t i o n  s in c e  the A ix - la -C h a p e i le  Conference 
to c a l l  f o r  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  'The second stated  that unless 
France committed an Act i n f r in g in g  the  T reat ies  no c o n fe r ­
ence o f  the  Quadruple A l l ia n c e  was necessary  or cou ld ,  
j u s t l y ,  be assem bled ,
“The f a i r  import o f  the whole o f  these p r o -  
"ceedings  ( a t  A ix - l a - C h a p e l l e )  seems to  be that the Five 
"Powers then formed a s t r i c t  Union and C on cert . vAiich 
"was to continue b in d in g  so long as France committed no 
"act which cou ld  be regarded as g iv in g  r i s e  to the  casus 
"fp e d e r is  e t  b e l l i  under the Treaty o f  A l l ia n c e ,  T i l l  
"such an a c t  should o ccur  the Treaty o f  the Quadruple . . . .  
.*iAlliance was d ec la red  to  be suspended, and..inoperative
" ............As the Four Powers, i t  i s  c o n ce iv e d ,  cannot
"a l le g e  a s in g le  in s ta n ce  in which the  Government o f  France 
"has a c t u a l l y  f a i l e d  in i t s  ex terna l  r e l a t i o n s  since 
"the t r a n s a c t io n s  were signed at A ix ,  they must ground 
"these proceed ings  upon th e  alarm w i t h  which they regard 
"her in te r n a l  s i t u a t i o n . . . . In  taking such a step th e  Four 
"Powers ought t h e r e f o r e  g ra v e ly  to  look  at a l l  the 
"consetiuences a n d . . .  they should not d is g u ise  from them- 
"s e lv e s  that  the d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  the Concert taken with 
"France at A ix  would be the immediate and probable con -  
"seq^uence o f  i t * "
“Assuming th a t  there  e x i s t s  no immediate 
"ground f o r  d i r e c t  in te r v e n t io n  on the  part o f  the A l l i e s  
"e i th er  by remonstrance or  o th erw ise ,  and that the only 
"measure o f  p re ca u t ion  ’now s u g g e s te d , fo r  adoption i s  the  
"establishment o f  a m in i s t e r i a l  con feren ce  on the part o f  
"the Four Powers e i t h e r  a t  Vienna or Paris  to d e l ib e r a t e  
" ( t o  the e x c lu s io n  o f  the French M in is ter )  on th e  s t a te
2 4 th . T h is  d ocu m en t was draw n up under s i x  h e a d in g s .
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"o f  F r a n c e . . , i s  the es tab l ish m en t  o f  such a Conference 
"under present  c i r cu m s ta n ce s .  Considered w ith in  e i th e r  
"the l e t t e r  or the  s p i r i t  o f  th e  engagements taken w ith  
"France at A l x - l a - C h a p e i l e ,  and, i f  th ere  should e x i s t  
"a doubt upon the p o i n t ,  and th e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  o f  such a 
"Conference compensate the r i s k  o f  shaking that arrangement 
" in  the present  s t a te  o f  b o th  France and E u rop e " . !
In P r o p o s i t i o n  5 f o l l o w s  an argument against 
the suggested scheme o f  renewed ambassadorial con ferences  
which would become the cen tre  o f  in t r ig u e .
" I s  such a system o f  Conferences  necessary  t o  
"the accomplishment o f  the  o b j e c t  which th e  A l l i e s  have 
"a lone in view, namely the p r e s e r v a t io n  o f  that  Union 
"upon which Europe i s  to  depend f o r  i t s  s e c u r i t y  in ca se  
"France ^ o u l d  in v i o l a t i o n  o f  the Treaty ,  compromise i t s
'repose
Ought the Conference  to be one merely o f
Report or o f  D e l i b e r a t i o n .
"The l a s t  a l t e r n a t iv e  (Conference  o f  Delibera-  
" t io n )  is  c e r t a i n l y  the most s e r io u s ,  countenancing as i t  
"does a d i r e c t  agency on the p o l i t i c s  o f  that country ,  £Lnd 
" i t  i s  o b v io u s ,  i f  a co n fe ren ce  i s  t o  be placed a t  P a r is ,  
"whether pur m in is te r s  i n t e r f e r e  or not ,  th a t  the nation  
" w i l l  be taught to b e l i e v e  that  they do, and perhaps i t  
" w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them not to neddle more or ia s s .
"Now upon t h i s  q u es t ion  i t  has always appeared to 
"the B r i t i s h  Government that  even cou ld  we see our way 
"much more c l e a r l y  than we do, we diould n everth e less  ab- 
" s ta in  from such in t e r f e r e n c e ,
"The P r in ce  R e g e n t 's  Government i s  s t ro n g ly  
"o f  the o p in io n  that the most prudent, the  most commanding, 
"as w e l l  as the  most u s e f u l  course  which the Four Powers
l . F . O ,  7 .  ( A u s t r i a ) ,  1 4 £ . N o. 1 ,
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"can pursue i s  to  avoid  every  demonstration o f  a d i s p o s i -  
" t ion  to  i n t e r f e r e  in the in te rn a l  concerns o f  F r a n c e . ” 1
The f i n a l  argument i s  against "Eventual In­
s t r u c t i o n ” which the I^emor andum says vvould do more harm 
than good hy p r e ju d i c i n g  France against  the very man they 
were intended to su pp ort ,  the r e a c t i o n a r y  Comte d 'A r t o i s .
C e r ta in ly  th e  opiniors expressed in t h i s  
document are n e i th e r  confused nor h a l f -h e a r te d .  Had - 
Castlereagh been in a compromising mood he might have 
agreed to those  a r t i c l e s  in  t he Tzar 's  proposa ls  which 
had been endorsed by A u str ia  and r e j e c t e d  the r e s t  but 
the r e f u t a t i o n  was com p le te .  In th e  eyes o f  Parliament 
and people  moderation a lone would j u s t i f y  his  p o l i c y  o f  
keeping England bound to the Continent, and to ob ta in  t h i s  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  he had to  r i s k d r i v i n g  A ustr ia  in to  t he arms 
o f  Russia ,  His in s t r u c t i o n  to S ir  Charles Stewart on h is  
conduct towards Decades and th e  ambassadors showed his 
earnest d e s i r e  to keep in with the A l l ia n c e ,  but t h i s  was 
dependent on Parliamentary s a n c t i o n .  Metternich was a fr a id
1. F.O. 7. (A u s tr ia )  14^. No. I .
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o f  f iussia ,  bat s t i l l  more o f  R evo lu t ion ,  and u n t i l  
Germany and France were s e t t l e d  again he was r e t i r i n g  be­
hind "a c loud  o f  in k " .  Anxious to be f r i e n d l y  a l l  round, 
trimming h is  s a i l s ,  so a s  to  be ready  f o r  s q u a l l s ,  from 
any quarter -
"For my p a r t , "  r ep orted  S t e w a r t , " !  r e a l l y  
"b e l ie v e  that  the A ustr ian  M in is ter  is  p e r f e c t l y  p l ia n t  on 
" a l l  t h i s  s u b je c t  and he ho lds  it up merely to  a f ford  
"ammunition f o r  working upon; he w i l l  be amenable to 
"anything the P r ince  R e g e n t 's  Government may deem a d v is -  
"a b le ;  but as the Emperor o f  Russia brought forward the 
" idea  o f  common in s t r u c t i o n s  to tne M in is te rs  at 
"Paris  f o r  the  guidance o f  t h e i r  conduct,  Prince Metternich 
" i s  d es irou s  o f  f l a t t e r i n g  that C ab in et" ,^
His wish f o r  "evenutal in s t r u c t io n s "  was 
probably  s in c e r e ,  complying with the T^ar in t h i s  
re sp ec t  in order to share with him the honour o f  helping 
the Comte de A r t o i s  to h is  throne. A Franco-Russian 
A l l ia n ce  mas the l a s t  th ing  he d e s i r e d .
He pressed  fo r  th ese  " in s t r u c t io n s "  with such 
ze s t  and so l i t t l e  ca r e  that the French Ambassador at Vienna 
d iscovered  the n e g o t ia t i o n s  and warned the King o f  France,
1. C a a t le rea g h 's  Foreign  P o l i c y .  (C.K,Webster) 210; F.O,
7 ( A u s t r i a ) . 143,
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Louis \v3ls alarmed and piq_ued at having h is  demise# d i s ­
cussed and sent a l e t t e r  to K e t t e r n ic h  on the *
r
He itwisted t h i s  in to  a demand from  Louis  f o r  " in s tru ct ion s®  
from the Four Powers, and passed i t  on t o  C astlereagh  who 
w e ll  knew that u n q u a l i f i e d  support f o r  any Bourbon would 
bring  down the  Government, This tense  s i t u a t io n  was ased  
by the murder o f  the  Due de B err i  which caused a v i o le n t  
a n t i - L ib e r a l  r e a c t i o n  and the Decades m in istry  was o v e r -  
tnrown. R i c h e l i e u  was returned  to power and no e x te rn a l  
help  seemed n e c e s s a r y  t o  ensure the le g i t im a te  successLon. 
ivietternich was s a t i s f i e d  and the “eventual  in s t r u c t io n s "  
f i n a l l y  appeared as in s t r u c t i o n s  to the  Ambassadors o f  the 
three Eastern Powers to;-, " r e cog n ise  the leg it im a te  successors  
o f  the King o f  F ra n ce ” , C ast lereagh  even held a lo o f  from 
th is  moderate d e c la r a t i o n  though the Cabinet was s a t i s f i e d  
with the p o l i c y  o f  the other Powers, His honest treatment 
o f  France in t h i s  matter was i l l - r e w a r d e d  fo r  the f  a l ie n  
Decades became Ambassador in London, and turned from  his 
old P r o -B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  to one o f  antagonism shared equa lly  
by the u l t r a - R o y a l i s t  Government, This animosity 
was soon to  in crea se  over  the t r o u b le s  in  Spain.
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In 1812, a f t e r  W ell ington  had forced  the French 
troops to  r e t i r e  from Madrid, l o c a l  Juntas had sprung up 
to  maintain order and government in t h e i r  v a r iou s  d i s t r i c t s .  
These had maintained a v igorous  o p p o s i t io n  to French 
co n tr o l  while the c e n t r a l  government had issued an extremely 
democratic C o n s t i t u t i o n .  Since Ferdinand’ s return , the 
country had been ru led  in an a u t o c r a t i c  and incompetent 
manner; King and m in is te r s  were incapable  and o b s t in a te ;  
r e la t i o n s  w ith  t-ortugal and with the South American 
c o l o n i e s  were in a s t a te  o f  rupture , the F lor ida  Treat ies  
with the  U,S,A. had not  b e e n r a t i f i e d , n e ith er  could England 
get her to f o l l o w  any s a t i s f a c t o r y  p o l i c y  towards the Slave 
Trade, S ince  A ix - la - C h a p e l l e ,  Madrid had been a hot-bed 
o f  Russian in t r ig u e s  and Alexander had even been forced 
to withdraw h is  ambassador Tatishchev because o f  th e  alarmed 
p ro te s ts  o f  the other Powers, At l a s t  the a c t iv e  p or t ion  
of  the nat ion  took matters in to  t h e i r  own hands by ca rry ­
ing out a m i l i t a r y  r e v o lu t i o n ,  and having Ferdinand in 
th e ir  hands they fo r ce d  him to s ign  the 1812 C onstitu t ion  
once more. The m a jor ity  o f  the Spaniards remained non­
chalant, and though they d i s l ik e d  the C on st itu t ion  as to o  
extreme and im p r a c t i c a b le ,  yet  they pre ferred  i t  to the
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ignoble r u le  o f  Ferdinand.
The e f f e c t  o u ts id e  Spaan was considerable .  
Alexander's Libera,lism, which had been bacl®d up by e ig h t -  
hundred bayonets,  was reduced to a minimum when he saw a 
brother monarch deposed by h is  own troops .  Besides being 
se r iou s ly  alarmed f o r  h is  ovin s a fe ty  he also  saw an opport­
unity  f o r  g e t t in g  the A l l ia n c e  working along his own l in e s .  
He proposed, f i r s t  at B er l in  and then in a c ir cu la r  to the 
A ll ied  co u r ts  that  there  diould be an Assembly of  the 
M inisters in Paris  to con s id er  a course o f  a ct ion .  "The in­
te r e s ts  to  be d e c id e d , "  he s a i d , "are those of  the universe 
and involve  the fu tu re  perhaps o f  a i l  c i v i l i s e d  p eop les ,"
The Central Powers were busy with the Vienna Conference 
but B er l in  was o f  the same mind as the Tzar, and Rose 
was informed that  Russia  vould be supported by Prussia in 
Invoking the  Holy A l l ia n c e  and in converting i t  into a 
means o f  a General Guarantee o f  T e r r i t o r i e s ,  This would 
have forced  the withdrawal o f  England from the European 
System.
In France the new R iche l ieu  -Fasquier 
ministry regarded the whole Spanish problem as a pr ivate
>7
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•bhc whole 3pa'i-iii»h--prjat."teai' Liyr i-A^Lg^tze concern o f  the
Bourbon fam ily ,^  and thought the question  o f  in te r fe ren ce  
to be a domestic  one. The m in is try  was d e f i n i t e l y  a n t i ­
B r i t i s h ,  c h i e f l y  on account o f  trade antagonism in the 
Americas, and S tu art  had f a l l e n  from the exalted p o s i t io n  
he had held when Decayes was in pov/er. To uphold thei
assumed p r e r o g a t iv e  in the Spanish Question, R iche l ieu  
sent La Tour du Pin t o  Madrid with in s tru c t io n s  to  advise 
Ferdinand, S tu a r t ,  hearing o f  t h i s ,  forevjarned both 
W el les ley  and the Spanish L ib e r a ls ,  The design had to be 
abandoned, and Le Tour du Pin returned to  France where the 
antipathy to S tuart  and England was consequently  increased.
This m iss ion  o f  Du Pin had been backed up 
by Pruss ia ,  who at the same time was advocat ing  a meeting 
o f  the Ambassadors in Paris  and common a c t i o n .  Everything 
rested on the  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  of  A u str ia .  There is  no 
doubt that M ettern ich  was g r e a t ly  alarmed by the Revolu­
t i o n .  In I t a l y  the  L ib e ra ls  were toa s t in g  the success 
o f  th e i r  Spanish comrades and the Austrian Emperors in te re s ts  
were sca t tered  in t o o  wide and d iverse  a f i e l d  to allow
- 9 0 -
any encouragement t o ,  or even h e s i t a t i o n  tovrard, a
movement which might cause d is ru p t io n .  This f e a r ,  how­
ev e r ,  mas outweighed by the  o lder  and g rea ter  fear  o f
Russia ,  H e t te rn ich  was bound by the Holy A l l ia n c e  to 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i f  the  moral i l l s  o f  Europe so requ ired ,  
but the idea o f  a Russian Army marching a cross  the Con­
fe d e r a t io n  to  the  a s s i s ta n c e  o f  Spain, a lthough  i t  might 
be in the i n t e r e s t s  o f  a u tocra cy ,  yet  i t  would c e r t a in ly  
have i t s  d isa d v a n ta g es .  Undue Russian in f lu en ce  e ither  
at Frankfurt or  P a r is  was to  be avoided at a l l  c o s t s .
This fe a r  o f  Russia on th e  part o f  Austria  
saved Spain from in te r v e n t io n  and, f o r  the moment, saved 
England from i s o l a t i o n .  C astlereagh  and Wellington had 
been g r e a t l y  alarmed at th e  step taken by Russia ,  Prussia 
and France. Though very much occupied in England with the 
unsavoury Royal D ivorce  Question, yet the Foreign M inister 
had time t o  adv ise  Vt^ellesley in Madrid as to the p o l i c y  
to be pursued. He was to  absta in  from any in te r fe re n ce  
u n less  e i th e r  the K in g 's  l i f e  mas in danger or Portugal 
was a tta ck ed .  He hoped that a more moderate Cortes ,  
e l e c t e d  by th e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  would a l t e r  that con­
s t i t u t i o n  f o r  one l e s s  dem ocratic .  To the in v i t a t io n  o f
9
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the three  Powers f o r  in t e r v e n t io n  he gave no r e p ly ,  but 
proceeded to  draw up a Memorandum, w ith  Wellington* s a s s i s t -  
a n c e , t o  be approved by the Cabinet and sent round to 
f o r e i g n  c o u r t s .
This  dociiment appeared as the famous Memorandum 
o f  May 5 th .  18S6, W ell ingto  n* s' c o n t r ib u t i o n  n a tu r a l ly  
diiieit a lm ost  e n t i r e l y  on the  in te r n a l  c o n d i t i o n  o f  Spain 
with which he had an in t im ate  acquaintance .  He d e s c r ib e d  
the s i t u a t i o n  as c r i t i c a l ,  but in t e r f e r e n c e  was impossib le  
owing to the  d i s l i k e  which the Spaniards enterta ined  f o r  
any f o r e i g n e r s ,  even when in  th e  country  f o r  th e ir  advant­
age, as in the  P en in su lar  War, and **of a l l  f o r e ig n e r s  the 
French a re  the  most od iou s  to that  c o u n tr y ” . Castlereagh  
la id  down very  d e f i n i t e  o p in io n s .  He knew that i t  was 
no o c c a s i o n  f o r  s u b t l e t y  or  h a l f -h e a r te d  statements but 
that  the B r i t i s n  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  A ix  o b l i g a t i o n s  must 
be d e f i n i t e l y  brought to  the  n o t i c e  o f  the  Pov^ers once 
again . His f i r s t  ca re  was to J u s t i f y  the p o l i c y  o f  
B r i ta in  towards Spain ,  that  o f  n o n - in te r v e n t io n .  The 
Spanish monarch had a ccep ted  the C o n s t i tu t io n ,  and moreover 
Spain was not l i k e l y  t o  menace other  c o u n t r i e s : -
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" The ca re  i s  not such as to warrant such an in t e r -
'’ f e ren ce  and we do not f e e l  th a t  we have at the moment 
"e i th e r  the r ig h t  or the means to in t e r f e r e  by f o r c e " .
He r e j e c t e d  the Russian and Prussian pro ­
posa ls  and suggested that  any a d v ic e  should be o f fe re d  
sep a ra te ly .  England had no d es ire  to aiiow "the character 
o f  the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to  be merged into that o f  the 
French Ambassador at Hadrid. , . .Nor under our national  
p r e ju d ic e s  would i t  be f e l t  otherwise than as an o b je c t io n  
to such a c o u r s e . "
N on - in te rv e n t io n  and the A l l ia n ce  P r in c ip le s
as understood by B r i t a in  were f u l l y  se t  down -
" Many S ta te s  o f  Europe are now employed in the
" d i f f i c u l t  taks o f  c a s t in g  anew th e ir  Governments upon the 
"R epresentat ive  System; but the notion  o f  r e v i s i n g ,  l i m i t -  
” in g , or r e g u la t in g  the course  o f  such experiments, e ither  
"by F ore ign  C ounc i l  or by Foreign  f o r c e ,  would be as 
"dangerous to  avow as i t  would be im possib le  to ex ecu te .
" In t h i s  A l l i a n c e ,  as in a i l  human arrangeij;ients,
"nothing i s  more l i k e l y  to  impair, or even to d es troy  i t s  
" rea l  u t i l i t y  than any attempt to push i t s  Duties and i t s  
"O b l ig a t ion s  beyond the sphere which i t s  o r i g in a l  Con- 
" c ep t ion  and understood P r in c ip le s  w i l l  warrant. Having 
"subdued the conqueror i t  took the s ta te  o f  possess ions ,
"as e s t a b l i s h e d  by the Peace, under the p r o te c t io n  o f  the 
" A l l ia n c e .  I t  never was however intended as a Union fo r  
"the Government o f  the World or f o r  the Superintendence 
"o f  the in te r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  other S t a t e s , . . . I t  was the 
"Revolutionary  Power in  i t s  m i l i ta r y  ch a ra c te r ,  actual 
"and e x is ta n t  w ith in  France, a g a in s t  which i t  intended to 
"take p re ca u t io n ,  and not against  th e  Democratic P r in c ip le s  
"then as now, but too  general ' ly  spread throughout Europe". 1
1. F.O.  7 .  ( A u s t r i a )  148.  No. 9
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The n o t io n  was "too deep ly  preva lent"  that 
the A l l i e s  cou ld  i n t e r f e r e  v/henever any great  p o l i t i c a l  
event o c c u rre d .
C a s t le rea g h  went to the  ro o t  o f  the d i f f e r ­
ence in ideas between England and the a u t o c r a t i c  s t a t e s ; -
“ The J^ing o f  Great B r i ta in  has, f r o m t  he 
"nature o f  our C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a l l  h is  means to acquire 
"through P ar l iam en t ,  and he must well  know by experience ,  
'-'that, i f  embarked in  war on grounds which th e  vo ice  o f  
"the country  does not su s ta in ,  the e f f o r t s  o f  th e -s tron g es t  
"a d m in is tra t ion  which ever  served the Crown would be soon 
"unequal to  the p r o s e c u t io n  o f  the c o n t e s t .  In Russia 
"there  i s  but l i t t l e  P ub lic  Sentiment w ith  regard to 
"Spain which can embarrass the d e c i s i o n  o f  th e  Sovereign.
"In Great B r i t a in  there  is  a great  d e a l ,  and the current 
"o f  that  Sentiment runs most s t r o n g ly  a ga in s t  the King o f  
" S p a in . . . .
" This in te r v e n t io n  coming from th e  Five Great
"Powers has always more or le s s  the a ir  o f  D ic ta t io n  and 
"o f  Menace, and the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  i t s  being intended t o  
"be pushed to a f o r c i b l e  in te rv e n t io n  is  always assumed 
"or imputed by an ad verse  p a r t y . The ground s o f  the in -  
" t e r v e n t io n  thus become u n p o p u la r , . . .
" The f a c t  i s  that we do not and cannot f e e l
"a l ik e  upon a l l  s u b j e c t s .  Our P o s i t i o n ,  our I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
"the Habits o f  Thinking, and the P re ju d ices  o f  our 
"peop le ,  render us e s s e n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t .  ViTe cannot, in 
" a l l  m atters ,  reason  and f e e l  a l i k e .  We should lo se  the 
"con f id en ce  o f  our r e s p e c t i v e  nations  i f  we d id ,  and the 
"very a f f e c t a t i o n  o f  such an im p o s s ib i l i t y  would soon 
"render the  A l l ia n c e  an o b j e c t  o f  odium and o f  d i s t r u s t .  
"Whereas i f  we l e e p  i t  w ith in  i t s  commonplace l im i t s ,  the 
" r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  Governments, and those which are more purely  
"monarchical,  may w e l l  f i n d  each a common in te r e s t .  The 
"Governments w i l l  th en  r e s p e c t i v e l y r e t a i n  t h e i r  f a c u l t y  
"o f  independent a c t i o n " ,  1
1. F . 0 . 7  ( A u s t r i a . )  148 .  No.  9.
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C ast le rea gh  had a lready  experienced 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  the c e a s e l e s s  a ttacks  o f  the opp os it ion  on 
his f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  Sven when his f r i e n d s h ip  towards the 
Powers remained p a s s iv e  these  a ttacks  continued, and a c t u a l ly  
endangered the C ab inet .  I f  he fo l low ed the Tzar in an 
a ct ion  opposed to  the wishes o f  Parliament and people the 
Government was doomed. The tendency o f  English thought 
and f e e l i n g  was in favour  o f  in s u la r i t y .  Coupled with 
nat ion a l  b ig o t r y  t h i s  was the cause o f  the  b e l i t t l e -  
ment and d i s l i k e  o f  a i l  th in gs  fo re ig n  which was very 
prevalent at t h i s  t im e. Proud and co n f id e n t  o f  the ir  
own system o f  Government, th e  English people  wished to 
see other  S ta tes  f o l l o w in g  th e i r  lead. This f e e l in g  accounts 
fo r  the i n i t i a l  sympathy towards the French Revolution , 
and the l a t e r  a nt ipathy  towards i t s  ex ce ss e s ,  f o r  the 
support g iven  to th e  Spanish r e b e l s  and c o l o n ie s ,  and fo r  
the d e s i r e  to aid the Danes and I ta l ia n s  la te r  in the 
dentury. Absence o f  r e s t r a i n t ,  and freedom to  work out 
th e ir  own n a t io n a l  d e s t i n i e s  were necessary con d it ion s  fo r  
obta in ing  t h i s  r e s u l t .  Such con d it ion s  then should be 
the p r i v i l e g e  o f  the s e r f s  in Russia and the c o l o n i s t s  in 
South America, whether prepared or not f o r  self-government.
- 9 o -
But t h i s  o p in io n  was m od if ied  by th 4 ^ con v ic t ion  that  a 
country ,  in order to  a ch ieve  the b lessed  s ta te  must reach  
i t  by i t s  own e f f o r t s .  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government and a 
t r a d i t i o n  o f  freedom must be earned. The moral s tren gth  
o f  a n at ion  does not n e c e s s a r i l y  l i e  in  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
but in i t s  h i s t o r y .
"The P r i n c i p l e  o f  one State  i n t e r f e r in g  by fo r ce  
in t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  another in order to en force
the g ov e rn in g  a u th o r i ty  i s  always a question
*' in t  he 
"obed ience  to
" o f  the g r e a t e s t  moral as w e l l  as p o l i t i c a l  d e l i c a c y ,  
"and i t  i s  not meant here to  examine i t .  I t  is  on ly  
"important on th e  p re se n t  o c c a s io n  to  observe  that to 
" g e n e r a l i s e  such a P r i n c i p l e  and to th in k  o f r e d u c i n g  
" to  a system, or to impose i t  as an o b l i g a t i o n ,  is  a 
" u t t e r l y  im p r a c t i c a b le  and o b j e c t i o n a b l e .
i t
scheme
" I t  i s  im p o s s ib le ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  make such a
" P r in c ip l e  the  B as is  o f  a General A l l i a n c e .  No country 
"having a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  system o f  Government would act 
"upon i t ,
" Great B r i t a in  has perhaps equal Power with
"any other  S ta te  to oppose h e r s e l f  to a p r a c t i c a l  and 
" i n t e l l i g i b l e  danger c a p a b le  o f  being brought home to the 
"n a t io n a l  f e e l i n g .  When the T e r r i t o r i a l  Balance o f  
"Europe i s  d is tu rb ed  she can p la y  t e r  part  with e f f e c t ,  
"but she i s  the  l a s t  Government in Europe which can be 
"expected ,  or venture ,  t o  commit h e r s e l f  on any questioh
"o f  an a b s t r a c t  ch a ra cte r  7/hich 
"cannot be made t o  f e e l . "  1
tae n a t ion a l  sentiment
I n t e r f e r e n c e  and the General Guarantee pro ­
posed by t h e  Tzar, ea ch  presented the same problem, th a t  
o f  supporting  d y n a s t ie s  which had not r e c e iv e d  popular
l . F . O .  7 ( A u s t r i a ) .  1 4 S . No,  9,
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sa n ct ion .  Mo C ab inet  cou ld  support th is  p o l i c y  and hope 
to s u r v iv e .  C a s t le re a g h  was f i g h t i n g  a hard b a t t le  
a ga in s t  the vagueness  o f  A lexander .  B es ides  exaggerating 
the A l l ia n c e  o b l i g a t i o n  he re fu s e d  to a ccep t  the f a c t s  o f  
the s i t u a t i o n .  The B r i t i s h  Memorandum r e c o g n is e s  the 
L ib e ra l  movements in  Europe. Though u n d es ira b le  they must 
be l e f t  a lone  to  the n a t io n s  con ce rn e d . Alexander was
y
also  soa r in g  too  h igh to n o t i c e  the d i f f e r e n c e  between 
forms o f  Governinent^ and i t s  importance. C astlereagh  
brought i t  home to him as an ex p la n a t io n  o f  his l in e  o f  
p o l i c y .  As re g a r d s  " i n t e r f e r e n c e ” he merely says that 
the B r i t i s h  n a t io n  would not stand i t .  The moral issues 
o f  OTi£ s t a t e  r e g a r d in g  i t s e l f  as s u f f i c i e n t l y  insp ired  
to d i c t a t e  to  o t h e r s  he l e f t  a lon e .
So d ec ided  a p o l i c y  was bound to ca rry  weight 
and a l l  t h e  powers ex ce p t  R ussia  agreed to  the Memorandum 
and withdre^’i t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s .  M ettern ich  s t i l l  pre­
ferred  the f r i e n d s h i p  o f  C a st le rea gh  to the doubtfu l  
b e n e f i t s  to be reaped by support ing  Alexander, e s p e c i a l l y  
as the a t t i t u d e  o f  each towards the German C onfederat ion  
question  was f r e s h  in h is  mind. Sven France agreed with 
the p ro p o sa l  and r e j e c t e d  a second c i r c u l a r  appeal by the
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Tzar, though R i c h e l i e u  s t i l l  hoped f o r  a Conference at 
which she cou ld  a s s e r t  her own p r e r o g a t iv e  in Spanish 
matters.  So a i l  seemed to  he s e t t l e d  north  of  the 
Pyrenees with Spain l e f t  to work out her own dest in y ,  
when a f f a i r s  in Naples caused a genera l  s h i f t i n g  o f  
sympathies and i n t e r e s t s  o f  which Russia took f u l l  ad­
vantage.
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C H A P T E R VI.
TROFFAU ANl; LAIBACH.
C H A P T E R VI.
TROFPAU AND LAIBACH.
The o c c u rre n c e  v;hich was to  be f a t a l  to th e  
A l l ia n c e  t o o k  p la c e  in  Naples to the astonishment o f  Europe. 
Since 1815, the Southern part  o f  I t a ly  had shown the best  
r e s u l t s  o f  any o f  the S ta te s  from th e  r e - i m p o s i t i o n  o f  
a u to cra cy .  Ferdinand I ,  though cowardly and incapable ,  had 
s u f f i c i e n t  sense  to  take  advantage o f  A ustr ian  a d v ic e ,  and 
to moderate h is  r e a c t i o n a r y  r u l e ,  and, d e s p i t e  d is con ten t   ^
caused by t h e  re in s ta te m e n t  o f  p r i e s t s  and m i l i t a r y ,  yet  
i t  was in Naples a lon e  that  M ettern ich  found any signs o f  
contentment and o f  g e n e r a l  in d u stry .  The B r i t i s h  Ambassador 
could r e p o r t  w ith  r e l i e f  in March 13H) that  the '•q.uiet 
and p rosperou s  s t a t e  o f  th ese  Kingdoms a f f o r d s  but few 
s u b je c ts  worthy o f  being brought to  your L ordsh ip ’ s n o t i c e " .  
P a r t ly  through the in f lu e n c e  o f  the M uratist  o f f i c e r s  s t i l l  
in the army i n t r i g u i n g  w ith  th e  C arbonari ,  and p a r t ly  
tnrough the g e n e r a l  d e s i r e  to c o n s o l id a te  and ensure the
1
1. C a s t le r e a g h 's  F ore ign  trolley (C .K .W eb ster ) , 260,261 
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p r o sp e r i ty  by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  change, the Neapolitan 
m i l i t i a  r o se  under General Pepe and fo r ce d  on Ferdinand 
the C on st i tu t ion  o f  1812. The c h ie f  o b je c t  o f  the reb e ls  
was the e x c lu s io n  o f  Austrian in f lu en ces  and Ferdinand's 
p o s i t i o n  was in no way endangered. A fte r  fe ign ing  i l ln e s s  
he s igned, c a l l i n g  upon God's vengeance i f  he l i e d ,  and 
immediately sending to A ustr ia  for  help and a d v ic e .
Europe was astounded. Castlereagh wrote to 
Stewart, "What an event d ir e c te d  against a Government without 
rep roa ch " .^  This r e v o l t  was obviously  in a d dif ferent 
c la s s  to that in Spain. The other I t a l ia n  States were 
d i r e c t l y  menaced by an extension  o f  i t s  in f luence  and, to  
a l l  appearances, i t  had no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  in i t s  o r ig in s .  
Castlereagh did not h e s i ta te  to assure i ie ttern ich  that ,  
in his o p in io n ,  i t  was an Austrian matter, t o  be d e a l t  with 
immediately and with s e v e r i t y .  Wellington even o f fe re d  
m i l i ta ry  a d v ic e .  But in case  t h i s  support created too great 
an optimism, Castlereagh  a lso  mentioned that his State 
Papers o f  May oth. s t i l l  held good, and that neither
1. Castler&agh's Foreign  P o l i c y  (C.K.Webster) £60,261 
F.O. S i c i l y , 8 6 ,9 0 .  ‘
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a s s i s t a n c e  nor open approva l  was to be expected from 
B r i ta in .
M e t te r n ic b  was e x c i t e d  and alarmed. He saw 
future  r e v o l u t i o n  a i l  over  I t a l y  and the German S ta tes ,  
and in his  t r e p i d a t i o n  did not  h e s i ta te  to  blame f i r s t  
Russia  and then England f o r  a f f a i r s  in  Naples. But 
at t h i s  p o in t  h is  n a tu r a l  t im i d i t y  reassumed i t s  domina­
t i o n  and he r e fu s e d  to take  C a s t le re a g h 's  adv ice  u n t i l  he 
could be sure  o f  more back ing ,  p r e fe r a b ly ,  from Russia.
Not on ly  might the r e v o l u t i o n s  themselves be too strong 
fo r  him, but th ere  was a ls o  the l i b e r a t i o n  o f  France and 
the Tzar to  p r o v id e  a g a in s t .  I f  Alexander was not fo r  him 
he might p o s s i ib ly  be on the  other  s id e .
The Tzar was not in a k in d ly  mood. His 
L ibera lism  had r e c e n t l y  r e c e iv e d  a severe  blow from the 
" in g r a t i t u d e "  o f  h is  P o l i s h  s u b je c t s  and he was d isgusted 
with his  A l l i e s  over  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  on the Spanish 
Question. He was lon g in g  to r e c o v e r  the l o s t  ground by 
in t e r v e n t io n ,  to  s e a l  th e  A l l i a n c e  o f  h is  dreams by m i l i ta r y  
a c t io n .  In h is  p resen t  s t a t e  o f  mind, t h i s  a ct ion  was 
u n l ik e ly  t o  be on th e  s id e  o f  d is tu r b e r s  o f  the peace.
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l i e t t e r n i c h ’ s appeal was a heaven-sent op p ortu n ity ,  anc3 
he r e j e c t e d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  o f  a con v ersa t ion  between Austria  
and R u ss ia ,  and demanded a meeting o f  the 'Quadruple A l l ia n ce .  
At the  same time F rance ,  t o  ensure her new s t a tu s  in Europe 
demanded a C on ference  o f  th e  3uint.y..ple A l l i a n c e .  She 
s t i l l  had her o ld  f e a r  o f  A u str ia  a lone  in I t a l y  and Louis 
XVIII was s t i l l  head o f  the Bourbon House. These demands 
placed M e t te rn ich  in  a c o r n e r .  I t  seemed that  he had e i th e r  
to o f fen d  the Tzar o r  C a st le rea gh ,  and h is  immediate p o l i c y  
was to ga in  time in  which t o  f in d  out how f a r  each power 
was w i l l i n g  to support  him. For t h i s  end he pr oposed that  
Ambassadorial C on ference  o f  a l l  the Powers should be held 
at Vienna to  d e c id e  on the method o f  in te rv e n t io n  and a f t e r ­
wards a C on ference  o f  the  three  Eastern monarchs piiich would 
s a t i s f y  A lexander .  C ast lerea gh  would rather Prussi 3.was 
excluded but he promised Esterhazy that ,  f o r  the time 
be ing ,  he would not r e c o g n i s e  the Neapolitan Ambassador 
nor the independence o f  S i c i l y .  He then set  to  work through 
Decajes to persuade France to withdraw her proposa ls  ßra 
Conference. He w rote  to  Stewart on August 5 t h . ,  r e f e r r i n g  
to  the French Ambassador
" 1 to ld  him th a t ,  i f  any m i l i t a r y  in te r fe re n ce
"was to take p la c e ,  i t  appeared to me that i t  could only  be 
" s a f e l y  or e f f e c t i v e l y  executed by an Austrian a rmy, that
- 1 0 2 -
“European c o n t in g e n ts  would never d o , and tiiat the l o c a l  
" in t e r e s t s  which A u s tr ia  had in the Question appeared 
"to me to render her in t e r f e r e n c e  both more natural and 
"more j u s t i f i a b l e  and l e s s  odious than i f  the p a r t icu la r  
"case was to be avowedly taken up in the fa c e  o f  Europe 
"upon a b s t r a c t  grounds .
"The remark o f  the French M in is ter  or ig inated  
" in  that d i s p o s i t i o n ,  v^hich the French as  well  as the 
"Russian Government always f e e l ,  to g e n e r a l i s e  every 
"quest ion  and to t r y  to b r in g  i t  w ith in  the s t r i c t  pale 
" o f  the A l l i a n c e .  R ussia  w i l l  always regard her con tro l  
"as complete in p r o p o r t io n  as  the Governments o f  Europe 
"can be made to form a s i n g l e  machine o f  which th e  
"Russian m i l i t a r y  power must ever c o n s t i t u t e  one o f  the 
"very  p r i n c i p a l  w h e e ls " !
By September Metternich  had decided that 
the T za r ’ s f r i e n d  sh ip  w ould be more u s e f u l  than that o f  
B r i ta in  should the worst  o c c u r .  He allovjed Alexander to 
understand that  t h e  meeting at Troppau would be a reunion 
o f  the A l l i a n c e s ,  and meanwhile t r i e d  to  throw d u s t  in 
C ast lereagh*s  e y e s .  He suggested r e fo r m in g  the A l l ia n ce  
and asked f o r  S te w a r t ’ s presence  at Troppau while asserting  
that p r a c t i c a l l y  the v iio le  quest ion  vould be s e t t le d  
p r e v io u s ly  a t  the Vienna Ambassadorial con fe ren ce ,  where 
he would be supreme, C ast lereagh*s  s u s p ic io n s  were by 
th is  time f u l l y  aroused. He d e f i n i t e l y  t o l d  Stewart that 
B r i ta in  cou ld  have no part  in j o i n t  a c t i o n ,  and that the
1. F.O.  7.  ( A u s t r i a )  160,  Mo. 2.
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cu e s t ió n  o f  Naples was a " s p e c i a l " ,  and not a "gen era l"  
q u e s t io n ,  " I t a l i a n "  and not  "European", and that  i n t e r f e r ­
ence should come from A u s tr ia  and not from  t h e  A l l ia n c e .  
He sent t h i s  Memorandum on September 16th.
I ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  hope that the Emperor o f  Russia  
w i l l  be c on ten t  to  c o n f in e  the in terv iew  at Troppau within 
the l i m i t s  proposed by h is  a l l y  the Emperor o f  A u str ia ,  
that  whatever m i n i s t e r i a l  co n fe ren ce  may be held may be 
regarded as o n ly  a d d in g  to  other means o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l  
e x p la n a t io n ,  and th a t  whatever i s  done s h a l l  be done 
upon the p a r t i c u l a r  case  v/ithout hazarding general  
d e c l a r a t i o n s  c o n t a in in g  u n iv e r s a l  p led g es  that  cannot 
be redeemed, and which, from th e  f i r s t ,  w i l l  be 
seen through and d e s p i s e d .  D is s e r t a t i o n s  upon abs tra ct  
p r i n c i p l e s  w i l l  do noth ing  in  the present  day unless  
su p p or ted ."  1
He never  v a r i e d  t h i s  view in the s l i g h t e s t  
degree from 1815 to the  day o f  h is  death .  The Memorandum 
then d e a l s  with th e  case  in p o in t  and the proposed i n t e r ­
vention  o f  the  A l l i a n c e  -
** Now t h i s  i s  a c o n c e r t  which th e  B r i t i s h  Govern-
"ment cannot en ter  in t o ,  f i r s t  because i t  binds them to 
engagements which th e y  c o u ld  not be j u s t i f i e d  in taking 
"without l a y in g  the whole b e fo re * P a r l ia m e n t , second i t  
" c re a te s  a League which at any moment may invo lve  them in 
"the n e c e s s i t y  o f  us ing  F o r c e ,  f o r  i t  is  c l e a r  that  the 
"d e fa c to  government o f  N a p les ,  upon such an a c t  being agreed 
to by us ,  might a c c o r d in g  to t h e  ord inary  Law o f  Nations, 
"sequester  a l l  B r i t i s h  P ro p e r ty  at Naples, and a t  once shut 
" th e i r  p o r ts  a g a in s t  B r i t i s h  commerce.. . .  f o u r th ,  such a 
"League would render  th e  B r i t i s h  Government both m orally  
"and in a P ar l iam en tary  sen se  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  a l l  the
1. F.O. 7. ( A u s t r ia )  148. 
Correspondence X i i ,  31i
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" fu tu re  a c t s  o f  the League ..........s i x t h  such a League would
"most c e r t a i n l y  be d isa p p rov ed  by our Far liament a nd , even 
"cou ld  i t  be s u s t a in e d ,  i t  i s  obv ious  from th a t  moment that  
"every  a c t  o f  the A u s tr ia n  Army in the Kingdom o f  Naples 
"would f a l l  as much under the immediate cogn isance  and 
" j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Parliament and be canvassed 
«as f r e e l y  as i f  i t  were the a c t  o f  a B r i t i s h  Army and 
"Com m ander-in -Chief , "  1
In a d d i t i o n  to  h is  permanent, d eep -roo ted  
o b j e c t i o n  to  i n t e r f e r e n c e  such a move in the case o f  
Naples would be d isadvantageous  to England ’ s commercial 
i n t e r e s t s  and f a t a l  to  the  M in is t r y .  The s t a t e  o f  B r i t i s h  
p o l i t i c s  d id  n o t  a l lo w  any b o ld  measures. The O pposit ion  
had a lr e a d y  made i t s e l f  f e l t  in the House o f  Lords over 
the Naples r e v o l t ,  and the s l i g h t e s t  s ig n  o f  weakness 
mould rend er  the overthrow  o f  the Cabinet unavo idab le ,  A 
f o r e i g n  army in  Naples mould in e v i t a b ly  cause damage, and 
such damage to  the p r o p e r ty  o f  B r i t i s h  s u b je c t s  vo uld mean 
q u es t ion s  in  the Commons, and i f  these t r o o p s  were there 
mit^i the open s a n c t i o n  o f  the Government, then, not on ly  
the Government, but even th e  monarchy might be in danger, 
such mas the e x i s t i n g  temper o f  the country .  But these  
f e a r s  o n ly  loomed in the d i s t a n c e .  Most probably  the 
Cabinet would not l a s t  lon g  enough t o  meet such q ues t ion s ,
C a s t le re a g h  nov/ heard o f  M e t te rn ich 's  double
1,  F . O . 7.  ( Austr i a )  148 .  N o . 6,
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dealing  through L ieven ,  the Russian Ambassador, and 
immediately informed Stewart who confronted  the Austrian 
i l in is t e r  and he, f o r  on ce ,  made a very bad show in endeavour­
ing to e x p la in  m atters .  I t  was obvious that h i s r e a l  
reason was that  he needed support,  and to conform w ith  
the T z a r 's  demands was the only  means o f  g e t t in g  i t .  He 
denied that the Tro:(>j5au Congress was to be an A ll ian ce  
Conference ,  and s a id  that S tew a rt 's  presence there would 
be s u f f i c i e n t  to  maintain the A l l ia n ce  in t a c t .  By th is  
time C ast le rea gh  was very annoyed with the whole matter, 
Lieven was p r e s s in g  f o r  a p le n ip o te n t ia r y  from England to 
turn the suggested C onference into  another A ix - la -C hapel le
9
meeting. But E sterh azy ,  w ith  grea ter  imagination s aw that 
importunity might even i r r i t a t e  Castlereagh in t o r d v o k in g  
Stewart*s perm iss ion  to  be p resen t ,  and that ,  in any case, 
none o f  the m in is te r s  could leave England, so tense was 
the s ta te  o f  dom estic  p o l i t i c s .
At l a s t  they l e f t  C astlereagh  alone with his 
p r in c ip l e s ,  and F e t t e r n i c h  dec ided  to get what support he 
could near a t  hand, Stewart had the unenviable t  ask o f  ' 
f in d in g  out what was go ing  on w ithout g iv in g  anything in
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re tu rn .  He had d e f i n i t e  Cabinet i n s t r u c t i o n s .  He was to 
iraintain the p o l i c y  and t h e o r i e s  o f  the S tate  Paper o f  May 
5 t h . ,  and to  watch ov er  the i n t e g r i t y  o f  the t e r r i t o r i a l  
system as s e t t l e d  at V ienna, but he had n e ith er  power to 
a c t  o r  to s ig n  f o r  B r i t a i n .  The Government were ^uite  
w i l l i n g  to f u l f i l  T reaty  o b l i g a t i o n s  but no more,
C ast le rea gh  was to o  a f r a id  o f  A lex a n d er ’ s g e n e r a l i s a t io n s  
to  g iv e  Stewart any more power. Each d is turbance  or 
r e v o l t  should be t rea ted  as a separate  ev en t .  No general 
p o l i c y  ought to be d i s c u s s e d .  Who was to d is t in g u is h  
betv/een " r e f o r m s ” and " r e v o l u t i o n s ” . No general  p r in c i i - le  
o f  in t e r v e n t io n  c o u l d  be l a i d  down. I f  England acquiesced 
in any such p r i n c i p l e  in  what p o s i t i o n  would the House of 
Hanover s tan d ,  and f o r  how long  would the Tory Government 
l a s t .  An ominous n o te  was sounded in a con v ersa t ion  between 
C astlereagh  and E sterhazy  -
” I f  i t  i s  d e s ire d  to extend the A l l ia n c e  so
"as to  in c lu d e  a l l  o b j e c t s  p resen t  and fu t u r e ,  f o re se e n  and 
"u n foreseen ,  i t  would change i t s  character  to such an ex ten t ,  
"and c a r r y  us so f a r ,  th a t  we should see in i t  an a d d i t io n a l  
"motive f o r  adhering  to our c o u r s e  a t  the r i s k  o f  s e e in g  
"the A l l i a n c e  move away f  roni us without our having quitted  
" i t . "  1
1. F.O.  7 ( A u s t r i a ) .  156.  Ho.  6.
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TROPPAU.
As a d i s c u s s i o n  between members o f  the
A l l i a n c e ,  the C on fe re n ce  a t  ^roppau was a lu d icrou s  f a r c e .
No country  but A u s t r ia  and R ussia  had any v o i c e  in i t .  The
King and M in i s t e r s  o f  P r u ss ia  were, a s  u su a l ,  e n t i r e l y
su b se rv ie n t  to  M e t te r n ic h ,  v;'hile the French re p r e s e n ta t iv e s
had even l e s s  in f lu e n c e  than Stewart owing to je a lo u s
b ic k e r in g s  amongst th e m s e lv e s . Stewart h im se l f  showed
the most in c a p a b le  and weak s i d e  o f  h is  character  e s p e c i a l l y
in the  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  the C onference ,  and he had to t r u s t
fo r  in fo rm a t ion  to  the former f r i e n d l i n e s s  o f  M ettern ich
b y t h e  i n s i n c e r i t y  o f  whom he was e n t i r e l y  duped. Gordon,
h is  s u b o r d in a te ,  was even l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  than Stewart h im self
So the o n ly  personages who counted in the
Conference were M e t te rn ich ,  Alexander and h is  minister  »
Capo d ' l s t r ^ ,  A lexander came f  rom Poland in a d isturbed  
s ta te  o f  mind. The r e c e n t  u n g r a te fu l  conduct o f  the Po les  
had fu r th e r  undermined h is  d eca y in g  L ib era l ism . Metternich 
was not slow in  ta k in g  advantage o f  t h i s  f a c t o r  in the 
s i t u a t i o n .  His aim was to g e t  support f o r  h is  scheme o f  
in t e r f e r i n g  in N ap les ,  and y e t  to r e f r a in  from an i r r e v o c ­
able  a l i e n a t i o n  o f  B r i t a i n .  This was a d i f f i c u l t  problem,
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f o r  C ast le rea g h  would countenance no p r o t o c o l ,  t r e a ty ,  
d e f i n i t i o n , or  commitments o f  a " g e n e r a l " c h a r a c t e r , and 
both Capo d ' I s t r i a  and the Tzar wished f o r  something o f  
th is  s o r t .  To them Naples was o n ly  the p a r t i c u la r  
case o f  a d i s a s t r o u s  w ide -spread  "g en era l"  d is e a s e ,  only 
to be cured by sweeping c o u n t e r a c t i o n .  Alexander immediate­
ly  granted a lon g  in te r v ie w  to Stewfart in which he loud ly  
and at len g th  harangued him on the  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  keeping 
the A l l i a n c e  t o g e th e r  in o rd er  to  s e t t l e  upon some p r in c ip le  
o f  "common a c t i o n "  a g a in s t  the e v i l  v m ich w a s  making such 
rapid p r o g r e s s  in  Europe, and v/hich had o r ig in a te d  in 
France. He met S t e w a r t ' s  p r o t e s t s  aga in st  "genera l"  
a c t ion s  with a p io u s  appeal  to  God. Fartunate ly  f o r  
i le t te rn ich  th ere  was s u f f i c i e n t  d ivergen ce  between the 
ideas o f  the Tzar and Capo d ' I s t r i a  f o r  a wedge to  be 
in s e r te d .  Capo d ' I s t r i a  had remained a L ib e ra l  and, in 
consequence, w h i l s t  A le x a n d e r 's  creed o f  C h r is t ia n  brotherhood, 
European amity and con cer ted  a c t i o n  had gra du a l ly  been 
s o l i d i f i e d  in to  a p o l i c y  o f  ensuring  boundaries ,  and "guar­
antee ing"  monarchs, Capo D ' I s t r i a ,  with his eye on Greece, 
s t i l l  wished the v a r iou s  p eop le s  to have a say in th e ir  own 
government. This w;as M e t t e r n i c h 's  op p ortu n ity .
-109-
At the  f i r s t  meeting o f  the Congress on 
October 23rd .  he put the f a c t s  o f  the ease  forward in a 
Memorandum with  the r e q u e s t  o f  the King o f  Naples fo r  
help ,  and w ith  the p r o t e s t  o f  the  N ea p o l i ta n  Government,
Ke asked o n ly  f o r  moral support in h is  a c t i o n  tov/ards 
that Kingdom and l e f t  "g e n e r a l "  q u es t ion s  a lon e .  Neither 
did he mention any form o f  Government which he proposed to 
apply  to  N aples  a f t e r w a r d s .  This  l a s t  om iss ion  r oused 
Capo d ' I s t r i a ,  P r u s s ia  immediately  gave her whole 
support to th e  A u s tr ia n  document, but the Russian ansivering 
Memorandum was lo n g  in  appearing .  I t  was issued on November 
6th. and s t r a n g e ly  enough i t  o f f e r e d  t r o o p s  f o r  the ov er ­
throw o f  the r e v o l u t i o n ,  but withheld "moral support" 
u n t i l  i t  should be shewn what was to be su b st i tu ted  in i t s  
p l a c e .
" Did the Kmperor o f  A ustr ia  want o f  Russia 150,
or 200,000 men to cu t  the th roa ts  o f  th e  Carbonari? They 
"were at her d i s p o s a l .  Did they want the d is se n t  o f  
"Russia to  m i l i t a r y  r e v o l u t i o n s ?  They had i t .  But i f  they 
"wanted an appui moral to overturn  a government, i t  must 
"be shewn what was to  be s u b s t i tu te d  in i t s  p la c e .  The 
" r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  governments f o r  the w e l fare  o f  mankind 
"was a s u b j e c t  worthy o f  the  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  the great  
" A s s o c ia t io n  o f  E u r o p e " . ! .
1. C a s t le r e a g h 's  F o r e ig n  P o l i c y  (C.K.Webster)  Appdx, 525.
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_ A f t e r  comparing the quest ion  o f  Naples and 
Spain, i t  suggested  a N at iona l  C o n s t i t u t io n  in Naples.
T his ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  d i d  not s u i t  l l e t t e r n i c h .  I f  Austria  was 
to grant a C o n s t i t u t i o n  to every  I t a l i a n  s ta te  which r e ­
vo lted  she might as w e l l  leave  the peninsula  a l t o g e th e r .
This Russian Jiemorandum was c h i e f l y  t h e  work o f  Capo d ’ l s t r ia ,  
?/hen M ettern ich  went to  see the Tzar on the s u b je c t ,  he 
found him much more p l i a b l e .  He cared l i t t l e  fo r  
"National C o n s t i t u t i o n s "  i f  he could g e t  a 'g e n e r a l ’ 
p r in c ip l e  s t a t e d .  So a compromise was arrived at in which 
l ie t te r n ic h  s a t i s f i e d  both the Tzar and Capo d j l s t r i a  by 
invoking the s p i r i t  o f  the  T r e a t ie s  o f  181b.
S tew a rt  and the French Ambassadors were 
excluded from  these  C onferences  almost without p r o te s t  
on t h e i r  p a r t .  The former had expressed his approval o f  
the A ustr ian  P^emorandum in o p p o s i t i o n  to  that  o f  Russia.
" 1 s t .  I c o n s id e r  the Reasons Alleged in the
"Austrian Memoir f o r  an in t e r f e r e n c e  on th e  part o f  the 
" A l l i e s  are in a s t ron ger  and more p a la ta b le  shape.
" 2nd, The Russian Memoir mixed up too much
"the two R e v o lu t io n s  o f  Spain and Naples in one general 
" c o n c lu s io n ,  whereas th ere  i s  a vast and decided d i f f e r e n c e  
"which has been f o r c i b l y  d welt  upon in my tra n sa c t io n s .
" 3 rd .  The endeavour to induce England to
"acqu iesce  in the p r i n c i p l e  that  her in te r fe re n ce  in the 
" la t e  R evo lu t ion  at Naples i s  d e f in e d  and re s o lv e d  upon
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"under the s p i r i t  o f  the e x i s t i n g  T rea t ie s  is a Doctrine 
“that I ara c l e a r  our Government (from a i l  the ir  comuiunica- 
“t ion s  h i t h e r t o )  w i l l  not admit, and I q^uestion the P o l icy  
"of  R u s s ia 's  renev7ing and f o r c in g  th is  r easoning.
" 4 th .  The in fe r e n ce  drawn from our imputed
“s i l e n c e  i s  u n fa ir  "because we have exp la ined  our l in e  o f  
“a s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y  and we have taken our p o s i t i o n  and 
“we do not c o n s i d e r  the  T rea t ie s  in which the casus foeder is  
"e t  b e l l i  i s  mentioned as a p p l i c a b le  to the case of 
"Naples,
" 5 th .  The cons ign ing  in a formal and o b l ig a -
“ tory  act the General P r in c ip l e s  upon which the A l l i e s  would 
"take cog n isa n ce  o f  in s u r r e c t i o n  in r egular Governments 
“o f  a p a r t i c u la r  nature w i l l  be a very d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not 
"an im poss ib le  u n d e r ta k in g ."  1
M ettern ich  could  have been in no doubt as to 
hov; fa r  he could  r e l y  on Castlereagh* s support having had 
the in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the Treaty  o b l i g a t i o n s  thrust down 
his throat  so o f t e n .  This being the c a s e ,  i t  would be 
best to keep Stewart out o f  the way w h i le  he made sure of 
the T za r .
The Ambassadors o f  France and England under­
stood that  no d e c i s i o n  would be made p u b l ic  u n t i l  r a t i f i e d  
by them. M ettern ich  explained to. Stewart that he wished
1 . F.O. 7. (A u s t r ia )  154. No. 3.
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to "unmask co m p le te ly  R ussia"  , He wanted to beguile  
the Tzar away from Capo d ' I s t r i a  arc his L ibera lism , and 
then R ussia  would be committed against  rev o lu t ion a ry  
d o c tr in e s  and A u str ia n s  back would be safe  whilst  her army 
marched down through I t a l y .  I f  he could do t h i s  and a t  
the same time keep B r i t i s h  f r ie n d s h ip  so much the b e t te r ,  
though an endorsement o f  any "general in s t r u c t io n s "  
c lause would sever  t h i s  con n ect ion .  But the n e ce s s i ty  o f  
immediate and supported  in te rv e n t io n  in I^^aples and the in­
s t a b i l i t y  o f  C a s t le r e a g h 's  ca b in et  made the Russian 
A l l ia n ce  very  a t t r a c t i v e  i f  Capo d T s t r ia 's  in f luence  over 
Alexander cou ld  be ch eck ed .  On November 14th. the news 
o f  the r e v o l t  o f  the Russian Guard regiments c linched the 
matter. Though caused by th e  b r u t a l i t i e s  o f  the ir  co lo n e l  
yet the Tzar saw in i t  another m anifestat ion  o f  that 
" s p i r i t  o f  r e v o l u t i o n  only too  prevalent in Europe". 
Confused by the behaviour both o f  his European children  
and o f  h is  own n a t io n ,  u n certa in  as t o  what p o l i c y  to pur­
sue, he now r e s ig n e d  h im se lf  in to  the hands o f  the Austrian
1. C a s t le re a g h 's  Foreign  H olicy  (C.K.Webster) S92.
2. M ettern ich  to E sterhazy .  Troppau. Cct,  24th. 1820.
F . 0 .7 .  (A u s t r ia )  C on federat ion  o f  Europe (W ,A .P h i l l ip s ) , 
page 206.
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M in is te r .  "So we are a t  one P r in c e ,  and i t  i s  to  you that 
I owe i t . . , . T e l l  me vihat you d e s i r e  and what you wish me 
to d o , I vh 11 d o , " Ke had f i n a l l y  abjured L ibera l ism , and 
he found support  f o r  h is  newly de f ined  p o l i c y  in the  very 
s c r i p t u r e s ,  from w h ich  h is  former s ta te  o f  mind had rece ived  
i t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  His s u s p i c i o n s ,  e n te r ta in e d  s ince  A ix -  
la - C h a p e l l e ,  had been con f irm ed ,  and now R evo lu t ion  was 
the E v i l  Thing, t o  be combatted by Faithx  embodied tn 
the pr inci^vles  o f  the Holy A l l i a n c e ,  now to be used as an 
instrument o f  r e a c t i o n .
S tew a rt ,  Caraman and La Ferronays were inv ited  
to a C on ference  on November 19th. They had been in the 
dark s in c e  the b eg in n in g  o f  th e  month, Stewart t r u s t in g  
so i m p l i c i t l y  in M e t t e r n i c h 's  goodv,iill that he had been some 
time away at Vienna w ith  h is  v j i fe .  His astonishment and 
in d ig n a t ion  knew no bounds when M ettern ich  la id  b e fo r e  the 
Conference the famous Troppau P r o t o c o l ,  signed by the three 
Eastern Fov/ers. T h is  P r o t o c o l ,  drawn up by Capo d ' I s t r i a ,  
la id  down as m otives  o f  a c t i o n ,  a l l  the p r in c ip l e s  which 
C ast lereagh  had so ru th le  s s l y  rep u d ia ted  at Aix.
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" (1 )  S ta te s  forming part o f  the European
" A l l ia n c e ,  which, have undergone a change, due to r é v o lu -  
" t ie n  in th e  form o f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n  ( regime in terrem) 
"and the r e s u l t s  o f  which menace other S ta tes ,  ipso f  acto 
"cease to  be part  o f  the A l l ia n c e  and remain excluded from 
" i t ,  u n t i l  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  g iv e s  guarantees o f  leg a l  order 
"and s t a b i l i t y .
" ( 2 )  The A l l i e d  Powers do not l im it  themselves
"to  announcing t h i s  e x c lu s i o n ;  but f a i t h f u l  to the 
" p r in c ip l e s  which they have proclaimed and to the 
" r e sp e c t  due to t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  every leg it im ate  govern- 
"ment as to ev ery  a c t  emanating from i t s  own f r e e  w i l l ,  
“agree to  r e f u s e  r e c o g n i t i o n  to changes brought about by 
" i l l e g a l  methods.
" (5 )  When S ta te s  where such changes have been
"made, cause by t h e i r  p rox im ity  other cou n tr ies  to f e a r  
"immediate danger,  and when the A l l i e d  Powers can e x e r c is e  
" e f f e c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l  a c t i o n  towards them, they w i l l  
"employ, in order to b r in g  them back to the bosom o f  the 
"A l l ia n c e ,  f i r s t  f r i e n d l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , se c o n d ly  
"measures o f  c o e r c i o n , i f  the employment o f  such c o e r c io n  
" i s  i n d i s p e n s a b le . "  1
Capo d ' I s t r i a ' s  "National C on st i tu t ion "  had 
van ished , and the King o f  Naples was to be allowed to 
reform h is  government as he l ik e d .  An army o f  occupation  
was to invade N aples ,  and Ferdinand was t o  be inv ited  to 
Larfcach to co n s id e r  how the invasion  and r e s t i t u t i o n  
were to be e f f e c t e d .
Eletternich and Capo d i s t r i a  did th e ir  best to
R ecu e i ls  de T r a i t e s .  (G ,F .de  liarte^nsj IV, 231. A lso .  
ÇTastlereagh's F ore ign  P o l i c y  ( C.K, Webster ; ,  295.
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soothe Stew art .  The Russian M in is ter  la id  a l l  the blame 
on M ettern ich  whom, as he s a id ,  he had thought was keeping 
the Ambassadors informed o f  the course  o f  e v en ts .  He 
lamented the absence  o f  a "National C on s t i tu t io n "  c lause ,  
and even suggested B r i t a in  in t e r f e r i n g  to persuade the 
Neapolitan  Moderates to  come to some agreement with 
A u str ia ,  M e t t e r n i c h was as pro fuee  and s t i l l  more vague 
in h is  e x p la n a t io n s  and a p o lo g ie s .  Wishing to avoid 
o f fen d in g  Stewart a t  any c o s t  he even consented to con­
sider the P r o t o c o l  as s t i l l  needing the approval o f  the 
French and E n g l ish  Ambassadors, Stewart was so impressed 
and appeeased that  he once more re tu rn ed  to  his wife in 
Vienna w h i l s t  M ettern ich  was endeavouring to n eu tra l ise  
Stewart ’ s d is p a t ch e s  to C ast lereagh  by a multitude o f  
excuses sent through Esterhazy .
C a s t le re a g h ’ s s u s p ic io n s  were aroused before 
those o f  h is  b r o th e r ,  and he had a Memorandum r eady to  
send o f f  when t h e  copy o f  the P r o to c o l  arrived from Stewart 
on December 4 th .  B es ides  his knowledge o f  M ettern ich 's
d u p l i c i t y ,  and o f  h is  b r o t h e r ' s  weakness, r ecent <ievelop-
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merits in the Spanish Question had increased his uneasiness. 
The King o f  Spain, f in d in g  h is  p o s i t i o n  weakened by the 
preoccupation  o f  the Eastern Powers, decided to  place 
his own case b e fo r e  the same t r ib u n a l  as the Kinged id 
l i t t l e  to a l l a y  C a s t le r e a g h 's  f e a r s  on t h i s  matter, and 
both on these o c c a s io n s  and in l e t t e r s  to Ster/art he con­
s ta n t ly  urged the danger o f  such d e velopments; o f  monarchs 
t r u s t in g  to an o u ts id e  source f o r  help rather than to their  
own i n i t i a t i v e  in d e fe n c e ,  or to t h e i r  own judgment in 
carry ing  out c o n c i l i a t o r y  re form s; o f  nations being sub­
j e c t  to th e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  a Monarchical Council ,  So urgent 
did he think t h e  matter that  he issued a Memorandum on 
December 4th .  the day on which he r e c e iv e d  the -P ro toco l .
In th is  document he a b s o lu te ly  re fused  to co -operate  
in any i n t e r - a l l i e d  o ccu p a t ion  o f  Naples. He denounced 
any form o f  General Guarantee or  General Precaution, and 
both r e fu s e d  to in t e r f e r e  in Spain and t o r e c o g n i s e  the 
r ig h t  o f  any other nat ion  t o  do  so. The bulk o f  th is  
had been w r i t t e n  b e fo r e  he re ce iv e d  S tew art 's  despatch 
showing w ith  what remarkable in s ig h t  he had gauged the
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tendency o f  táe C o n fe r e n c e .  He very much regretted  his
enforced  absence from Troppau, f o r  he was sure o f  his
a b i l i t y  to  in f lu e n c e  A lexander ,  even in d i r e c t  o p p o s i t io n
to M ettern ich ,  and from h is  e xper ien ce  a t  A ix ,  he w e l l
knew the p e r s u a s iv e  po\';ers o f  the w i ly  Austrian u n con tro l led .
At London he had guessed more o f  the Conference r  e s u l ts
than Stewart had learned at Troppau , u n t i l  Metternich had
shewn h is  hand. A f t e r  the P r o to c o l  a rr iv e d  he had only
to add a short  note  emphasising what was already s a id  -
" To in v o lv e  us and a l l  o ther  Powers without
"the semblance o f  d i s c u s s i o n  in a formal d ip lom atic  com plica -  
" t ion  q u i t e  u n p a r a l l e le d  in a l l  former times and i r r e c o n c i l ­
ia b le ,  i f  I c o r r e c t l y  understand i t ,  w i th  any admitted 
" p r in c ip l e s  o f  p u b l i c  law, does qu ite  a s to n is h  me." 1
Further study o f  the P r o to c o l  rather  in­
creased than déminished h is  annoyance. Despite  a p o lo g ie s  
and e x p la n a t io n s  from M ettern ich  he trounced the Russian 
and A ustr ian  Ambassadors in a most undiplomatic fash ion ,  
and then sen t  o f f  a sca th in g  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the Conference 
and i t s  achievem ents to the Emperors through-- Stewart.
1. F.O. 7 ( A u s t r ia )  143.
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» The r i g h t  claimed o f  excluding  States from the
"Europeani system and a l t e r in g  th e ir  in s t i t u t io n s  ty f o r ce  
" is  against  in t e r n a t i o n a l  Law, and not l i k e l y  to  be ob-  
"tained by U niversa l  con sen t .  Are the Great Powers pre -  
"pared to apply such P r in c ip le s  to them seives , .  . I f  so any 
"attempt to  e c o g n is e  i t  in Great B r i ta in  would be so 
" r e v o l t in g  t.o every  c l a s s  and descr±pt ion  of  the people 
that i t  might shake His M a jes ty 's  t i t l e  to th is  throne 
" i f  not expiated by the punishment o f  the Minister by whom
“such advice had been g iv e n ......... The extreme r ig h t  of
" in te r fe re n c e  between nat ion  and nation aan never be 
"properly  made a matter o f  s t ip u la t io n  or be assumed as 
"the a t t r ib u t e  o f  any A l l i a n c e . . T h e  P ro to co l  appears 
"to the B r i t i s h  Govemment to  make the A l l ia n ce  into a 
"Super-State which would tend to destroy  a l l  independent 
"a c t ion ,  more e s p e c i a l l y  within  the smaller S ta tes " .
"The King t r u s t s  that  he w i l l  not be regarded however 
as presuming to i n t e r f e r e  beyond the ju s t  l im it s  o f  the 
" o b l ig a t io n s  which un ite  His Majesty w ith  his A l l i e s ,  i f  
"he should again recommend to th e ir  con s id era t ion  the wiâdom 
o f  not being tempted, by the nature o f  th e ir  p a rt icu la r  
" i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  to  hazard an experiment which cannot f a i l  
"to e x c i t e  p u b l i c  f e e l i n g s  and pub lic  d iscuss ions  through- 
"out Europe, the e f f e c t s  o f  which, in the present s t a t e  
"of  moral and p o l i t i c a l  ferment, no human fo r e s ig h t  can 
"es t im ate . , . "  1
U ettern ich  was g re a t ly  disturbed at the un­
compromising tone o f  the Memorandum. I t  meant the breaking 
up o f  the A l l i a n c e ,  and moreover of  the A u stro -B r it ish  
understand ing, and a t  the moment he 7; as s t i l l  uncertain 
as to whether he had a supporter in Russia to take her 
p lace .  Capo d ' l  s t r i a  7ias s t i l l  hoping for  a say in
1 P.0, 7, (A u s tr ia )  148. No. 53
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the c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  N ap les ,  and in t h i s  matter he had an 
a l l y  in France. Caraman however ruined any Franco-Russian 
understanding by p r op os in g  mediation on th e  part of France 
between the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  and the monarchs, and such an 
idea was u t t e r l y  abhorrent to the Tzar, This was one 
danger avoided but Alexander was s t i l l  determined to 
bring the q u e s t io n  o f  Spain under the scope o f  the Con­
fe r e n c e ,  and s t i l l  h a l f -s u p p o r te d  Capo d ' l „ - s t r i a  in 
wishing to  e s t a b l i s h  some so r t  o f  C on s t i tu t io n  in Naples 
a f t e r  Ferdinand had been r © s t o r e d . Metternich was any­
thing but happy when th e  a c t i o n  o f  the ex trem ists  in that 
country gave him the advantage. S ince  the r e v o l t  the
more moderate re fo rm ers  had been t r y in g  to  get the 
C o n s t i tu t io n  o f  1312 m odif ied  with a view to a return to  
a moderate monarchy, and the B r i t i s h ,  French and Russian 
Ambassadors had a ls o  used th e ir  in f luence  in that d i r e c t i o n  
But the e x t r e m is ts  had de feated  the plan at the la s t  moment 
and fo rced  the ^ ing  to  s ig n  the Spanish C on st i tu t ion .
After  s ig n in g  and swearing to i t  with unnecessary warmth 
he was allowed to  leave f o r  Laibach accompanied by the Due 
d i  Callo  as government r e p r e s e n t a t iv e ,  I 'e t tern ich  was now
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happ ier .  He found ” the  s i t u a t i o n  much improved" as there 
was no danger o f  a F r a n c o -R u s s o -B r i t i s h  combination to 
oppose h is  r i g h t  o f  way v /ith  a s o lu t i o n  o f  h is own. The 
N eapol itans  had ru in ed  t h e i r  cause  by greed and an 
Austrian  army would march on Naples, He even made a la s t  
attempt to p a c i f y  Stewart  by promising to r e s t r i c t  the 
forthcom ing  C on fe ren ce  to  I t a l i a n  a f f a i r s  and so d isappoint  
A lexander .
L A I B A C H .
At Laibach  M e t te rn ich ’ s supremacy was even 
more i n c r e a s e d , Pozzo d l  Borgo a rr ived  from Paris  with 
w hole -hearted  support  f o r  the Austr ian  M in ister ,and  the 
French M in i s t e r  from Rome, B ia ca s ,  ca u sed  French p o l i c y  
to assume a more d e f i n i t e l y  a u t o c r a t i c  course .  Stev/art 
l e f t  h is  d u t i e s  to Gordon u n t i l  January 25th. The King 
o f  Naples a r r iv e d  in  the middle o f  that  month and, d e s p i t e  
his  promise to the N e a p o l i ta n  government, immediately 
repudiated a l l  he had s ig n e d .  He urged the A l l i e s  to use 
r ig o ro u s  methods in N ap les ,  and even d isgusted  M etternich
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by his  meanaeas and cow ard ice .  Capo d ^ I s t r i a  and his 
" c o n s t i t u t i o n "  were q u i t e  out o f  the p i c t u r e .  The Con­
ference  opened on January 12th, and i t  was immediately 
decided to  send down an Austr ian  Army into  I t a l y t o  be 
fo l l owed  by Ferdinand.  Cordon and even Biacas refused 
to s ign a G-eneral P r o t o c o l  on t h i s  p o in t  and so the 
d e c i s i o n s  were o n ly  r e c o r d e d  in the Conference Journal .  
Stewart now a r r i v e d ,  and d e s p i t e  M e t t e r n i c h ' s attempts to 
b l u f f  him in to  s i l e n c e  he re fu sed  to a c c e p t  a c lause in the 
report  which s tated  that  the measures to be taken with 
regard to Naples had the support o f  a l l  the A l l i e s .  Metter­
nich had to  g i v e  v;ay and a fur ther  d e c l a r a t i o n  was a dded 
s ta t in g  the i n a b i l i t y  o f  the B r i t i s h  Min isters  to add the 
s ignature to the r e s t .
This r e p o r t  was then handed over to th e  Due 
di  G a l l o ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  the new government at Naples, but 
not b e f o r e  the m in i s t e r s  had t r ied  t o  get  round Stewart 
by s u b s t i t u t i n g  f r e s h  papers f o r  the report  passed by 
him. This having been found out by him and r e c t i f i e d  the 
Due di  G a l l o  ' accepted the r e p o r t  much to  the r e l i e f  o f  
the Austr ian  and Russian m in i s t e r s .  He had f a i l e d  to make 
any c a p i t a l  out  o f  the  added c la u s e ,  and promised to counsel
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submission to  tiis oountrymen. S tev /ar t ' s  p r o te s t s  bad 
not prevented M e t t e r n i c h ' s c o m p l e t e  su c c e s s .
At t b i s  p o i n t  the f low o f  the a u t o c r a t i c
t ide  r e c e i v e d  a s e t  back by a Memorandum issued by the
B r i t i s h  C a b in e t ,  C a s t l e r e a g h  was determined to f r u s t r a t e
the attempt at the i n c l u s i o n  o f  B r i t a i n  in the acts  o f
the A l l i a n c e ,  by a p r o t e s t  sent  to a l l  c o u r t s .  I t s  tenor
i s  the same as b e f o r e  and h is  Troppau p o l i c y  is  r e i t e r a t e d
Neither  the p o l i c y  towards Maples nor General Pr inc ip le  s
could be supported by B r i t a i n  though Austr ia  h e r s e l f  might
s e t t l e ,  what were to  her ,  in t e r n a l  problems.
" The system o f  measures proposed under the former
"head ( g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s ) ,  i f  to be r e c ip roca l  l y  a c ted 
"upon, X’iould be in  d ir e c t  r epugnance to t h e  fundamental 
"law o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y .  But even i f  t h i s  d e c i s i v e  o b j e c t i o n  
"did not  e x i s t  the B-r i t i sh  Government would, never the less  
regard th e  p r i n c i p l e s  on which these  measures r e s t ,  t o  be 
"such as cou ld  n o t  be s a f e l y  admitted as a system o f
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law.......... with  r e s p e c t  to t he p a r t i c u la r  g ase
"of  Naples ,  the B r i t i s h  Government, at  the very e a r l i e s t  
"moment, d id  not  h e s i t a t e  to  e x p r e s s  t h e i r  s trong d i s -  
"approbation  o f  the mode and c i rcumstances  under which 
"that R e v o l u t i o n  vjas understood to  have teen e f f e c t e d ;
'-'but they ,  a t  the same t ime,  e x p r e s s l y  d e c lared  to the 
" severa l  A l l i e d  Courts  that  they should not cons ider  
"themselves as e i t h e r  c a l l e d  upon or j u s t i f i e d  to ad-vise 
^an i n t e r f e r e n c e  on the part  o f  t h i s  country;  they 
" f u l l y  admitted however th a t  other  European S ta tes ,  and 
" e s p e c i a l l y  A u s t r ia  and the I t a l i a n  powers, might f e e l  
"themselves d i f f e r e n t l y  circaimstances,  . .  " 1
1. B r i t i s h  and F ore ign  S tate  Papers.  V o l . V I I I .  page 160 
G a s t l e r e a g h ' s  F ore ign  P o l i c y  (C.K,Webster)  , 321^322.
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C a s t l e r e a g h  was s t i l l  c l i n g i n g  to  the 
A l l i a n c e  w h i l e  r e j e c t i n g  t t s  methods, A u s tr ia  should 
have acted  on h i s  a d v i c e  in  the b eg in n ing ,  without any 
attempt at  manufacturing  d o c t r i n e s ,  or ra ther  adopting 
those o f  the  Tzar ,  in o rd er  to  j u s t i f y  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  But 
she p r e f e r r e d  Russ ian  s u p p o r t  to that  o f  England, and now 
B r i t a in  was applauded by L i b e r a l s  a l l  over  Europe, and in 
the House o f  Commons the o p p o s i t i o n  f o r g o t  f  or a time th e ir  
antagonism to  C a s t l e r e a g h ,  though he h imse l f  was as d e s i r -  
ous o f  A u s t r ia n  f r i e n d s h i p  as ever ,  and through Esterhazy 
he c o n s t a n t l y  pressed  f o r  a moderate c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  
Maples w’h i ch  he cou ld  support  in P a r l ia m en t . But Met t e r ­
nich would not  support  t h i s  d e s p i t e  the p r o t e s t s  o f  Stewart,  
Capo d ’ i s t r i a ,  La Ferronays  and Esterhazy  had to  inform 
Cast lereagh  that  Ferdinand would not allow' any c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  l i b e r t y  in h i s  Kingdom and that the Powrers would 
support him in that  d e te r m in a t io n .
V/hile the A u str ia n  army was marching south­
wards to r e - e s t a b l i s h  Ferdinand on t h e s e  terms a new in ­
s u r r e c t i o n  shook M e t t e r n i c h ' s s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n .  This 
occurred in Piedmont on March 1 0 t h . ,  and though temporar i ly
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s u c c e s s f u l  i t s  f i n a l  r e s u l t  was to s u b s t i t u t e  the U l t ra ­
R o y a l i s t  Char les  F e l i x  f o r  V i c t o r  Emmanuel. Austr ia ,  
who had l i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e  in Piedmont b e f o r e  th is  time, 
now sent an Arniy o f  O ccu pa t ion  to support  the new Monarch, 
The Tzar ,  much to  M e t t e r n i c h ' s  t r e p i d a t i o n ,  ordered 100,000 
Russians t o  march westwards and on ly  stopped  them fo r  
fear  they would become i n f e c t e d  with Western heresy.
France a l s o  hoped to  i n t e r f e r e ,  on which s ide  Metternich 
was u n c e r t a i n ,  but  he was sure that she would not f o rego  
an o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  making her a ge - long  c laim to predominance 
in I t a l y  f e l t .  C a s t l e r e a g h  re fused to intervene  both on 
p r i n c i p l e  and in o rder  to keep the Mediterranean as f r e e  
from Russian and French in f lu e n c e  as p o s s i b l e .  He was 
g r e a t l y  a f r a i d  o f  f o r e i g n  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in Piedmont, and, 
although he sympathised with t h e  o ld  King and d i s l i k e d  the 
harshness o f  Char les  F e l i x ,  y e t  he did nothing but express  
a wish f o r  the  r e t u r n  o f  V i c t o r  Emmanuel f o r  f ear  o f  b r in g ­
ing in e i t h e r ,  o r  bo th ,France  and Russia  aga inst  him.
T h is  w'ish had no e f f e c t  and brutal  punishments 
and an i n t r i c a t e  spy system were the immediate r e s u l t s  o f  
the r e v o l t .
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Meanwhile the Austr ian army had entered 
Naples and the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  had f l e d  in a most cowardly 
panic .  Many had been a s s i s t e d  to escape b y A 'C o u r t  the 
B r i t i s h  Ambassador. This  c o l l a p s e  o f  Liberal ism in I ta ly  
brought a ¿proportionate  decrease  in the power o f  the 
o p p o s i t i o n  in Par l iament ,  but Cast lereagh  was -^uick to  l e t  
Metternich knov/ that  t h i s  new s e c u r i t y  o f  the Government 
mean no change in p o l i c y ; -
" I see by your and Gordon's l e t t e r s  that our
" A l l i e s  w i l l  s t i l l  d e c e iv e  themselves upon the p o l i t i c a l  
"a t t i tu d e  o f  t h i s  Government. They i d l y  persevere in 
" a t t r ib u t i n g  the l i n e  we have taken, and must s t e a d i ly  
"continue to take ,  to the temporary d i f f i c u l t i e s  in whifh 
"the Government have been p laced ,  instead o f  imputing them 
"to those  p r i n c i p l e s  which in our system must be immutable, 
"and which,  * i f  the three  Courts persevere  much longer in 
"the open promulgation o f  t h e i r  u l t ra  d o c t r in e s ,  wl 11 ere  
- long work a s e p a r a t i o n  which i t  is the wish of  a l l  o f  us 
"to avoid  , "  1
Gordon had w r i t t e n ; -
'■ The Emperor o f  Russia stopped me, the  other
"day, in the promenade, t o  d e s i r e  I would p a r t i c u la r l y  
"express h i s  c o n g r a t u la t i o n s  upon the success in Parliament, 
"I have even some d i f f i c u l t y  in persuading Prince Metter-  
"nich that  our f o r e i g n  are not in that  degree int imately  
"connected with our domestic  p o l i t i c s  as w i l l  permit o f  
"any change in our a t t i t u d e  poise  upon th e  a f f a i r  o f  
"Naples, which he almost expects  as in conseciuence upon 
"the successes  o f  our Government at home". 2
1, C a s t l e r e a g h ' s  Fore ign  P o l i c y .  (C.K.V/ebster) . <¿3^
2. C ast lereaghts  Correspondence.  XII .  372.
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i ; e t t e r n . i c h ' s  o b j e c t s  were now achieved,  and 
he was very w i l l i n g  to r e - e s t a b l i s h  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  
7-iith England, He knew that  the Tzar was scpecting 
his support  f o r  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in Spain and t r o u b l e  was 
brewing in the East in which he would need support,  Cast le -  
reagh was dead a g a in s t  even French in t e r f e r e n c e  in Spain, 
much l e s s  the A l l i a n c e .  7 ? e l l e s l e y ' s  a dv ice  was sent from 
fi.adrid on January 2 1 s t .  1821,
” I am s t i l l  o f  the op in ion  that the best  l in e
"o f  p o l i c y  which the A m e s  could pursue with r e s p e c t  to 
" th is  c ou n try ,  even f o r  the attainment o f  t h e i r  own o b j e c t s ,  
would be t o  a b s t a in  from a l l  in t e r f e r e n c e  in i t s  a f f a i r s .
"An in t im a t ion  to  t h i s  e f f e c t  might be made to the Spanish 
"Government, wherein i t  might be ret^uired that they should 
"absta in  from promulgat ing t h e i r  p r i n c i p l e s  in other 
" c o u n t r i e s ,  A d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  kind would at once 
" g r a t i f y  t h e i r  v a n i t y ,  a l l a y  t h e i r  apprehension,  and would 
"go fa r  to  depr ive  them o f  any p r e t e x t ,  found upon a l leged 
attacks upon the Spanish C o n s t i tu t i o n ,  f o r  e x c i t i n g  Naples 
"to r e s i s t  the viev/s o f  the A l l i e d  S overe ign s " ,  1
But no " D e c la r a t i o n "  was forthcoming,  and 
fear  o f  the monarchs at  Laibach begat mob v io len ce  in Kadrid 
and caused the Tzar to a d v i s e  an immediate French advance 
in to  Spain.  France dare not  do t h i s  f o r  f ear  o f  her own 
L i b e r a l s .  M et te rn i ch  w as against  i t  f o r  f e a r  o f  u t t e r l y
1. F .C .Sp a in .  244. C a s t l e re a g h ’ s Foreign P o l i c y .  (C.K.Webster) 
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breaking with  England and C a s t l e r e a g h  merely r e f e r r e d  to 
the S ta te  Paper o f  Kay 5th .  when Lieven  approached him on 
the m atter .  By the time th a t  Capo d ' I s t r i a  brought up the 
matter o f f i c i a l l y  a t  L a ib ach ,  the f e a r s  o f  an ensuing French 
r e v o l t  had so taken p o s s e s s i o n  o f  A l e x a n d e r ’ s mind that  he 
agreed to  a postponement o f  in va s ion  but would allow no 
d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  n o n - i n t e r f c r e n c e  hoping f o r  a favo'urable 
o p p o r t u n i t y  l a t e r .  The C on ference  then issued i t s  l a s t  
P r o t o c o l  r e - s t a t i n g  the  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  Troppau and 
p la c in g  a l l  r  e v o l u t i o n s  under the ban o f  the A l l i a n c e ,  
f i n a l l y  announcing  a meeting  o f  the A l l i a n c e  the next  year 
at F l o r e n c e .  T h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n  w as soon under f i r e  f rom the 
o p p o s i t i o n  in th e  Commons and C a s t l e r e a g h  did not attempt 
to defend i t .  He p o in ted  out that  i t  was in d i r e c t  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  h i s  l a s t  Memorandum ~
'» He d id not s c r u p l e  to d e c l a r e  his  d is appro-
"bat ion  o f  the p r i n c i p l e s  advocated in  the documents which 
"had been b rou gh t  t o  the n o t i c e  o f  the House, He could 
"not r e c o g n i s e  the  p r i n c i p l e  that  one S ta te  was e n t i t l e d  to 
" i n t e r f e r e  w i th  another  because changes might be e f f e c t e d  
" in  i t s  Government in a way wihich the former S tate  d i s -  
"approved.  For c e r t a i n  S t a t e s  to e r e c t  themselves into  a 
" t r i b u n a l  t o  judge o f  the i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  o thers  
"was in d e f i a n c e  o f  the Law o f  Nat ions ,  and the p r i n c i p l e s  
"o f  Common s e n s e " , 1
1. Hansard, Commons, Thursday,June £ l s t .  13£1.
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C H A P T E V I I .
THE EASTERN QUESTION
C K A P T 3 R' VII.
THE EASTERN Q'UESTICN.
I n t e r e s t  v/as soon to  turn from middle 
Europe to th,e Near E ast .  Tjtie Congress o f  Vienna had l e f t  
the Turks supreme in the Balkans and the Powers even 
wished to r e c e i v e  Turkey in to  the c i r c l e  o f  European 
n a t i o n s ,  R u ss ia  was n a t u r a l l y  opposed to  t h i s  p o l i c y .  
Since  the time o f  P e ter  the Great ,  sh e  had cherished hopes 
o f  expans ion  towards the Mediterranean, and Turkey was in 
the way. In r e l i g i o u s  matters  Russia saw her Greek brethren 
o f  the Orthodox  Church under the i n f i d e l  h e e l ,  and by the 
Treaty o f  Kutchuk K a i n a r j i  in 1774 she had succeeded in 
o b t a in in g  guard ian  r i g h t s  over  the Greek Christ ians o f  the 
P r i n c i p a l i t i e s  and over  the church in Constantinople .  These 
r i g h t s  she had endeavoured to  extend.  To the Tsar the 
Turks were A s i a t i c s ,  inca_./able by t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n s  and 
t h e i r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f  ta k in g  th e i r  p la c e  as a nation in 
Europe. The o n l y  means o f  d e a l i n g  with them was by fear 
as they unders tood  no code o f  honour or o f  humanity.
■Uuring the N a p o l e o n i c  s t r u g g l e  there  had been peace between
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these  two n a t i o n s  o b t a in e d  by promises o f  c e r t a in  c o n -  , 
c e s s i o n s  in A s ia  on the pa r t  o f  Russ ia .  But these con­
c e s s i o n s  had been w i t h h e l d ,  and Russia was supposed to be 
support ing  a S erb ia n  r e v o l t .  Besides  these i r r i t a t i n g  
c i r cu m s t a n ce s ,  th e r e  was a l s o  the long standing q.uestion 
o f  the r i g h t s  o f  Russ ian v e s s e l s  in th e  S t r a i t s ,  Though 
war was u n l i k e l y  r e l a t i o n s  were hardly  f r i e n d i y . Austr ia  
and England both v/ished f o r  a strong  power in the Balkans 
to keep R u ss ia  in check and France a lready  had a centur ies  
o ld t r a d i t i o n  o f  a l l i a n c e  with  the Turks.
The Turks themselves were r u l in g  t h e i r  vassa l  
s t a t e s  with  the utmost  incompetence.  ®They had ne i ther  
subjugated nor p a c i f i e d  the Greeks vfco kept  th e i r  own 
r e l i g i o n  and paid the same taxes  as the  Musselmans and had 
advantages ov er  them such an exemption from m i l i t a r y  s e r ­
v i c e .  S p ora d i c  massacres mingled with per iods  o f  peace 
and q u ie t  o n l y  served to keep a l i v e  the s p i r i t  o f  r e v o l t  
and n a t i o n a l i t y  fed as i t  was by the s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s  such 
as the K e t e i r a  F h i l i k e  and by a great  l i t e r a r y  r e v i v a l .  But, 
l i k e  the Turks they were l i t t l e  b e t t e r  than h a l f - c i v i l i s e d
I
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and when, war did break out  i t  was waged on both, s ides  with 
barbaric  cruelt^f .  The r e c e n t  r e v o l t s  in the west had 
encouraged the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  in the arch ipe lago ,  already 
influenced by the e f f o r t s  o f  Capo d l s t r i a  and the e a r l i e r  
a t t i tu d e  o f  the Tzar .  A l l  the Greeks c o n f id e n t ly  expected 
help from t h e i r  c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s  whenever they opened the 
struggle f o r  freedom. In 1320 Al i  Pasha, the 'Lion o f  
lanina*,  roused wide i n t e r e s t  by s e t t - i n g  himsel f  up as a 
King a)f the Mountains,  and the occupation o f  the Turkish 
army with t h i s  r e b e l  roused the hopes o f  the Greeks. The 
f i r s t  r i s i n g  took  p lace  in Moldavia and ’Mallachia under the 
leadership o f  Pr ince  Hypse lantes . These two provinces were 
not Greek in p o p u la t i o n  or in sentiment and with l i t t l e  
popular enthusiasm i t  was evident  that only  Russian in te r ­
vention cou ld  save the cause.  This intervention  so 
c o n f i d e n t l y  e x p e c t e d ,  was not forthcoming,  and in a short 
time Turkish t r o o p s  occupied  the p r i n c i p a l i t i e s  and the 
ch ie f  Greek leaders  f l e d  over the f r o n t i e r .  But a far  
more formidab le  r e v o l t  fo l l ow ed  in Greece proper.  I t  was 
amongst the i s lan ds  and mountains o f  Morea that the Greek 
rebel  bands had always been more or less  in freedom, sometimes
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f i g h t i n g  f o r  the Turks ,  sometimes a g a i n s t  them. Amongst 
the i s l a n d s  the  Greek s a i l o r s  had maintained the a nc ient  
s e a f a r in g  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  r a ce  and th e  Turkish navy 
was manned by the  s u b j e c t  p e o p le .  Aided by the support 
j f  th ese  accustomed  f i g h t e r s ,  having command o f  the sea ,  
and t h e  Turk ish  army b e in g  f u l l y  o c cu p ied  with  A n  Pasha, 
the r e v o l t  made c o n s i d e r a b l e  headway and hundreds o f  Turks 
were c r u e l l y  m a ssa cred .  But s t i l l  th ere  was no s ign  o f  
support  from R u s s i a ,  The c h o l e r i c  o l d  Sultan  now revenged  
h im se l f  in the t r u e  T u r k i s h  f a s h io n  by ra v a g in g  Greek 
v i l l a g e s  and hanging  many prominent Greeks,  i n c lu d in g  the 
o ld P a t r i a r c h  o f  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e  h imse l f*  Had the Tzar at 
t h i s  moment been in Iv'oscow or  S t ,  P e t e r s b u r y  with Capo d'
I s t r i a  a t  h i s  e lbow  his  r e l i g i o u s  z e a l  and n a t i o n a l  hatred 
would d o u b t l e s s  have g o t  the b e t t e r  o f  h i s  wish f o r  peace .  
But he was s t i l l  a t  La ibach  under the i n f l u e n c e  o f  M et ter ­
n i c h ,  and M e t t e r n i c h  was f o r  l e a v in g  the East to  i t s e l f  
"beyond the p a l e  o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n " .  Ke had j u s t  been a 
l ead ing  f i g u r e  in subduing r e v o I t  in I t a l y  and, d e s p i t e  
the u rg in gs  o f  Capo d* I s t r i a ,  and the o u t c r y  o f  the 
Russian peoj^le,  he wished to  keep a t  one with his c h i e f
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a l l y  i l  p o s s i b l e .
Roughly the s i t u a t i o n  from the beginning o f  
18hl to the death, o f  C as t le rea gh  vjas t h i s ,  England was 
determined on peace  and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  as long as Turkish 
e x i s t e n c e  was n o t  i m p e r i l l e d .  K e t t e r n i c h ,  no7/ having 
thoroughly u t i l i s e d  the  Russian a l l i a n c e  in I t a l y ,  wished 
f o r  a renewed u n ders tan d in g  with  England, e s p e c i a l l y  so 
because the Eastern  p o l i c y  o f  each was the same, t h a t  is  
to maintain a b u f f e r  s t a t e  to  Russia in the south, and 
t h e r e f o r e  to s t o p  Russ ia  a t ta ck in g  Turkey. The Tzar was 
in a t^uandary as t o  whether to help the Greek Christ ians 
aga inst  " l e g i t i m a c y ” or  to keep his f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  Austria 
by d i s co u n te n a n c in g  r e b e l l i o n .  He had e i t h e r  to s a c r i f i c e  
the o ld Russian P o l i c y  o f  Se l f -aggrandisement at the 
expense o f  the Turks,  or  h is  nev/ a n t i - r e v o l u t i o n  th eory  
of  the Holy A l l i a n c e .  A l l  Russia  was f o r  revenge on the 
S u l t a n .
In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the two c h i e f  ambassadors 
were S trangford  the Englishman, who adopted a pro-Turkish 
p o l i c y  and S troganov ,  t h e  Russian,  anxious f o r  war. While 
Strangford  was endeavouring to m i t igate  the s e v e r i t y  and
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c r u e l t y  o f  the T u rk ish  methods,  Stroganov was denouncing 
the P o r t e  on a c c o u n t  o f  the cont inued o c c u p a t ion  o f  the 
i r i n c i p a i i t i e s , t h e  massacre  o f  the Greeks,  and the holding 
up o f  the Russian  v e s s e l s  in the Black Sea. S t r a n g f o r d ’ s 
aim was to a v o i d  any s u g g e s t i o n  o f  c o l i a h o r a t i o n  or j o i n t  
appeal hy the  m i n i s t e r s  and so to gain  the con f idence  o f  
the P o r t e .  Th is  done he t r i e d  to ensure peace by persuading 
that body to  ad op t  a moderate p o l i c y  towards both Russia and 
the Greeks and to  a v o i d  f u r t h e r  f r i c t i o n .  Stroganov opposed 
him in e v e ry  way and, in Ju ly ,  having r e c e i v e d  in s t r u c t i o n s  
from the Tzar , now back in Russ ia ,  he demanded redress  o f  
the -Russ ian  g r i e v a n c e s .  R e c e iv in g  no answer from the 
Sultan he l e f t  Turkey on August 1 0 t h . ,  being allowed to 
go a l i v e  o n ly  by the p e r s i s t e n t  appeals o f  Strangford to 
the Turkish F o r e ig n  M i n i s t e r .
S in c e  I S ld ,  C a s t l e r e a g h ' s  p e r s i s t e n t  adv ice  
to h is  ambassadors a t  C on s ta n t in op le  had always been to 
r e c o n c i l e  R u ss ia  and Turkey. Ke now followred the same 
p o l i c y  in a more emphatic manner. There was a large  Hel len­
i c  f o l l o w i n g  in England.  C l a s s i c a l  e n th u s ia s t s ,  poets  vh o 
longed f o r  the r e v i v a l  o f  the a nc ien t  Empire, l i b e r a l s  anxious
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f o r  the overthrow o f  a u t o c r a c y ,  r e l i g i o u s  enthus iasts  to 
whom a war a ga in s t  the Tur^s was a new Crusade, t‘,any o f  
these peop le  o f f e r e d  t h e i r  money and t h e i r  l i v e s  in the 
Greek cause,  and whi le  governments supported Turkey for  
fear  o f  Hussia ,  popular  sympathy was on the s ide  o f  the 
r e b e l s ,  I f e t t e r n i c h  and even Pruss ia  suggested the sub­
s t i t u t i o n  o f  a Greek f o r  a Turkish State  as equa l ly  
su i ta b le  f o r  b u f f e r  purposes .  Cast lereagh  was against  
t h i s ,  f i r s t  as  in c u r r in g  war and in t e r f e r e n c e  and secondly  
because Russia  would have too  much in f lu e n c e  in a Greek 
i^tate. He made h is  p o l i c y  c l e a r  in a person l e t t e r  to 
the Tzar on J u l y  1 6 t h . ,  Preah from Laibacn Alexander had 
s t rong ly  denounced the r e v o l t  as in th e  same c a t e g o r y  as 
a l l  the  o th e r  r i s i n g s  and with i t s  r o o t  in Pa r i s .  Ke 
7iOuld abide by the A l l i a n c e ,  he s a i d ,  s i n c e  then he 
had been s u b j e c t  to the clamours o f  his  peop le ,  but 
Cast lereagh  urged peace ,  the  maintenance o f  the A n i a n c e ,  
and the su p p re s s i o n  o f  r e v o lu t i o n *  In language which can 
oijly be excused as d i p l o m a t i c ,  c ons ider ing  his p o l i c y  t o ­
wards Austr ia  and Russia  at Laibach,  he c a l l e d  upon the 
Tzar to maintain the s o l i d a r i t y  o f  the A l l ia n c e  f o r  the
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repose o f  Europe,  <and to  stamp out r e v o l t  by al lowing the 
Turks to suppres s the G reeks .
“ S i r e  -  When admitted to  take  leave of  your
"Imperia l  M ajes ty ,  p r e v io u s  to  your departure in 1613 from 
" A i x - l a - C h a p p l l e , Your Majesty  condescended to permit me 
"to address myse l f  d i r e c t l y  to  Your Majesty on any occasion 
"when the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the European A m a n c e  might j u s t i f y
me in having r e c o u r s e  to t h i s indulgence,
" That I have not  h i t h e r t o  ava i led  myself  o f
"Your M a j e s t y ’ s g r a c i o u s  permiss ion  is  a proo f  that I have 
"not been tempted to abuse the p e c u l ia r  mark o f  Yourmlmperial 
"Majesty ’ s favour and c o n f i d e n c e ,
" In o b e d ie n c e  t o  the King my Sovere ign 's
"commands, and under a deep sense o f  the importance o f  the 
"present  c r i s i s ,  I now presume to address Your Imperial 
"Majesty upon the a f f a i r s  o f  Turkey. , . I am con f ident  
"that the d r e a d f u l e v e n t s  which now a f f l i c t  that  p or t i on  
*-'of Europe are no t  regarded by your Imperial  Majesty as 
" c o n s t i t u t i n g  in the h i s t o r y  o f  these times a new or an 
" i s o l a t e d  CiUestion. They form a branch o f  that organised 
" s p i r i t  o f  i n s u r r e c t i o n  which is  ^ s t e m a t i c a l l y  propagating 
" i t s e l f  throughout  Europe,  and xvhich e xpiodes  wherever 
"the hand o f  the governing  power, from whatever cause, is  
"enfeeb led . . .
" I t  would be super f luous to vjaste Your Imperial
"Majesty ’ s t ime by a rg u in g  that  Turkey, with a l l  i t s  bar-  
"barism, c o n s t i t u t e s  in the system o f  Europe what may be 
"regarded as a n ecessa ry  e v i l . .  I t  is an excrescence which 
"can s c a r c e l y  be looked upon as forming any part  o f  i t s  
"h ea l th fu l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ;  and y e t ,  f o r  that  very reason,
"any attempt to in trod uce  order  by e x t e r n a l  in te r fe ren ce  
' into the j a r r i n g  elements or  to assiimilate i t  to th e  mass, 
“might expose the whole frame o f  our general  system to 
"hazard. The r e a l  q u es t ion  which presses f o r  cons iderat ion  
" i s  how the danger s h a l l  be kept at a d is tance  from other 
"Sta tes ,  and how the a d ja c e n t  Powers can best  preserve the ir  
" p a c i f i c  r e l a t i o n s  w/ith a peop le  so convulsed" .
He sympathises with the Tsar because o f  the
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C h r is t ia n s  in Turkey,  and urges fu r th er  forbearance and
pat ience  u n t i l  the  madness should pass .
'* No doubt  humanity shudders at the scenes
“which are a c t i n g ,  as i t  appears ,  throughout the greater  
"part o f  European Turkey,  and i t  u i l l r e c i u i r e  a l l  the 
"commanding a u t h o r i t y  o f  Your Imperial  M a jes ty ’ s great  
"name and c h a r a c t e r  t o  r e c o n c i l e  the Russian nation to 
"7.'itness the m i n i s t e r s  o f  a c on gen ia l  f a i t h  so barbarously  
"immolated t o  the  resentment o f  a government under 'àhich 
"they have the  m i s f o r t u n e  to  be.  But i t  is  in vain to
"hope that  we can m a t e r i a l l y  a l t e r  t h e i r  l o t  or d e l i v e r  
"them from t h e i r  a i f f e r i n g s ,  and preserve  the system o f  
’’Europe as i t  now s tan ds .  The hazard o f  innovating 
"upon t h i s  c o n s t r u c t e d  work and the r e f  l e c t i o n  that  whi lst  
"we cannot r e f u s e  to the Greeks our sympathy and our com- 
"pass ion ,  they have been the  agg ressors  on the present 
^occasion ;  and th a t  they have y i e ld e d  to the corru pt in g  
" p r a c t i c e  o f  the t im es ,  s o r e p r o v e d  by Your Imperial  Majesty,  
may w e l l  e e c o n c i l e  Yo\ir Imper ial  Majesty  and your l i l i e s  
" to  observe  r a t h e r  than to intermeddle in t h e  endless  and 
" i n t r i c a t e  mazes o f  Turkish  c o n f u s i o n .
" The f lame h um s at the moment too a .rdently
"to be o f  l ong  d u r a t i o n ;  a time must a r r i v e ,  and that  
" p r o b a b l y a t  no d i s t a n t  p e r i o d ;  w^en the Turkish power 
"exhausted by i t s  own co n v u ls i o n s  w i l l  be a c c e s s i b l e  to 
"reason,  and when Your Imper ia l  M a jes ty ’ s v o i ce  w i l l  be 
"heard, and your wrongs r e d r e s s e d ,  and perhaps Providence,
"in many t r i a l s  to w^hich i t  has dest ined  Your Majesty  in 
"your e v e n t f u l  and g l o r i o u s  l i f e ,  has never presented 
"an o c c a s i o n  in which Your Imper ia l  Majesty  may a f f o r d  
"to your own t imes and to  p o s t e r i t y  a prouder manifesta -  
Htion o f  Your Im per ia l  M a j e s t y ' s  p r i n c i p l e s  than by ex er -  
" c i s i n g  tow'ards t h i s  f a n a t i c  and semi-barbarous s ta te  that  
"degree o f  f o r b e a r a n c e  and magnanimity which a r e l i g i o u s  
"and e n t h u s i a s t i c  r e s p e c t  f o r  the system which Your Imperial  
"Majesty has so p o w e r f u l l y  con tr ibu ted  to r a i s e  in Europe 
"could a lone d i c t a t e  under such p rovoca t ion s  and with 
"such means at Your Im per ia l  M a je s t y ' s  d i s p o s a l .
" I esume to  hope that the sentiments I
i n d i g n i t i e s  and i n j u r i e s  s u f f e r e d  by R u s s i a n s  and Ort nodox
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"have ventured to  e x p r e s s  w i l l  n e i th er  prove unacceptable 
"to nor be disavov^ed by,  Your Imper ia l  i i a j e s ty .  Whatever 
"degree o f  d i v e r g e n c e  o f  o p i n i o n  may have occurred in la te  
" d i s c u s s i o n s  on a b s t r a c t  t h e o r i e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law,
' a^nd however the ^.-osition o f  the B r i t i s h  Government may 
"have l a t t e r l y  been rendered d i s t i n c t  from t r a t  o f  the 
three A l l i e d  C o u r t s ,  by tne l i n e  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  which the 
"King tnought i t  n e c e s s a r y  to adopt with r e s p e c t  to 
" I t a l i a n  a f f a i r s ,  there  h ap p i ly  has hardly  occurred an 
" instance  s i n c e  the a u s p i c i o u s  per iod which gave b i r th  
“ to the e x i s t i n g  A l l i a n c e ,  o f  any p o in t  o f  ^  ave p r a c t i c a l  
“p o l i t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between Your Imper ial  Ea^esty 's  
" c ou n c i l s  and those  o f  my august Master,  I f e e l  int imately  
"convinced that  each  s t a t e ,  avowing c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  in 
the face  o f  a l l  the world i t s  own p r i n c i p l e s ,  and at the. 
“ same time adher ing  to i t s  p e c u l ia r  hab i ts  o f  a c t i o n ,  w i l l  
"n everth e less  remain u n a l t e r a b l y  true to the fundamental 
" o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  the A l l i a n c e ,  and that  the ^.-resent Buro.ean 
"System, thus tem perate ly  and prudent ly  administered,  w i l l  
"tong cont inue  to s u b s i s t  f o r  the s a f e t y  and r e p o s e  of  
"Yurope . . . , "1
This  p o l i c y  i s  not  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  ^-revious 
d e c l a r a t i o n s .  I t  i s  s t i l l  n o n - i n t e r f s r e n c e . There was no 
thought o f  support ing  Turkey, on ly  o f  p a c i f y i n g  her and 
persuading her to  c o n c i l i a t e  the r e b e l s  by clemency,  and 
j u s t i c e ,  and to  a v o id  i r r i t a t i n g  Hussia .  The arguments 
used to i n f l u e n c e  the Tzar are  r a t h e r  t h in .  Gastiereagh 
now shows h im se l f  as anxious to merge a l l  r e v o l u t i o n s  into 
the same c a t e g o r y ,  in order  to get Alexander to commit 
himself  to a  -uniform p o l i c y ,  a s  b e f o r e  he had been to keep
1. Castlereagh^s C orrespon den ce , X I I . 403
- 1 3 8 -
\them sep arate  t o ’prevent "G eneral D e c la ra tio n s ''. The 
statem ent th at " i t  i s  in  vain to hope that we can 
m a te r ia lly  a lt e r  th e ir  lo t  or d e liv e r  them from th e ir  
s u f fe r in g s , and preserve the system o f Europe as i t  
now sta n d s" had no supporting argument and carried  no con­
v ic t io n , His appeal to  the T z a r 's  "forbearance and magna 
n im ity " would have l e f t  anyone but Alexander unmoved. I t  
was in sh ort a warning as to where England's in te r e sts  
la y , wrapped up w ith that f la t t e r y  and appeal to lo f t y  
id e a ls  which would be most l ik e ly  to  in flu en ce the Tzar.
M ettern ich , w h ilst  supporting Castlereagh in 
t h is ,  wished fo r  a jo in t  p o lic y  at Constantinople by 
England, A u s tr ia , France and P ru ssia , but C astlereagh  
knew th a t Stran gford  ¡had more Influence when on h is own, 
and r e je c te d  the A u strian  suggestion  of an Ambassadorial 
Conference at Vienna, M etternich had a d i f f i c u l t  game 
to play as he was in  the Tzar*s d eb t, and unless he could ' 
get a backing from England, he might have to f u l f i l  h is  
o b lig a tio n s  by supporting a p o lic y  contrary to Austrian  
in t e r e s t s .
The tz a r  sen t h is  rep ly  through Baigot on
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August S9th,. He pointed out th a t  “he had to  contend with 
a strong t id e  of p u b lic  opinion and public p reju d ice , and 
that he had to oppose h is  own anxious d e sire  to preserie  
the t r a n q u i l l i t y  o f Europe to that o f  the great mass o f  
his p e o p le ."
" At my la s t  audience with the Emperor, he
repeated to me "what he sa id  at my former one -  that he 
"was much g r a t i f ie d  by your lo r d s h ip 's  le t t e r  to him, and 
"th a t there was nothing which be so much desired as to 
"encourage the f u l l e s t  and most unreserved communications 
-With the B r it is h  Government." 1
This le t t e r  shows the e f fe c t  o f Capo d 'l s t r i a  
on the TzaLT sin ce  he had l e f t  Laibach. There Is no doubt 
that but fo r  the rep re se n ta tio n s  of B rita in  and A u stria , 
he would have thrown h is  a n ti-re v o lu tio n a ry  crusade to the 
winds and declared war on th e  Turks. Even now peace was 
far from c e r ta in . A l l  depended on th e  S u lta n 's  rep ly  to 
the H ussian demands. Alexander had stated h is terms. I f  
they were not accepted before the spring war would be the 
r e s u lt .  To s im p lify  m atters M etternich reduced the demands 
to four p o in ts (1 )  the p rotection  o f the Greek r e l i g i o n ,(2) 
the r e s to r a tio n  of the Greek Churches, (3 )  the recognition
1 . C a stle re a g h 's  Correspondence X II . 431,
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of the d is t in c t io n  between th e  g u i lt y  and the innocent 
Greeks and (4 )  the evacu ation  and reo rga n isa tion  o f the 
P r in c ip a l i t ie s ,  The Sultan  was w illin g  to concede a l l  
but the la s t  o f  th ese  and i t  was upon th is  point that both 
B r it is h  and A u strian  M in iste rs  tr ie d  to influ en ce him.
M ettern ich  and C astlereagh  had met at Hanover 
in  the la te  autumn o f 18B1, and had come to a thorough 
understanding. Peace was to be urged both a t  St.P etersburg  
and at C on stan tin o p le ! but no sign o f  co llu sio n  must 
appear. This miight shake the Tzair^s fa ith fu ln e s s  to the 
A llia n c e  and cause him to adopt an iso la te d  d efia n t  
a t t i t u d e . I t  was a l l  the e a sie r  to hide the jo in t  p o licy  
as C astlereagh  could go so f a r  as to leave her fr ie n d ly  
n e u tr a lity  in dou bt» much fu rth er than A u stria , i f  Russia  
proved in tr a c ta b le .
I t  was the in flu en ce o f A u stria  and England 
a g a in st th at o f Capo d ' l s t r l a  and the Russian nation in 
the co u n cils  o f the T zar. For some time i t  seemed that 
the la t t e r  would win. A d e cisio n  had to be reached before  
March and the w inter was already w ell spent. Capo d ' l s t r l a
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and b is supporters were sure of mar, e s p e c ia lly  as tbe 
Porte refused any fu rth er concessions in tbe P rin cip a litie s  
u n til G-reek refu g ees in Russia had been turned ou t. Volum­
inous d ispatch es passed between London,Vienna and S t.P eters­
burg with l i t t l e  r e s u lt .  On December 14th . Castlereagh  
wrote to Bagot, again fo r  the b en efit o f the Tzar, urging 
that tbe Greek r e v o lt  was tbe most formidable of a series  
of revolu tion s and th at any intervention should be on the 
Bide of tbe Turks, but as tbe Taar could hardly take th is  
course, the next b est thing was to keep q u iet. On January 
19th. he again wrote to Bagot, th is  time urging a resumption 
of diplom atic r e la t io n s  between Russia and Turkey as the 
Turks had made considerable concessions.
" In r e f le c t in g  upon the present sta te  of a f fa ir s
"in  Greece as connected with those of the r e st  of Europe 
"and one may say o f the world, i t  is  impossible the Emperor 
"o f Russia should not be struck with the c r i t i c a l  nature 
"o f the course which he has to p u rsu e.. . .  .The f i r s t  point 
"th at deserves the Emperor's a tten tiv e  consideration is the 
"wide and increasin g  spread of the revolutionary movement 
“throughout the American as w ell as the European Continent.. 
"The same s p ir i t  has deeply mixed i t s e l f  in the a ffa ir s  of 
"Greece. The in su rrection  throughout European Tiarkey,
"in  i t s  o rg an isatio n , in i t s  o b je c ts , in i t s  agency, and 
"in  i t s  external r e la t io n s , i s  in no r  espect d lstin g u ish -
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"able from the movements which have preceded i t  in Spain, 
"Portugal and I t a l y * . . . I n  s h o r t , i t  i s  im possib le  th at  
"the Smperor should not see th a t the head o f th is  r e v o lu -  
"tionary to rre n t i s  G reece, th a t the t id e  is  flow ing in  
"upon his Southern p rov in ces in  an alm ost uninterrupted  
"and continuous stream  from  th e  other s id e  of the 
"A tla n tic ; and i t  i s  upon t h is  p r in c ip le , and not upon 
"lo c a l views o f  p o l i c y ,  th a t h is  Im p eria l M ajesty w i l l ,
"I  doubt n o t, as a sta tesm an , r e g u la te  h is  conduct*
" 1 am n o t now about to  say what the B r it is h
"Qovernment would do in  such a c a s e . , , .b u t  sure I am t h a t ,
I'lf what i s  now p a ssin g  in  G reece, e s p e c ia lly  in Morea,
"had shown i t s e l f  in  any oth er c o u n tr ie s  lim itro p e  to  
^Russia, th e  Bmperor would, ere t h i s ,  have acted as he 
*"dld when a t  L a ib ach , and no q u estion  with the Turks would 
"have induced him to h e s ita te  in opposing the common and for- 
"midable enemy", 1
As th in g s  were th is  was too much to  exp ect, 
and Bagot w ithheld the d isp a tc h  u n t i l  a more favou rable  
opportunity should o c c u r . , I t  n igh t have produced the same 
resu lt which had been avoided b efore  by separate representa­
tion , th at o f  i r r i t a t i n g  Alexander in to  d e fia n c e . Sven 
without such an i r r i t a n t ,  he was on the point o f d ispatch ln g  
an un frien dly  le t t e r  o f  com plaint to M etternich which seemed 
a prelim inary to a ru p tu re . But t h is  was immediately 
followed to  Vienna by T a tlsh e h e v , The Tzar had changed his  
mind. The le t t e r  meant d e fia n c e , p o s s ib ly  w ar, th e
1* C astlereagh *8 Correspondence X I I .  Page 443 .
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d ip lo m a tis t  meant p e a c e . A lexander « a s  a fr a id  o f  throw ing  
away a l l  the in f lu e n c e  he had gained a t  Troppau and L a i­
bach i f  he broke w ith  A u s tr ia . I t  would mean c a n c e llin g  
her d ebt to R u s s ia . He imputed to  h im se lf higher m otives  
o f  p o l i c y .
" I am s e n s ib le  o f  the danger 4h ich  surrounds
"u s  a l l  when I lo o k  a t  the s ta te  o f  France and th e  new 
"M in is t r y , when I  see  s t a t e  o f  Spain and P o rtu g a l, when I 
" s e e ,  as I  do s e e , the s ta te  o f  the whole w orld , I  am 
"aware th a t  the s m a lle s t  spark which f a l l s  upon such com- 
"b u s t ib le  m a te r ia ls  may k in d le  a flam e which a l l  our 
" e f f o r t s  may perhapd h e r e a fte r  be i n s u f f ic ie n t  to  
extin gu ialh " 1
He could hairdly r i s k  encouraging t h is  " a l l  
to o  p r e v a le n t " r e v o lu t io n a r y  fe e l in g  and be looked upon 
as the sponsor o f  L ib e ra lism  by a com bination o f  A u str ia  and 
B r it a in . T a t1shehev had in s tr u c t io n s  to put the Russian
demands forw ard , and even to exten d  the Four P o in ts  to a  
demand f o r  a r e -o r g a n is a t io n  o f Turkey in  the in t e r e s t s  o f  
the G reek s, M ettern ic h  was too w ily  fo r  the R ussian
1 C a stle r e a g h *s  Correspondence X I I .  4 4 3 .
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d ip lo m a tis t  and in  order to s a t i s f y  tiim and the Tzar he 
promised h is  m oral support to R ussia in case  o f n a r , and 
a lso  to bree^k o f f  d ip lo m a tic  r e la t io n s  with Turkey i f  the 
A l l i e s ,  in th at e v e n t, would do the same. He knew that 
B r ita in  would r e fu s e . The f i n a l  se ttle m e n t o f the 
q u estion  could  w ait t i l l  the conference arranged at Laibach 
should m eet,
Castlereaigh had been even le s s  p lia b le  to 
Lieven who had put forward s im ila r  proposals to those o f  
T a tisc h e v , He refu sed  to  hear of any a lte r a t io n  of the 
Four P oin ts which Strangford was s t i l l  p ressin g  on the 
Porte and on h is  o f f i c i a l  r e p ly  to Bagot he e n t ir e ly  refused  
to  break o f f  d ip lom atic  r e la t io n s  in any even t. The 
gen eral p u b lic  in England might lik e  to se e  the Greeks 
independent but not at the p rice  o f  an in crease in 
Russian power, and C astlereagh  was determ ined rather to 
err in  over caution  than to get trapped in to  jo in t  
a ctio n  w ith  the A m a n c e  which was as unpopular as Russia  
h e r s e l f .
Meanwhile in  Turkey S tran gford »s labours had 
a t l a s t  borh f r u i t .  In January an interview  with the 
S u ltan  and strenuous exh ortation  had re su lte d  in a vague
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promise o f  evacu ation  o f the P r in c ip a l i t ie s  -  some­
tim e, The a s s a s s in a t io n  o f A l i  Pasha gave the Forte a 
fu rth e r  excuse fo r  p r o c r a s tin a tio n  fo r  a few months, and 
then in  A p r il th ere  was a change in the m in istry  and ordess  
were g iv en  fo r  the e v a cu a tio n . For the tim e-peace was 
se cu re . Capo d * I s t r i a  had fa i le d  and in a l l  lik e lih o o d  
some f i n a l  se tt le m e n t would be made a t the coming co n fer­
en ce .
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C H AP T E R  V i l i .
VERONA.
C H A P T E R VIII.
V E R O N A .
The Powers were to meet a t Verona in October.
The I t a l ia n  se ttle m e n t, on account o f  which the Conference 
had been proposed, was not expected to tak e up very much 
tim e; n or, as th in gs had turned ou t, was the more v ita l  
E astern Q uestion; but fu rther west storm clouds were p ilin g  
up b lacker than b e fo r e , and the Tzar*e in te r e st  in Spain 
and even in  the Spanish American Colonies meant more 
trou ble ahead for C aatlereagh.
In Spain rea ctio n a ry  p lo ts , countenanced by 
Ferdinand and the French R o y a lis ts , had caused the overthrow 
o f the moderate Cortes and i t s  replacement by one more extremely 
L ib e r a l. The Comte d 'A r to is  and Montmorencl in France and 
the Tzar in Russia were anxious fo r  interferen ce to r e ­
e s ta b lis h  Ferdinand. Alexander*s usual C ircular Despatch 
met w ith a co ld , though not e n tir e ly  a n ta go n istic , rec e p tio n  
from both M etternich and G astlereagh. These two M inisters  
kept each other w ell informed of th eir  various moves, and
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n eith er was w il l in g  to see  a Russian army marching across 
C entral Europe. Even the French thought in terferen ce  
was th e ir  own r ig h t  and d u ty , e s p e c ia l ly  as the Russian  
troops would have to c r o ss  France, and Alexander him self 
was a fra id  o f  h is  troop s coming into  contact with L ib era l­
ism. However he did not wish to  lo se  the opportunity o f  
r e c e iv in g  payment fo r  A u strian s debt to  him, and K etternich  
was h a lf committed at Troppau to a p o lic y  of jo in t  in te r -
. f
ference in  S pain . The M ach ia^vellian  nature o f Central 
Europe an diplom acy was as y et l i t t l e  r e a lis e d .
F erd in an d 's appeals to France had resu lted  
in a stron g  p a rty  in  the Government fo r  in terferen ce , and 
the Cordon S a n ita ir e  in  the Pyrenees, to prevent the spread 
of sm allp ox , had become a form idable army. But the party  
in the ascendant led by V i l l e l e  waited fo r  the d ecisio n  of 
the A l l ia n c e .
The Q uestion o f the Spanish Colonies was 
even more in t r ic a t e  and more important to England, Napoleon's 
in vasion  o f  Spain had re su lte d  in lo y a l Juntas being s e t  
up in the C o lo n ie s . Ferdinand * s i l l —ru le  had tiirned these 
into re v o lu tio n a r y  governments, and these Colonies had opened
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up a b r isk  trade with B rita in  even before IS IS , When the  
monarchy vas restored in Spain the Cortes wished to re­
e s ta b lis h  i t s  au th ority  in South America and also i t s
\
trade monopoly. In 1812 C astlereagh offered  to mediate 
between the mother country and her Colonies provided th at,
(1^ there should be no secret advantages such as Spain 
had o ffe re d  fo r  a c tiv e  h e lp , (2 )  that the mediation should 
apply to a l l  her C o lo n ies , (3 )  that force was not to be 
used. England could a ffo rd  to r e fu s e  sp e c ia l trading  
p r iv ile g e s  in any country on account o f her universal 
su p e rio r ity  both in the navy and in the merchant s e r v ic e .
She had no need to buy advantages, and free  trad e in a l l  
C olonies o f whatever n a tio n a lity  was the p o licy  which would 
b e n e fit  her the most, Ferdinand would not consider the 
la s t  term of the proposal which was then r e je c te d .
In 1817 the A llia n ce  was approached by Ferdinand 
through the T zar. This was the time when the negotiations  
r e la t in g  to the old Russian f le e t  caused so much anxiety  
a t Vienna and London. But the anxiety was so much allayed  
th at even A u stria  joined with the other ambassadors in 
supporting a scheme o f Pozzo di Borgo and Fernán Nunez for
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s e t t l in g  the Spanlsh-Portuguese d isp u te . Only the refu sa l 
of Castlereagfa to allow  Intervention  in Portugal by force  
o f arms caused i t s  r e je c t io n  by the A llia n c e . In a d is ­
patch d ealin g -w ith , t h is  m atter, Castlereagh goes on to the 
more important q^uestion:
" There is  another branch o f th is  question of
•great importance and upon which the Prince Regent is  d e s ir -  
•ous to be most d is t in c t ly  understood; namely that His 
"Royal Highness cannot consent that h is mediation s h a ll ,  
"under circum stances assume an armed ch aracter. . . .H is in -  
"te rv e n tio n  must throughout be understood to be confined 
•within the bounds of good o f f ic e s  and the employment of 
"th a t ju s t  in flu en ce  which must belong to any Great Power 
"when labouring only to promote the w elfare of an A llied  
•Sovereign and h is p eop le . His Royal Highness deems i t  
•proper to be more e x p l ic i t  on th is  branch o f the subject 
•as he is  persuaded that the party in Spain, which s t i l l  
"u n fo rtu n a tely  c lin g s  to the ar4Cient co lo n ia l system of 
?that country, and which has hitherto had influence enough 
"to  prevent any e ffe c tu a l attempt at r e c o n c ilia t io n , w ill  
^continue to ob stru ct any such attempt so long as they 
!are  perm itted to indulge a hope o f involving other Powers 
?in  the con test and thereby ava ilin g  themselves o f foreign  
"arms fo r  the subjugation  of the Spanish C o lo n ie s ." 1
A few months la te r  Castlereagh said to Lieven -
« By what r ig h t  could she (England) force a
■population which had freed i t s e l f  because i t s  government 
•was oppressive and place i t s e l f  once more under the 
•domination of that same government,"
» In te r e st and sentiment lay  in the same
"p o lic y , n on -in terferen ce and the expansion of over-seas  
•trade, B rita in  would not allow the A llia n ce  to in terfere  
■except on her own terms and Spain had refused these term s."
l .P .O , Spain 204 , Cabinet liemorandum, C astlereagh 's Foreign 
P o lic y ,(Ite b ste r) 414) - 150-
At A lx -la -C tia p e lle  nothing was decided,
Russia and Frame© proposed a scheme by which W ellington  
was to s e t t l e  m atters in Madrid as rep resen tative  of the 
Powers. Nothing was said with r egard to force not being 
used. To C astlereagh the scheme was "h igh ly  unsatisfying  
and o b je c t io n a b le ", we could "mediate or f a c i l i t a t e "  but 
not "compel or menace". No extern al power was en titled  to 
■arb itrate  or judge" between the King of Spain and his 
su b je c ts . In consequence the scheme f e l l  through.
Meanwhile the United S tates were moving 
towards a recog n itio n  of the independence of the Colonies. 
Their tendency towards is o la tin g  the American continent, 
th eir  su spicion s of the Powers in Europe, and th eir own 
fev o lu tio n a ry  beginnings, a l l  tended to made© for their  
recogn ition  of the South American Colonies as self-govern in g  
s ta te s . Added to th is  was the fe e b le  p o licy  of Spain 
which provoked rather than suppressed or con ciliated  the 
r e b e ls . C astlereagh endeavoured to sheer America o ff  
th is  I s o la t io n  p o lic y  by making the interference of the 
A llia n ce  seem probable, but a fter  the A ix-la -C h apelle  Con­
gress th is  was d i f f i c u l t .  However he passed the Foreign 
Englistm ent B i l l  to prevent Englishmen from joining the
-151-
reb e ls  as Lord Cochrane and many others had done. But 
th is  a tt itu d e  o f f a i r  play to Spain was considerably modi­
f ie d , when he found out th at the French Government had 
been in tr ig u in g  for a French Prince to s e t  him self up as 
monarch o f one o f the C o lo n ies , In rep ly  to  th is  treacher­
ous p o lic y  he Informed Zea, th e  Columbian rep resen tative  
in London, th at the B r it is h  Government would recogn ise  
any Colony adopting monarchical in s t itu t io n s .
On May 4 th . 1S22, Congress passed a B i l l  
allow in g  expenses fo r  “such m issions to the independent 
nations of the American Continent as the President of the 
United S ta te s  may deem p rop er". On June 19th. the r e -  
p rese n ta tiv e  o f  Columbia was form ally  received in the S tates, 
By th is  time C astlereagh  had given up hppe of Spain 
s e t t l in g  her own a f fa ir e  and having re -en tered  upon fr ie n d ly  
terms w ith M etternich a fte r  the storms of Troppau and Lai­
bach, he was beginning to adopt a p o lic y  o f rec o g n itio n .
This hardly agrees with h is o ft  declared non-intervention  
dogma as I t  would be a d is t in c t  blow to Spain. Commercial 
in te r e s ts  however were outweighing other con sideration s, 
and he knew that the public was behind him as English mer-
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chantB tradin g irltti South America were heiag treated as 
pirates by the Spaniards. So the f i r s t  step he took was 
to get the N avigation  Acts revised  so as to allow Spanish 
American v e s s e ls  to use E nglish  harbours, thus e s ta b lis h ­
ing freedom of trade and commercial r e c o g n itio n . Diplomatic 
or p o li t ic a l  rec o g n itio n  would come la t e r . An appeal to 
France to do lik ew ise  fa ile d  but Russia was le s s  h o stile  
to C astiereagh*8 p o lic y , A new o ffe r  from Spain of more 
lib e ra l in s t itu t io n s  in South America brought a pause and 
a warning from C aatlereagh, "th at the State which can 
neither by i t s  counsels nor by i t s  arms e ffe c tu a lly  assert  
Its  own r ig h ts  over i t s  dependences so as to enforce pb- 
edience and thus make i t s e l f  resp on sib le  for maintaining their  
relatio n s with other Powers, must sooner or la ter  be pre­
pared to see those r e la t io n s  establish ed  from the overruling  
necessity  o f the ca se , under some other form ,"
In h is  in stru ctio n s for his own use at the 
forthcoming Verona Congress he wrote -
" I f  the actu al governments o f South America shall
"maintain them selves, suad i f  Spain s h a ll , neither by her 
"cou n cils nor her BLrms, r e -e s ta b lis h  her authority within 
"a lim ited  tim e, other S tates w ill acknowledge them sooner 
"or la t e r ;  and i t  is  in the in terest o f Spain h erself to 
"find  the means o f r e sto r in g  an intercourse where she 
"cauanot succeed in r e -e s ta b lish in g  a dominion. The whole 
"may be regarded rather as a matter o f time than of p r in c ip le ..
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" I t  i s  w ith regard to the t e r r it o r ie s  in which the struggle  
"may be said to be over, and the possession  become complete 
"on the part o f the lo c a l government, th at the discu ssion  
"must t u r n ."  1
No question as to commercial recogn ition  
already accorded. He drew up his in stru ction s very broad­
ly  in order to allow  him self every freedom.
" The question then r e so lv e s  i t s e l f  into one
"rath er as to the mode of our r e la t io n s  than as to whether 
"th ey  sh a ll or sh a ll not s u b s is t , to the exten t, in the 
m atter of r ig h t, aas regulated by the law of nations.
In judging th is  point i t  is  m aterial to d is -  
■tinguish  the fo llow ing d escrip tion s of r e c o g n itio n ,
" (1 )  the recognition  de f  a cto . sii ioh now su b sta n tia lly
* (2 )  the more formal recognition  by diplom atic agents.
" (3 )  the recogn ition  de .jure, which p rofesses to decide
- upon the t i t l e ,  and thereby to create a certain
impediment to the assertion  o f  the r ig h ts  of the 
former occupant.
"Now as to the la s t  d escrip tion  of recogn ition  there can 
"be no f a ir  pretence fo r  c a llin g  upon th is  country to commit 
"h e r s e lf  by i t s  adoption. I t  is  for the two contending 
"p a r t ie s  them selves to s e t t le  the question of t i t l e ,  aot 
" fo r  a  th ird  psirty to in te r fe r e . They have a motiee of 
"convenience in doing so however d i f f i c u l t  may be the  
"adjudgment.
" The p r a c tic a l question is  -  How long should
"th e  de fa cto  system of recogn ition  be maintained to the 
"e x c lu sio n  of the d ip lom atic , and when can the la tte r  be 
"ad op ted ?" 2 .
1 , W ellin gton  Despatches, Vol I ,  page 284,
2 . Ib id  page 2 8 4 -7 .
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There ia  no doubt as to G astlereagh*s in -  
te n t lo n s . This la s t  Memorandum is  the most Important 
document he has le f t *  I t  contains h is la t e s t  thoughts on 
the g en era l s itu a tio n  and g iv es a fa ir  idea of the p o licy  
which he intended to use at Vienna. Before he could use 
i t  he was dead* The stretin of the session  was too much 
for him. Trouble in  England, the D ivorce Question, constant 
o p p o sitio n  a tta ck s in  a d d itio n  to the p ersisten t foreign  
problems caused h is  h ea lth  to f a i l .  He had few friends  
and none to whom he might ease h is mind and open his  
h e a rt. He bore alm ost the nihole r e s p o n s ib ility  o f govern­
ment and the hatred of a l l  L ib era ls  at home and abroad.
His to rtu re  o f mind was overwhelming, but he never broke 
h is  reserv e  and d ig n ity . At la s t  the burden was too great, 
h is b rain  gave way and he committed su icid e by cu ttin g his 
th roat on August 12th . 1322.
Canning, who was on the poin t o f s ta rtin g
fo r  In d ia  as G overnor-G eneral, was prevailed  upon to f i l l
h is  p o s it io n  and the task  of B r it is h  Ambassador to the
Verona Congress was assigned to W ellin gton . M etternich
viewed th ese changes with some alarm. He r ea lised  that 
«
the understanding w ith England was purely personal, and
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ttiat Canning "the m alevolent meteor* would be bound by 
no old a sso c ia tio n s with the Eastern States* His fea rs  were 
r e a lis e d  fo r  Canning*s im patient mind had long disagreed  
with the apparent half-heau’ted measures of C astlereagh, 
and he cut England a d r ift  without h e sita tio n  by the energy 
o f his character. The continental p o licy  entered upon 
in 1793, was broken, and, a s  Castlereagh had fe a re d , "th e  
A llia n c e  moved away from B r ita in ".
W ellington went to Verona with C astlereagh 's  
Memorandum a>B his plan of campaign. He found that the 
E astern Question had been tem porarily se ttled  at a prelim­
inary conference at Vienna, and the I ta lia n  question was 
a lso  a m atter for R ussia, A u stria  and Prussia alone and 
had a lso  bean provided fo r  ay the same previous conference, 
there only remained the Spanish problem. With regard  
to Spain i t s e l f ,  there was to be no in terferen ce , and In 
the Spanish C olon ial Question attem pts at a so lu tion  of 
the c o n s t itu tio n a l quarrel were to be made but above a l l  
B r it is h  trade In te r e sts  must be protected . Canning had 
nothing to add to the Memorandum on th ese  su b jects .
On September 14th , 1822, Bathurst forwarded 
to W ellin gton  the in stru ctio n s l e f t  by Castlereagh mentioned 
above -
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" With regard to Spain there aeems nothing to
"add to  or vary in the course o f p o lic y  h ith erto  p^^rsued, 
■ S o lic itu d e  fo r  the s a fe ty  of the Royal Fam ily, observance 
"o f  our own engagements with P ortu gal, and a r ig id  a b stin -  
"enee from any in te r fe r e n c e  in the in tern al a f fa ir s  o f that 
"country must be considered as forming the b asis  o f His 
■M ajesty*s P o lic y " .  1 .
This p o lic y  seemed to tak e the A llia n ce  by 
su rp rise . The p rop osals before the Congress were e ith er  
for French in te r fe r e n c e  or fo r  a general European in te r ­
vention . W ellin gton  opposed both and withdrew from th e  
Conference when th e  proposals were pushed forward. Fear 
of Alexander*s R ussian Arqjy marching across the Confederate 
States and France, led to a r e je c t io n  of the second pro­
p o sitio n  and i t  was l e f t  to Louis XVXII and V i l le le  to 
take the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f a war on th e ir  own shoulders. 
This d efin ed  the r e ia .tio n s  o f B r ita in  and the A llia n c e .
In C an n in g 's w ords:­
" So th ings are g e tt in g  back to a wholesome sta te
"a g a in . Every nation  fo r  I t s e l f  and Bod for us a l l .  The 
"tim e fo r  Aeropagus and the l i f e  o f  i t  is  gone b y ."
" Come what m ay," he wrote to W e llin g to n ,"H is
"M ajesty  w i l l  not be a party to any in te r fe r e n c e ."
This excited  much L ib eral opposition  from 
W ilb e rfo rc e  and h is su p p orters, but Canning had l i t t l e  
sympathy with th e ir  id ea lism .
■ They would have complained that we had taken
"a le a f  from the book of the Holy A llia n c e  i t s e l f ;  th a t  
"we had framed in th e ir  own language a canting p rotest  
"a g a in s t  th e ir  purpose...........In tru th  the p rin cip le  o f non-
1. Wellington's Despatches. Voll, page 286. -157
“ in te rfe ren ce  is  one on whicb. we were already irrevocab ly  
"a t  variance in  opinion with the A l l i e s . . . . o n  the on© 
"hand the A m a n c e  upholds the doctrine o f an European 
"p o l ic e .  This country p ro te sts  against that d o ctrin e . 
“Great B r ita in  haiS come out o f the n eg otia tio n s with a l l  
“the honour due to h er. She has not sprung fo rth  armed 
“ in d ign an tly  but has r e fle c te d  and assumed the a tt itu d e  
“o f J u stice  with an unsheathed sword. 1 was and s t i l l  am 
"an en th u siast fo r  national Independence, but I am not -  
Sand I  hope 1 never s h a ll  be -  an enth usiast in favour of 
S r e v o lu tio n ." 1
His famous renunciation of the A llia n ce  and 
r e c a p itu la tio n  o f a l l  our e f f o r t s  to control i t s  wayward 
f l i g h t  towairds autocracy, was in rep ly  to H etternich who 
had been complaining at the freedom of speeches in 
P arliam ent. The le t t e r  was sent to S ir  Henry W e lle s le y , 
B r it is h  M in iste r , at Vienna on September 16th.
" The pretensions of Prince M etternich in respect
to  th is  country appear to me to be p e r fe c tly  unreasonable. 
“They must be founded upon some strange misconception of 
"our o b lig a t io n s , our in te r e sts  and oizr f  eel l a g s . . .Engl gyid 
“i s  under no o b lig a tio n  to in te r fe r e 'o r  to a s s is t  in in -  
" t e r fe r in g  in the in tern a l concerns of independent n ation s. 
“The s p e c i f ic  engagement to in te rfe re  in France is  an e x -  
“ cep tion  so stu d io u sly  p articu larised  as to prove the r u le .  
“The r u le ,  I take to be that our engagements have r e f e r -  
"ence w holly to the s ta te  o f  a f fa ir s  between nation and 
“n a tio n , not (w ith  the sin g le  exception above stated ) to  
“the a f f a i r s  o f any nation within i t s e l f .  1 thought the 
^public d ec la ra tio n  o f  my predecessor had set th is  
if%uestion e n tir e ly  a t  r e s t . ' ’
R eferrin g  to the place occupied by England 
in the con stru ction  o f  the p o licy  of the A llia n c e ;
1. Canning&s Speeches. V o l. 5 . Page 65.
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■ We protested  at Laibachj we remonstrated a t
!?Verona, ,Our p ro te st was treated as waste paper; our r e -  
*monstranoes mingled with the a ir . Our in flu en ce , i f  i t  is 
“to be maintained abroad, must be secure in the sources of 
"s tre n g th  a t home and the sources o f that strength are in  
"th e  sympathy between the people and the Government, in 
"th e  union of the public sentiment with public counsels;
" in  the rec ip ro ca l confidence and co-operation of the 
"House of Commons with the Crown. Our business is  to pre­
serve the peace o f  the world and therefore the independence 
"o f  the several nations which compose i t .  In r e s is t in g  
"th e  R evolution in a l l  i t s  s ta g e s ...w e  r e s is te d  the s p ir it  
"o f  change to be su re, but we r e s is te d  also  the s p ir i t  of 
•foreign  dom ination ". 1.
What would have been the outcome of the Con­
feren ce had Castlereagh been present? Had the Powers 
taken the lin e which th ey did take the r e s u lt  would pro­
bably have been the same, C astlereagh 's opinions on 
in terven tion , e s p e c ia lly  in Spain, were as decided as 
those o f Canning, though the dramatic and fo r c e fu l manner 
in which the la tte r  m inister made his views public has 
prejudiced opinion g rea tly  in his favour. Nothing was new 
in  h is a ttitu d e  to the A m a n c e , l i t t l e  was new in what 
he said about i t ,  hut he made a d is t in c t  break with C a stle -  
reagh in the way in which he said i t .   ^ I t  is  probable
that C astlereagh would have altered the whole p o licy  of the
1 . F .O ,(A u str ia ) lldiCD No. 4 1 , 
7.
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Congress of Verona by h is  influ en ce over the Tzar and 
M etternich . The A ustrian m in iste r 's  sorrow at his death, 
h is eu logy , and d e je c tio n  when Canning was appointed are 
s u f f ic ie n t  to show that he inteneded a continuance of 
h is  understanding with England, e s p e c ia lly  as Russia and 
France would probably come to an agreement on intervention  
in  Spain,. This M etternich did not want, c e rta in ly  not at 
the price o f lo sin g  C astlereagh*s fr ie n d sh ip .,
When the la tte r  was dead and England's support was not to 
be hoped for he had to pursue an A llia n ce  p o licy  almost as 
la id  down by R ussia. A$[Stria could not stand alone in 
opposing in terven tion .
The A llia n ce  s t i l l  survived. Shorn of i t s  
power, w ith i t s  p rin cip le s  perverted, i t s  endeavours to 
in te r fe r e  d e c is iv e ly  in European m atters were e n tire ly  
in e f fe c t u a l . In 1823 the adoption o f the Monroe doctrine  
by the United S ta te s , together with the recognition  of the 
South American Republics in 1825, by the B r it is h  Government, 
d e a lt  a f i n a l  blow at the u n iversal extension o f the 
A llia n c e  which Alexander had in mind. The Ajnerican declara­
tio n  and Manning's well-known declamation only served
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to turn the lim e -lig h t  away from the people who had r e a lly  
won th e ir  own lib e r ty  before 1 8 i^ . C astiereagh would have 
recognised th eir  independence sooner and in a le s s  osten ta­
tio u s  manner. He would probably have fo r e sta lle d  the 
Monroe d eclara tion  and thus prevented the formation of an 
unfortunate trad i t I o n ,
The A llia n c e  was fu rther undermined by the 
d iv is io n s  on the Eastern Q uestion, and the advent of the 
reaction ary  Tzar N ich olas did l i t t l e  to r e -e s ta b lis h  i t s  
p restige  in  Western e y e s . The London Conference and the 
Peace of Adrianople in 1829 se ttle d  fo r  a moment the d i f f e r ­
ence of opinion of England, A u stria  and Russia as to the 
fa te  of the Turkish and Greek n a tio n s, and i t  was l e f t  to 
the events of the revolu tion ary  year 1850 f in a l ly  to s p lit  
the A llia n c e , A tardy recogn ition  of Louis Philippe by the 
Eastern Powers was follow ed by the L iberal A llian ce  o f  
England and France in favour of the Belgian and P olish  
rev o lu tio n s . W illiam  IV having thrown his crown into the 
"g u tte r *  in 1832, and Palmerston the "Jacobin* being Foreign 
M in ister of the L ib eral P arty , N icholas thought i t  time 
to cast out so infected  a nation from amongst the chosen 
p eop les. A u stria  and Prussia had to follow  and In 1835 
the Holy A llia n ce  was transformed into a Triple A llia n ce  
by the Convention of B e r lin . Once more the d eterm ination
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to in te r fe re  in diatarUed countries was asserted . The 
A llia n c e  had become a d e fin ite  and proclaimed league 
against revolu tion  in Europe. I t  existed u n til the 
Crimean War and i t s  Last united action was the crushing 
of the Hungarian r e v o lt  under Louis Kossuth in 1849.
Then came the Eastern Question again, a wedge sundering 
that much repaired and ever more unstable structure which 
was once A lexander's Most C hristian Brotherhood.
-1 6 2 -
C H A P T E R  IX.
THE FAILURE.
C H A P T E R IX.
THS FAILURE.
During the years from 1815 to 1822 European 
p o lìt ic a  present an ever-increasing tension and f in a lly  
open c o n flic t  between two conceptions, Alexander*b 
Holy  A llian ce  id e a l, a great European Confederation with 
unlimited powers of supervision for maintaining the 
peace and happiness of Europe, and Castlereagh*s European 
Alliance to achieve Jthe same resu lt by the elim ination of 
fr ic t io n  between n ation s. Both these system swere new, 
born during a chaotic period of s t r i fe .  The years of 
the la s t  coa lition s had profoundly a ffected  the outlook 
o f the various countries and time seemed ripe for some 
great advance in international r e la tio n s . The personal 
influence of the leaders on each other, and the 
n ecessity  for co-operation i f  the in teg rity  o f European 
national l i f e  were to be achieved, created for a t ime a 
d esire  for mutual friendship and external assistan ce.
The idea of a future war was unthiakable, and Cast lereagh  
might w ell have imagined that his Conference System to
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perpetuate peace would find strong and lasting support.
Both, schemes fa ile d . The Holy Alliance was 
k ille d  ch ie fly  hy the perversion of the ideals which 
created it  and partly by the unkindly nature of the 
s o i l  which was to nourish i t .  With the passing of the 
memory of the horrors of the war and of the danger from 
France, e g o tistic  considerations regained their control.
A General Alliance was as yet an anachronism, i t s  necessity 
unrealised. Not only did i t  f a i l  i t s e l f  but i t  helped to 
ruin Caatlereagh*s Alliance because to the popular mind 
they were Ident ica l .
Any matter with which the Tsar was connected 
was suspect espec ia l ly  to  Englishmen, Criticism of  him 
in the House was often very b i t t e r .  Brougham on February 
4th. 1825, said
" Can anyone imagine, that, i f  there be a por-
“tlon  of territory  in the neighbourhood of the Emperor 
"Alexander* 8 ,peculiarly suited to his views, he w ill 
'‘not soon be able to discover some fa u lt , to spy out some 
"flaw  in i t s  p o lit ic a l in stitu tion s requiring his in ter- 
"vention , however l i t t l e  these may savour of democracy, 
isupposing i t  even to be a part of the Ottoman Empire 
" i t s e l f " T h e  Three Gentlemen of Verona" 1 fea r ,
"w ill  turn a-deaf ear to argument and set about prying for 
^some imperfection in which to  enter the territory ; and i f  
"they cannot find a way, w ill probably not be very
"scrupulous about making one..........In aJbout three months
"time the Emperor Alexander w i l l  be found one morning at 
"Constantinople, or i f  t t  su it  him, at M inorca . . . . "  1
1, Speeches o f  Henry Lord Brougham. Voi I ,  page 673.
-164-
He died on December 1 s t , 1825, and th ree  
weeks la te r  the Times re fe rs  to his death :­
** But i f  the death of Alexander was an event to
"be deplored b j the great m ajority o f his own people,
"by Europe gen erally  we may suppose i t  w ill be looked at 
•with very d iffe re n t emotions. As the author and master 
•and mover of the Holy A llian ce  the la te  Emperor was a 
"declared foe to the p o li t ic a l  r ig h ts  o f c iv ilis e d  nations, 
"to  the cause of freedom over the whole earth, and to 
"the improvement and happiness o f man as a member of 
"S o c i e t y " . !
These were the sentiments o f the men who were 
upholding the Corn Laws, suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, 
and passing the Six A c ts . They certa in ly  had l i t t le  sym­
pathy with democratic movements either in England,
Naples or Spalh, but they had le s s  sympathy s t i l l  with any 
external Interference. Had Castlereagh been a popular hero 
i t  is  lik e ly  that he would s t i l l  have found Alexander’ s 
supposed in iq u ities too large a burden to be carried  
so c r i t ic a l  an Opposition. As i t  was i t  was a sheer 
im p o ss ib ility . He was successfu l up to 1818 and the end 
o f the Congress of A ix -la -C h ap elle  found his Conference
1 . The Times, Dec, 2 1 s t , 1825,
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th is  time Parliament, and even the Cabinet were less  
complacent. The Opposition was attacking the Holy 
A llian ce  and the Tories were demanding a more insular 
p o licy . Unrest and r io ts  were causing general nervous 
ir r ita t io n , and protests against the European connection 
became more and more aggressive and menacing.
Castlereagh’ s personality was useless to 
stem th is t id e . He was looked upon as the friend and 
advocate of the Tzar, that "foe  to the p o lit ic a l r ights of 
civ ilised  nations”. His friendship with Metternich helped 
to brand him as the "arch enemy of freedom". Domestic 
repression on the part o f his Government strengthened 
th is idea especially  amongst the Opposition whose rancour 
was increased by the fact that "a Whig administration 
seemed as remote as a thaw in Zembla,” Wellington'was 
more reactionary than he, but Wellington was a m ilitary  
commander whose v ictories had made him a public hero. The 
v ic to r ie s  gained by a diplom atist are not such as 
appeal to the popular imagination and the secrecy of his 
successes told against him. The country was convinced 
that he was the English r epresentative of the Holy 
A llian ce and an accomplice in a l l  i t s  doings. As late
System s t i l l  undamaged. H© had gained a l l  he had
w ished fo r  s o l e ly  by h is  dom inating p e r s o n a lity ,  but by
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th is  time Parliament, and even the Cabinet were less  
complacent. The Opposition was attacking the Holy 
A llia n ce  and the Tories were demanding a more insular 
p o lic y . Unrest and r io ts  were causing general nervous 
i r r i t a t io n , and protests against the European connection  
became more and more aggressive and menacing.
C astlereagh 's personality  was useless to 
stem th is  t id e . He was looked upon as the friend and 
advocate of the Tzar, that "fo e  to the p o lit ic a l  r Ig h ts  of 
c iv ilise d  nation s” . His friendsh ip  with Metternich helped 
to brand him as the "arch enemy of freedom*. Domestic 
repression on the part o f his Government strengthened 
th is  idea esp ecia lly  amongst the Opposition whose rancour 
was increased by the fa ct that "a  Whig administration  
seemed as remote as a thaw in Zem bla,” Wellington'was 
more reactionary than he, but W ellington was a m ilitary  
commander whose v ic to ries  had made him a public hero. The 
v ic to r ie s  gained by a diplom atist are not such as 
appeal to the popular imagination ajad the secrecy of his 
successes told  against him. The country was convinced 
that he was the English r epresentative of the Holy 
A llia n ce  and an accomplice in a l l  i t s  doings. As la te  as
System s t i l l  undamaged. He had gained  a i l  he had
w ished f o r  s o l e l y  by h ie  dom inating p e rs o n a lity ^  but by
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1835, in the Introduction to the speeches of Brougham his 
r e s p o n s ib ility  for a i l  the actions of the Alliance is  un­
questioned .
*■ The denial f i r s t ,  the explanation afterwards,
'-'fin a lly  the defence of the Holy A llia n ce , devolved upon 
"one who had been the associate of the three Sovereigns".
His m ediocrity, lim ited capacity and sorry 
discourse are commented upon, the only asset allowed being 
his bold and fe a r le s s  speech.
* His foreign  adm inistration was as destitu te
"o f a l l  merit as p o ssib le . íTo enlarged views guided his 
"conduct, no lib e r a l prin cip les claimed his r e g a r d , . . .I t  is  
" l i t t l e  to be wondered at that those potentates found him 
"ready enough w ith h is defence of their Holy A llian ce ,
"When i t  was attacked in 1816, he began by denying that 
" i t  meant anything at a l l .  He afterwards explained i t  
"away as a mere pledge o f p a c ific  intentions and a new 
"secu rity  for the s t a b i l it y  of the settlem ent made by the 
"Congress of Vienna. F in a lly  when he was compelled to 
"depart from the monstrous prin ciples of the systematic 
"interference to which i t  gave b irth  and to estab lish  
"which i t  was o rig in a lly  intended, he was tardy and cold 
?in the cause of international independence." 1
The p olicy  of the Government at the Congresses 
o f Troppau, Laibach, and Verona are then c r it ic is e d .
Castlereagh*s polilcy is considered to be reactionary "a 
very meagre dissent from the principle of intervention" 
while he was in perfect agreement with the restoration  of 
the old governments in Naples and Spain. The advent of 
Canning is  hailed with d e lig h t.
1 . Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham. Vol. I .  page 634. 167
" H is views mere widely d i f fe r e a t  f  rom t  hose of
"C astlereagh . He was ju s t ly  jea lou s of the whole policy  
•and p r in c ip le s  o f the Holy A llia n c e . He mas disgusted  
“with the c o u r tly  language of the cruel and cra fty  despots 
"who, under the mask o f r e l ig io u s  z e a l , were enslaving  
"Europe, He was indignant at the subservient part in those  
•design» which England had been playing and he resolved  
"to  change it.*^ 1
Brougham's speech fo llow in g  the Introduction
is  an example of the separatism  against which Castlereagh
had stru ggled  so lon g. R eferring to the A ii ia n c e :-
" Let us not deceive o u rse lv es ; th e se d e sp o ts
"can have but l i t t l e  lik in g  towards th is  nation or i t s  
• in s t itu t io n s , more e s p e c ia lly  to our Parliaments and 
"P ress , th erefore  as long as England remains unenslaved 
"she w il l  be the o b je c t  o f th eir  h a tr e d .,.,M y  co-operation  
" i s  with any fa i t h f u l  servant of the Crown who s h a ll , in 
"perform ing h is duty to h is  country, to freedom and to 
!!the w orld, pursue a language that is  tr u ly  B r it is h , pursue 
"a  p o lic y  th at i s  tr u ly  fr e e , and look to fr e e  sta tes  
?as our b est and most natu ral a l l i e s , . ,q .uarrelling with 
^no one,whatever th eir  form of. government, keeping peace 
^but prepared fo r  war, determined to maintain the 
?aupremacy o f  a l l  separate s t a t e s ,"  la
Such op p osition  had C astlereagh 's p olicy  
aroused. And in the fa ce  o f i t  he was alone. Calm, cold, 
and se lf -c o n ta in e d  he had no d is c ip le s , no G astlereagh- 
ite s  to continue h is p o lic y . As the dramatic and passion -
1. Speeches of Henry,Lord Brougham, V o l. I .  page 642. 
la .  I b id , Page 675.
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ate P it t  had found him self alone amongst the cy n ica l, 
polished and prosaic Whig S o ciety  of the 1750’ s ,  so C a stle -  
reagh, a lo o f  and reasoning, was iso la ted  amongst the 
em otional e n th u sia sts  o f h is day. They refused to believe  
in him, f i r s t  in h is a b i l i t y  and, when th is  was proved, 
then in h is  s in c e r ity . They pretended that his calm 
e x te r io r  cloaked a deadly zeal against mankind. Had he 
taken the trou ble  o c c a sio n a lly  to declare his fa ith  in 
N a tio n a lity  or h is  sympathy with the oppressed he might 
have pursued h is  p o lic y  with impunity. But he was too 
honest and too o b s tin a te . He fa ile d  to appreciate either  
N ationalism  or Democracy. N evertheless he helped to 
d estroy  the Slave Trade which to him was cruel and degrad­
in g . He spent a great part of h is l i f e  in freein g  Europe 
from Napoleon, because he was enslaving Europe and upsetting  
the Balance of Power, He rep eated ly  advised Louis XVIII 
and Ferdinand of Spain again st au tocratic  methods. A ll  
th is  was fo r  the sake of Peace, He le t  nothing come in 
the way of that aim and had he had lo f t ie r  and more 
im practicable id e a ls  he could not have achieved the 
re su ltin g  fo r ty  years of peace which were to a great
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extent the outcome of h is  p o lic y .
As a d ip lo m a tic  M etternich had to recognise  
in him h is  eq u al. At A ix -la -C h a p e lle  his energy and 
persu asive powers backed by h is courage and in sigh t en­
abled him to lead the Conference as he wished. In 
th is  sphere h is a b i l i t y  and success are in d u b itab le , 
but i t  i s  h is  statesm anship  which has provoked such h o s t i l ­
i t y ,  and the backbone o f h is  p o licy  was his Conference Sys­
tem, He had succeeded in  saddling England with th is  
when she was s t i l l  befuddled by war, but he knew that i t  
was e s s e n t ia l  to  Europe in her crying need of a la stin g  
peace. He thought he could succeed and so did other im­
p a r t ia l c r i t i c s  such as Adams ihe American Ambassador, who 
saw no reason why the -A lliance should not la s t  for ever.
But in le s s  than two years from his death i t  had been
ousted to make p lace  fo r  Canning's id e a l o f “every State
1
for i t s e l f  and God fo r  us a l l " .
In th is  p o lic y  he was only voicing the 
sentim ents o f the m a jo rity  o f  the E nglish  p u b lic . Limited
1. To B agot, Jan, 3rd . 
P h i l l ip s )  page 2 6 4 .
1864, Confederation of Europe (A lison
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fr a n c h ise  meant a limitect in te r e st  in  p o li t ic s  of any 
kind , and an absence o f  alm ost any knowledge of external 
a f f a i r s  l e f t  opin ion s on fo reig n  p o lic y  to be formed 
c h ie f ly  by t r a d it io n . There was the tr a d it io n  o f l ib e r ty ,  
both n a tio n a l and in d iv id u a l; the tr a d it io n  of s e lf -d e ­
term in ation  for n a tio n s : and the tr a d it io n  of in s u la r ity .  
The overthrov; o f the old s o c ia l  order in England during 
the l a t t e r  h a lf o f  the 18th . century and the aibsequent 
d is t r e s s  and s ta rv a tio n  might make the E n glish  landowners 
support o f l ib e r t y  abroad seem a mockery of h is domestic 
c o n d it io n s , but the Anglo-Saxon s p ir i t  o f l ib e r ty  was to 
su rv iv e  and to emerge triumphant over e x is tin g  f a c t s . ,  
C en tu ries of a lte r n a te  rep ression  and triumphs o f freedom, 
of hard knocks and su c c e ss fu l r e v o lts -  have only served 
to engrave th is  c h a r a c te r is t ic  s t i l l  deeper in the mind 
of the r a c e . The idea o f a Holy A llia n c e  formed by a 
com bination of monarchs without the consent of th eir  
peoples was repugnant to th is  in s t in c t .  I t  savoured 
o f the S tu art tyranny and of France before the Revolu­
t io n , and, except in  extraordinary con d ition s such as the 
la te  war, could not be to le r a te d . Even benevolent despot­
ism was now outworn and when the d e sire  o f rep ressin g
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popular r e v o lu tio n s  became o f paramount importance to thè 
A llia n c e  the fe e lin g  o f  q^uiescent disapproval changed to  
a c t iv e  d i s l i k e .
Contempt fo r  a l l  things foreign  was the ch ief  
fa c to r  in the renewed d e sire  for in s u la r ity . Prejudice  
a g a in st  fo r e ig n  methods and foreign  governments and a 
g en era l fe e l in g  o f d i s t r u s t ,  e s p e c ia lly  o f Russian 
am b itio n , moved both country and Government a lik e . This 
d isd a in  and su sp ic io n  was now aggravated by the increasing  
commercial r iv a lr y . The d esire  to con tro l or to gain a 
fo o t in g  in p a r tic u la r  markets overseas was a considerable  
in c e n tiv e  to the p o lic y  o f  turning away from Europe. 
England was fo r  a short time the so le  factory  of the 
world and custom ers in South America must not be offended 
even though a cleavage in  the European Confederation  
should r e s u l t ,
T his cleavage was in e v ita b le  in the circum­
s ta n c e s , but i t  would have needed more imagination than 
C astlereagh  possessed to have foreseen  the fa ilu r e  and 
probed i t s  ca u ses. U nlike the present League o f N ations, 
i t  had no d e f in it e  c o n s titu tio n  and no fixed occasions for
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reunion. Too much was l e f t  to the whims of monarchs and 
statesm en who them selves might have hut tra n sito ry  power. 
The great motive fo r c e s -o f  the century, n a tio n a lity  and 
democracy, were as y et dormant o r , i f  a c tiv e , suppressed 
by the A llia n c e  which ia te r  they were to overwhelm. There 
was no popular support in any country and C astlereagh 's  
in te rn a l rep re ssio n  made the A llia n c e  appear as an in stru ­
ment fpr extern a l r e p r e s s io n . D esp ite  the S ix  Acts and 
h is  hatred of R adicalism  h is  p ro te sts  against th is  use of 
the A llia n c e  were continuous, emphatic and genuine, but 
whereas he h im self could be blind to such interferen ce  
as was flanctioned a t  Troppau, in order to preserve t he Con­
ference System at Verona, as he had hoped, yet the general 
p u b lic  could not fo r g e t . F in a lly  the le sse r  Powers would 
not have been content to have stayed out in the co ld , 
n eith er could the Eastern Question have been eith er  
shelved or solved in a manner s a t is fa c to r y  to a l l  the 
Powers. So in s p ite  o f  C a stie re a g h 's  diplom atic genius 
and u tte r  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  in the cause of peace, yet his  
system was bound to  f a i l ,  but in sp ite  o f i t s  fa ilu r e  i t  
helped to  keep Europe fr e e  frommwars for fo rty  years. ■
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Since tiien the d e f in it io n  o f n a tio n a l fr o n t ie r s , a growing 
d is lik e  o f armaments, the growth of democracy with i t s  
greater in te r e s t  in  and comprehension o f foreign  p o l i t i c s ,  
the commercial interdependence of n a tio n s , and rapid tra n s­
port and communications have removed much of the undergrowth 
which held up the p ioneer and the way i s  c learer for the 
present League.
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